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1Introduction




This book makes the scandalous claim that queer discourse has run its course, its project made obsolete by the full elaboration of its own logic. Far from signalling the demise of anti-
homophobic criticism, however, the end of queer offers an occasion to 
rethink the relation between sexuality and politics. Via a critical return 
to Marxism and psychoanalysis (Freud and Lacan), I argue that the way 
to implant sexuality in the field of political antagonism is paradoxically 
to abandon the exhausted project of sexuality’s politicisation. 
There are two principal premises from which I develop each chapter’s 
discussion. First: queer theory was set in motion by transformative 
developments in Anglo-American sexuality theory in the early 1990s, 
inspired by decidedly post-Marxist currents in what is generally known 
as poststructuralism. Derived from these currents, the hegemonic 
assumptions of queer theory have proven to be irreconcilable with the 
premises of a generically emancipatory politics. Second: queer’s demise 
presents a strategic opportunity to reconceive how we think about 
sexuality and politics. Indeed, a quite paradoxical truth is exposed. The 
sexual politics of both feminism and queer theory generally insist that 
sex is inherently political. I argue instead that the reverse contention – 
that politics is inherently sexual – inserts sexuality immanently within 
the field of political antagonism. By sexualising the political, it becomes 
possible to wrest sexuality discourse from its various minoritarianisms, 
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opening it up to a genuinely universal emancipatory struggle beyond 
the reach of capitalism’s complicity with the continuing proliferation 
and deconstruction of sexual and gender identities. My alternative 
thesis further exposes the underwhelming political implications of 
sexuality, as queer theory has generally understood this term – that is, 
as a discourse in the vague sense of the social constructionists and the 
more carefully articulated sense of Michel Foucault’s poststructuralist 
historicisation.
Some context: on the left today, one hears from time to time that 
the gay and lesbian movements of the 1960s and 1970s featured a 
broader political horizon, linked to their organic relation to feminism 
and the New Left, than the more lifestyle-oriented, theoreticist and 
narrowly defined interests of the more recent queer agendas. There 
were remnants of authentic socialist praxis among members of the first 
post-Stonewall generation, and it’s still possible to find work by writers 
who remain faithful to varying degrees to this seminal moment.1 Even 
in the best-case scenarios, by contrast, poststructuralist queers tend 
merely to add ‘class’ to the end of their long list of preferred categories 
of social difference to which they lend their reformist attention. 
But there is a second reality, much more paradoxical, which has been 
left largely unobserved to this day. Whereas previously politicised gay 
and lesbian communities, founded on generally unproblematised ideas 
of (minority) sexual identity, saw inherent links between their own 
ambitions and those of other oppressed constituencies (in particular 
straight women and people of colour), more recent queer writers and 
activists, asserting identity’s inherently normative and exclusionary 
workings, have been comparatively self-concerned, reluctant to forge 
alliances with groups that don’t define themselves in sexual terms. This 
has remained the case despite the often universalising reach of their 
claims (i.e. everyone is actually or potentially queer). To be sure, queer 
theory has been more interested in complex theoretical articulations 
and transgressing presumptive identity categories, than in thinking 
through its relation to the historical social movements that made queer 
possible in the first instance.
Counterintuitively, the subversion of sexual identity has turned the 
sexually marginal inward. With few exceptions, the queer contingent 
has been less willing than its predecessors to articulate its concerns 
to those of other groups, particularly geopolitically distant ones 
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whose marginality takes a more conventionally material, that is to say 
socioeconomic, form. As a theoretical discourse, the queer project has 
primarily addressed itself to an Anglo-American academic readership. 
More specifically, particularly during its early history, it has been 
situated in elite centres of academic capital in the United States. For 
these reasons, it should hardly come as a surprise that queer discourse 
in general reflects the interests and investments of this group of 
privileged academics and students in the global North. 
The advent of queer saw a project coupling minority sexual identity 
with a wide-reaching emancipatory political agenda, cede ground to 
an approach that wed sexual identity’s immanent subversion and a 
vision of the universal implications of queerness with an issue- and 
lifestyle-oriented micro-level politics, alarmingly distanced from the 
critique of capitalism or any programme for thoroughgoing social 
change. Far from forging broad political alliances, the project of 
identity’s subversion has had the unanticipated effect of strengthening 
the boundaries that separate a given identity, however problematised 
or deconstructed, from the wider social field. Meanwhile, in the 
world of academic publishing, queer studies and queer theory are 
intellectually dead discourses. Excluding for the time being its elite 
theoretical vanguard, recent queer textual production can be divided 
into two moribund categories: introductions and textbooks that repeat 
old mantras from the 1990s, and a range of largely untheorised studies 
of cultural phenomena featuring non-normative sexual content, 
otherwise fully conventional in scope and aim.2
For its part, the vanguard of queer theory has most recently turned 
its attention to what we might loosely call the negative. Shame, 
impersonality, the antisocial and ‘the end of sex’ are the new fashionable 
themes.3 But these emergent tropes are still marked by the discourse’s 
inherent contradiction. This contradiction can be traced all the way 
back to queer’s dawning moment, when Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick asked 
if homosexuality is of universal or particular concern. In light of queer’s 
subsequent history, we can ask: is sexuality inherently, universally, 
queer? Or should it rather name a distinguished minority, an elite 
experimental constituency pushing the boundaries of community, 
social life, politics and subjectivity?4 
This book suggests that these questions are no longer productive 
because they assume a false dilemma. If the former is the case, then 
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we lack a rationale for queer’s existence as a special field of inquiry 
and, in any event, we already know all about it from Freud’s strong 
theses about a constitutive bisexuality in the subject, and the drive’s 
resistance to reproductive normalisation.5 Even more importantly, on 
the level of theoretical practice, the premise of queer universality – 
the idea that sexuality is inherently queer – demonstrates against its 
own intentions how sexuality is an inauspicious starting point for a 
project invested in genuine social change, one which addresses itself to 
a humanity generically conceived. This is so because the universality 
premise implicitly desexualises expressions of political interest that 
don’t make explicit reference to sex. In other words, sexual politics is 
viewed as a subspecies of a generic politics, which implies unhelpfully 
that there’s a politics that has nothing to do with the libido. For their 
part, artists and critics who opt for the alternative minoritising option 
have produced texts that are not without interest. Because they adopt 
a mode of aesthetic and experiential analysis limited to merely sexual 
or erotic utopian horizons, however, work in this mode fails to qualify 
as political in any genuine, that is to say socialist, sense of the term. 
After Queer Theory foregrounds the strong, if not absolute, 
determination of sexual identities by economically structured social 
relations. Sexual identities, however deconstructed or problematised, 
are always in a significant sense responses to developments in the 
relations of capital. This is to say that the discourses of sexuality and 
sexual identity are necessarily ideological. As Bolshevik feminist 
Alexandra Kollontai argued with respect to women, class antagonism 
has always-already divided the ‘queer community’ from itself. Or, perhaps 
more accurately, the identification of class antagonism places the 
queer on the side of what we used to call the bourgeoisie. Class is a 
diagonal difference that cuts through all the other differences – with 
the exception of sexual difference – that queer theory and poststruc-
turalism have alternatively valorised. 
Each of the chapters that follows this introduction seizes upon a 
significant aspect of the queer argument, exposing its inconsisten-
cies and problematic political assumptions. Each then begins to 
propose challenging alternatives inspired by a critical return to the 
psychoanalytic and Marxist traditions. Although the elaboration of 
these alternatives has barely begun, After Queer Theory aims to clear the 
terrain for a fresh start. It looks forward to the day when the concern 
Penney T02732 01 text   4 08/10/2013   08:16
introduction:  after queer theory
5
for sexuality in cultural and political studies is wedded to a genuinely 
emancipatory and transformative vision of anti and post-capitalist 
social change.
Six Points
The argument this book develops can be summarised in the form 
of six main theses. Each is outlined below, followed by a condensed 
exposition. I revisit each argument in more detailed and complex 
ways throughout the rest of the book. Everything relates back in one 
way or another to these key points. Some readers may wish to return 
periodically to this section as they work their way through. 
1. All the valuable points queer theory has made about human sexuality 
were previously made by Freud and developed in (aspects of ) the 
psychoanalytic tradition. For instance, the foundational claim that 
queer theory ‘politicizes sex, gender and sexuality in a way that 
severs the notion of identity from any stable reference points’6 fails to 
add substantial insight to the argument of Three Essays on the Theory 
of Sexuality. In fact, Freud’s theory is more radical than at least this 
particular queer iteration. Rather than assume that sexual identities 
slide promiscuously and unpredictably from one ‘reference point’ to 
another, psychoanalysis posits instead that sex is coterminous with 
the immanent subversion of each and every such point. Sex is the 
obscene shadow of every social identity; it presents the constant threat 
of collapse into nonsense, non-meaning. 
2. The promise of queer universalism – that everyone is (potentially) 
queer – is compromised by both an identitarian gesture of self-privileging 
and a reference, tending towards paranoia, to the quasi-omnipotence of 
heterosexism or ‘heteronormativity’. To rationalise its distinct existence, 
queer generically references a style or aesthetic, a (non)identity, a 
set of affects or feelings, a politics, or a mode of sociality or relation, 
which it then routinely differentiates from an idealised and hostile 
adversary, the social and psychical purchase of which is unhelpfully 
exaggerated. To be clear, I don’t wish to minimise the sometimes 
lethal effects of homophobia. The point is rather that the premise of 
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a heteronormativity embedded in the very fabric of culture, society, 
‘power’, or subject production is both incorrect and self-defeating. 
Here again, psychoanalysis is more instructive. It first takes the 
homosexual current of the libido as such as a foundational and universal 
fact of psychic life, and then sets out to analyse its manifold vicissitudes. 
There is no non-libidinal, non-sexual obstacle to homosexuality. The 
corollary of this is that any such obstacle is already homosexual. 
Further, the psychoanalytic claim that sexuality is neither primarily 
reproductive nor naturally heterosexual is generic in nature. There’s 
no such thing as reproductive or fully heterosexual – ‘normal’ – sex. 
In this precise sense, sex as such is queer and, despite the protestations 
and asceticisms of various moralistic would-be legislators, there’s no 
actually existing normality against which it might be contrasted. Sex is 
always-already transgression of the norm. This also implies that there’s 
no such thing as (a particular) ‘transgressive sexuality’. As a result, the 
injunction to (be) queer tends to have perversely normalising effects. 
This is the case, for example, with the various queer vangardisms that 
wish to normalise promiscuity, inveigh against same-sex marriage, 
or impose regimes of aesthetically-conceived forms of alternative 
social being.
3. No positive social or political claim can be made in the name of queer 
when queer is defined, as above, as the generic real of sex. Further, there 
is nothing in this claim that in any way hinders the war against 
homophobia, which should and will continue. The proper way to 
pursue the intersection of sex and politics is to inquire after the 
libidinal logic, the unconscious fantasies, that buttress particular 
political judgments and desires. 
Speculatively, the imperative is to theorise and instantiate new 
forms of liberatory sublimation. As Alain Badiou has forcefully 
argued, the truths from which can be deduced the project of human 
emancipation from oppression and inequality are generic, universal in 
their address.7 Generic humanity is sexed (sexué, as the French say), 
and in this precise sense only, queer. The corollary of this is that political 
programmes that fail to acknowledge human sexuality in this way (for 
example, programmes that normalise heterosexuality and legislate 
against ‘deviations’) are fundamentally illegitimate, and can be shown 
to be illegitimate without arduous effort. 
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4. There can be no meaningful, specifically sexual, utopianism from an 
authentic psychoanalytic perspective. This doesn’t imply that properly 
political utopias of all kinds are inherently and always undesirable. 
Although his misinformed polemic against psychoanalysis continues 
to have disastrous effects on the study of sexuality, Foucault was well 
placed historically to draw the lesson of the various ill-fated 1960s 
and 1970s lifestyle vanguardisms. Utopianisms centred on erotic 
subjectivity remain without exception tied to liberal or libertarian 
individualisms, which can only detract from a meaningfully political 
horizon of social transformation. 
5. Properly formulated, the psychoanalytic idea of sexual difference is 
neither heterosexist nor anti-feminist. The various anti-oedipal and 
gender theory arguments animate a wish-fulfilment fantasy of infinite 
sexual and gender possibilities, which solves only a false problem. For 
psychoanalysis, there are only two possibilities for sexuation, for failing 
to achieve a sexual identity. That these possibilities are masculine and 
feminine in no way establishes a sexual relation, nor does it impose 
a putative ‘compulsory heterosexuality’. There is no necessary 
connection between either biological and psychical sex, or psychical 
sex – masculine or feminine – and the biological sex of one’s partner(s). 
Usually taken to mean that men and women are neither sexually 
complementary nor naturally inclined to one another, Lacan’s dictum 
‘there is no sexual relation’ must inevitably relate to same-sex partners 
also. Same-sex partners are neither more nor less naturally suited to 
one another than their heterosexual counterparts. Freud was right to 
insist that there are fundamental psychical differences between the 
sexes, and in this precise sense only they’re unequal. This inequality, 
however, carries no necessary political or social consequences. Nor is it 
even necessarily hostile to programmes based on the feminist principle 
of ‘equality between the sexes’, which usually acknowledge anyway 
that sexual equality is contingent on the recognition of particular 
differences between the sexes, however these are conceived.
6. The recent queer interests in affect and the negative are politically 
inadequate. The affective turn is apolitical and narcissistic because it 
ignores the psychoanalytic insight that affect – with the exception of 
anxiety – is always connected to an unconscious object that has been 
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disguised or distorted in order to break the barrier of repression. 
Unanalysed, affect is fundamentally a mechanism of defence. For its 
part, the so-called antisocial thesis in queer theory is desirable to the 
extent that it lays bare the connection between, on the one hand, the 
drive’s involuted, nonsocial, incommunicable qualities and, on the 
other, the constitutive antagonism of the social, that is the inability of 
the social world to organise itself into a consistent, unbroken whole. 
The antisocial current has also provided a refreshing alternative 
to the bourgeois and assimilationist trajectory of the (post) gay 
movements, at least to the extent that we discount the bourgeois, 
primarily American, academic milieu to which its purchase has largely 
been limited. Politically, however, both tendencies leave much to be 
desired. The cult of the death drive offers only a decadent nihilism, 
which casts any and all references to futurity as abstractly reactionary.8 
Alternatively, when antisocial queer theory acknowledges the 
need for a dialectical counterpart to the negative, it produces only 
elitist programmes for vanguard social life or alternative aesthetic 
programmes with political implications that are ambiguous at 
best. Any politically significant discourse on social negativity must 
acknowledge its relation not only to psychical antagonism, but also 
to the antagonisms of capitalism, both internal and external. The 
internal antagonisms pertain to how capitalism’s conflict with itself 
creates a dependency on crisis, imperialism and war; the external to 
how capitalism necessarily produces a class conflict, on which it must 
expend tremendous resources in order to disguise its workings from 
the oppressed. 
The following five chapters offer detailed examinations of specific 
sites of discourse that raise central questions concerning the relation 
of queer discourse to the Marxist and psychoanalytic traditions. Each 
chapter makes suggestions about how the anti-homophobic project 
can integrate itself with a new political discourse that extends beyond 
the limits of the queer problematic. The concluding chapter resumes 
where the first chapter leaves off: it examines one final thematic in 
contemporary queer discourse – so-called antisocial queer theory – 
and elaborates on the parameters of a new way of thinking about the 
place of sexuality in transformative political thought.
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Currents of Queer
This first chapter consists of four sections, each of which takes on a key emergent tendency in the most recent queer-theoretical work. In each discussion, I try to articulate the argument and 
its significance, offer criticisms from both psychoanalytic and Marxist 
perspectives, and then suggest alternative avenues of interrogation, 
which go beyond the limits of queer discourse as I see it. 
The main trends I consider are the resurgence of phenomenology, 
the inquiry into affect or emotion, and finally the discourse of 
‘homonationalism’. A further emergent trend of today, the so-called 
antisocial turn, is taken on and contextualised in the concluding 
chapter. By necessity not without an arbitrary quality, the selection 
of texts aims to be representative rather than exhaustive, both with 
respect to each considered author’s body of work and the queer theory 
field in general. Throughout, I attempt to relate the author’s most 
foundational assumptions to particular illuminating details of their 
discussion as a means of clarifying the concrete political implications 
of general theoretical ideas. In the first section, I consider a recent 
example of the queer discourse on identity and community, perhaps 
its most consistent and dominant thematic. The example gains in 
significance in light of its concern for the British, rather than the 
hegemonic American, political context.
Community and the Subversion of Identity
Arguably, the most paradigmatic gesture of queer theory since its 
inception has been to insist that gender and/or sexuality subvert claims 
to identity. Pre-queer activists and critics tended to assume that an idea 
of gay or lesbian identity was required in order to resist the pathologi-
sation of non-normative sexualities, make claims for civil rights, and 
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gain legal protection from discrimination. With the deconstructionist 
and Foucaultian turns of queer theory, however, the emphasis shifted 
to considerations of how all social identities, even minority ones, are 
unstable social constructions and/or productions of power, viewed 
as ‘discourse’. In Foucault’s later work, power carries a disciplinary 
function, and in this precise sense is always normative. In the shadow 
of latently homicidal state policies developed in the early days of the 
HIV/AIDS crisis, queer theory began to consider all invocations of 
gay and lesbian identity and citizenship as more or less inherently 
oppressive. This tendency developed in conjunction with a poststruc-
turalist feminist theory that similarly began to consider all invocations 
of ‘woman’ as essentially exclusive of ‘other’ women, in particular 
lesbians and women of colour. Many queer authors justifiably 
enlisted psychoanalysis to support the claim that sexual identities and 
orientations are never stable because they are subordinated, as Freud 
consistently claimed, to a primary psychical bisexuality. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the thesis that sexuality is antithetical 
to identity makes it impossible to ground a restricted notion of 
community on sex. In other words, it’s impossible to ground a notion 
of community on queer, if queer is what stops you from identifying any 
quality its members might share. If everyone is potentially queer, then 
there are no definite exclusions by means of which that community 
might be defined against society, or the people, at large. And yet, it’s 
impossible to deny that wide swathes of queer theory manage to do 
just that, even when it explicitly endorses the position that sex subverts 
any and all identity claims. 
At the root of queer-theoretical production lies an unrecognised 
contradiction. Queer insists that the gay and lesbian identities of 
previous generations functioned in an unacknowledged normative 
way, implicitly excluding men and women of colour, transsexuals, 
transvestites, femme lesbians, butch fags, the poor and any other 
identifiable marginalised group or subgroup. On its more theoretical 
register, however, queer claims that sex disturbs attempts made by 
language, discourse, the ego or power to fix identity to stable terms 
of reference. But even the most sophisticated queer theorists rely on 
an implicit distinction between what is queer and what is normative, 
the latter often rendered as ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ or ‘the 
heterosexual matrix’, for instance.1 Even the distinction queer tries 
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to make between itself and its more fixed generational predecessors 
requires the most fundamental gesture of identity construction, 
namely differentiation from an ‘other’. After all, it’s much easier to 
define yourself by specifying what you aren’t than by identifying 
essential qualities that don’t depend on a contrast with something else. 
In short, queer wants to subvert identity and have it too. It qualifies 
queer as groundless as a means of compensating for prior political 
blind spots, while at the same time positing a queer ground defined 
against a ‘normativity’, the status of which is never clearly defined. 
Now, the introduction to a relatively recent UK-published queer 
theory reader can serve as an example of this persistence of identity and 
community in queer work. Authored by Iain Morland and Annabelle 
Willox, the essay also emblematises the kind of false politicisation 
of sexuality that I set out to challenge in this book. I should signal 
here that I chose this particular text because it concisely expresses the 
difficulties that underlie the logic of queer discourse’s approach to the 
identity and community issue. The essay also gains in importance to 
the considerable extent that the political moves its argument makes 
are generally characteristic of dominant queer discourse as a whole. 
Morland and Willox’s discussion pivots around former UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s response to a spate of nasty homophobic hate 
crimes, which took place in London in April 1999. The central event 
was a bomb attack at the Admiral Duncan pub, an establishment in 
Old Compton Road, historic centre of gay life in west-central London’s 
Soho district. The perpetrator of a whole series of attacks designed to 
stir up homophobic and ethnic resentments, known neo-Nazi David 
Copeland detonated a nail bomb in the pub, killing three people and 
wounding about 70 others. In conjunction with the Prince of Wales’s 
visit to the attack’s survivors, Blair made a public statement condemning 
the anti-gay violence that plagued Britain that spring. ‘When the gay 
community is attacked and innocent people are murdered’, Blair 
proclaimed, ‘all the good people of Britain, whatever their race, their 
lifestyle, their class unite in revulsion and determination to bring the 
evil people to justice’.2 
To all appearances, the Blair statement was designed to teach a 
version of the lesson of universalism that queer theory itself, at least 
in certain of its iterations, wants to teach: homosexuality, as well 
as the prejudice against it, should be of concern to everyone, not 
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just the ‘community’ to which Blair’s words also allude. The prime 
ministerial proclamation rests on the assumption that even though 
homophobic violence is targeted against a particular group of people, 
the implications of this violence, and therefore the ethical duty to 
speak out against it, pertain to everyone equally. Further, this remains 
the case in spite of the various differences, including those of sexuality 
(the ‘lifestyles’ cited by Blair), that distinguish us from one another. 
Without question, Tony Blair has been among the most cynical and 
hypocritical world leaders of recent memory, guilty in particular of 
deliberately misleading the British public in order speciously to justify 
a nasty and racist neo-imperialist war. But this aspect of Blair’s politics 
is not what’s of interest here. Rather, I wish to examine details of the 
critical view of Blair’s statement expressed by Morland and Willox. 
They begin by granting the argument that the statement ‘would 
seem to mark the success of queer activism’ because it gives voice to 
‘the official view that the gay community [is] a respectable minority’ 
(3), albeit one, I’ve already noted, whose victimisation should be of 
concern to all. In light of the anti-identitarian claims of queer theory, 
one might reasonably assume that the editors’ difficulty with Blair’s 
statement would lie in what might be construed as a simplistic or 
essentialist reference to a ‘gay community’. Indeed, many queer 
theorists might justifiably want to argue that the seemingly innocuous 
phrase marginalises lesbians and/or women, not to mention all the 
other varieties of sexual nonconformity on which the queer movement 
has striven to shed light. 
Curiously, however, the authors’ criticism raises instead questions 
of invisibility and sexual erasure. On the one hand, Morland and 
Willox argue that Blair’s reference to a gay community subsumes the 
apparently unpalatable realities of gay sexual life under a putatively 
less offensive reference to ‘lifestyles’. In other words, the phrase ‘gay 
community’ works to dissimulate from a potentially hostile public 
what gays actually do with one another in bed. On the other hand, 
however, Morland and Willox use the problematic term themselves 
when they affirm in the next paragraph that ‘in an important sense 
queer politics is about shared lifestyles’. They even go as far as to 
attribute ambivalence to Blair’s statement concerning whether or not 
‘the killing of homosexuals should incite revulsion’ (3), basing this 
judgment on what is very likely a misreading of what he said. Without 
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providing contextual evidence to support their interpretation, the 
editors make the rather paranoid assumption that Blair’s reference to 
‘innocent victims’ is meant to include only the heterosexual dead. 
In any case, the fact that Blair’s statement in the editors’ view is 
‘couched in terms of everything but sexuality’ poses unanswered, 
and perhaps unanswerable, political questions about ‘a diversity 
of identities’ and ‘a cultural diversity that surpasses the notion of 
identity’. They conclude their discussion with a question: ‘Is queer still 
queer, and is it important for “queerness” to refer always to the same 
communities, acts, and beliefs?’ (3). These last formulations confusedly 
convey the full extent of queer theory’s underlying ambivalence 
towards the idea of community. Arguably, ‘gay community’ or ‘queer 
community’ may indeed attenuate the potentially corrosive force of 
sexuality on specifically heterosexist interests, the former perhaps 
more than the latter. Further, such constructs provide tangible targets 
in the social world for homophobic violence which, as the London 
attacks demonstrate, routinely hit even persons who don’t identify as 
homosexual or queer. All the same, queer discourse clings anxiously, 
if ironically, to the idea of an ‘us’, apparently unable to let go of the 
notion despite the lack of convincing political or theoretical arguments 
in its favour. 
This curious ambivalence becomes even more pronounced as 
Morland and Willox’s own analysis of the bombing shows that the 
target of homophobic violence isn’t really even a community in the 
sense in which they use the term. The authors’ laudable insistence on 
foregrounding the unsettling social impact of the very notion of queer 
sex suggests that anti-gay violence results from a fantasy of an ‘other’ 
jouissance, which both fascinates and repels. From the psychoanalytic 
perspective, the gay pub, or even the ‘gay community’, is a material 
or social stand-in for a properly psychical object – that is to say, the 
traumatic object of enjoyment that the ego attempts to jettison from 
consciousness with the associated forces of repression and idealisation. 
It doesn’t require an investment in psychoanalysis to think that by 
detonating the bomb, the perpetrator seeks unknowingly to cleanse 
himself of his own unconscious ‘queer’ sexual fantasies. Indeed, 
queer universalism can be put in this instance to a different use, more 
subversive than its mobilisation in queer theory itself. Queer inheres 
most essentially in the subject who seeks to destroy it, through acts 
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of homophobic violence or pseudo-therapeutic processes of hetero-
sexualisation, for instance. Queer becomes truly universal precisely at 
the moment when it’s targeted for elimination as a perverse, impure, 
community-destroying anomaly. Paradoxically, the universal reach of 
queer is only underscored by its motivation of the very ‘acting out’ that 
seeks to eradicate it. 
In this light, it’s hardly coincidental that the homophobic bomber 
was also a neo-Nazi racist. Racism, too, targets an object that can’t be 
equated with persons or communities. Rather, racism is set in motion 
by fantasy perceptions of ethnicised and racialised enjoyments; 
constructions of ‘other’ satisfactions associated with incomprehensi-
ble languages, spiced or differently spiced foods, traditional collective 
customs and rituals, and the like. Or, more precisely put, such 
fantasies are projections onto the Other of the subject’s own disavowed 
enjoyments, which can be conveniently rejected by the ego as foreign 
and obscene. Marxism surely adds to this line of analysis the insight 
that such fantasy perceptions are often directed across the traumatic 
psychosocial dividing line of class. 
The general theoretical point to be made in this context for anti-
homophobic work is that a notion of a gay community, or even of 
the queer person, isn’t required to denounce, as of course one must, 
symptomatic acts of homophobic violence. Indeed, the fact that a 
bomb going off in a queer establishment will almost always impact 
heterosexual persons as well betrays the disjunction between the true 
cause or object of homophobic violence – a psychical object of fantasy 
– and the actual, ‘real-life’ persons whom it affects. The anti-identi-
tarian logic of queer theory, the logic it so routinely fails to follow to 
its proper conclusion, should ultimately imply that the queer person, 
with his or her distinguishing marks of lesbian, gay or transsexual 
jouissance, exists only in the homophobe’s head. Never, however, 
does queer theory entertain the corollary that both the idea of a ‘gay/
queer community’, and the ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ that forms 
its negative ground, might in fact exacerbate, rather than attenuate, 
homophobic passion. 
In the final analysis, however, the most basic and egregious problem 
with the Morland and Willox essay lies in its misidentification of 
the political. As for much of queer theory, politics for these authors 
signifies only the ambivalent struggle with notions of community 
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and identity, as well as the proclamation of their immanent, but 
nonetheless provisional, subversion. As we’ve considered, the authors 
reproach Blair’s speech for whitewashing the obscene realities of gay 
sex with politically correct talk of a multiplicity of lifestyles. At the next 
moment, however, they’re embracing an idea of politics as lifestyle, 
and then inventing a provisional notion of community to give it form. 
Like so much of queer theory, their discourse never extends beyond the 
innocuous horizon of lifestyle politics, with its implicit or unconscious 
call to the Other for recognition, for sanction, for integration with 
dominant social norms. This call persists beneath what appears, and 
is consciously intended, as its opposite. After all, it’s not at all clear 
why it would be so important for queer politics that Tony Blair openly 
disclose what lesbians, for example, do in bed, either on the occasion 
of the commemoration of an act of homophobic violence or, for that 
matter, at any other time. 
Psychoanalytically, this brand of queer pseudo-politics can be 
linked to an anxiety arising out of the impossibility of speaking sexual 
experience, of transcribing the real of sex into the order of the signifier. 
For Lacan, sex signals the disjunction between jouissance – that is, the 
ecstatic experience of the body – and what can be articulated logically 
in language, in speech, and therefore consciously known. That this 
disjunction is indifferent to what is understood as sexual orientation 
– although not to sexual difference, but that’s another story3 – is but a 
further indication that sexual identity can’t form the basis for political 
subjectivation, that is for a truth procedure in Alain Badiou’s sense 
of the phrase. Because both queers and non-queers alike experience 
it ‘in the defiles of the signifier’,4 as Lacan put it, sexuality can’t be 
directly politicised. But this statement isn’t tantamount to claiming 
that sex is entirely severed from politics. Rather, sex is what haunts 
the expression of all political judgment. It’s the excess that estranges 
political articulation from itself; the surplus showing that political 
judgments always contain latent sexual significance. 
And from the perspective of Marxism, queer politics fails because 
the difference upon which it rests (queer vs ‘heteronormative’) carries 
no necessary relation to class antagonism, to the mode of production 
in its determination of the relations of capital. Non-heterosexuals are 
widely distributed across the range of material privilege. In fact, what’s 
so politically disconcerting about queer is the largely academic and 
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upper-middle-class origin of so much of the discourse, not to mention 
its serious lack of geopolitical mobility and awareness. To be sure, there 
is no doubt that in the liberal and ‘post-oedipal’ global North, there are 
concrete material advantages to be gained from engaging in the queer 
lifestyle of which Morland and Willox speak. The queer is not only 
unburdened by conventional family obligations or the monogamous 
relationship. Also, the lifestyle values he or she embraces are inherently 
synchronous with the flexibility, mobility and precariousness on which 
contemporary capitalism so exploitatively thrives. 
Phenomenally Queer
One of the better-known queer theory figures based in the UK, Sara 
Ahmed has made a substantive contribution to one of the discourse’s 
newer and alternative currents. Ahmed draws from the phenomeno-
logical tradition in philosophy, more specifically from three of its usual 
suspects: Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Although Elizabeth 
Grosz’s writing can be credited for initially charting this direction,5 I’ve 
chosen to focus instead on a selection from Ahmed’s work for three, 
somewhat arbitrary, reasons: its contemporaneousness, its emergence 
from outside the American academic context, and the clarity with 
which it brings forward numerous problems in contemporary queer 
theory as I see it. 
Ahmed is interested in what phenomenology might have to say 
about the idea of orientation. She premises her elaborations on 
an understanding of space which, viewed from the psychoanalytic 
perspective, fails to take account of the effects of the unconscious. But 
the difficulty with Ahmed’s work isn’t merely theoretical in nature. 
Indeed, the phenomenological assumptions that ground her argument 
are characteristic of much hegemonic queer theory, the political 
implications of which I find deeply problematic. Counterintuitive 
though it may sound, queer phenomenology effects a desexualisation 
of cultural analysis, which has the strange consequence of rendering 
banal both the term ‘queer’ and politics as such. In line with mainstream 
opinion, Ahmed’s view of queer politics remains, like Morland and 
Willox’s, entirely within the horizon of lifestyle choices. For this 
reason, her discourse presents no significant threat to the status quo, 
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including in particular the forces of heterosexism that her own analysis 
sets out to attack. 
Ahmed inquires after the implications of the phenomenologi-
cal current for today’s discourse of sexual orientation, taking into 
consideration that this latter term carries a quite particular meaning 
in the philosophical tradition. In very general terms, phenomenology 
sets out to offer an alternative to the Platonic and Cartesian traditions 
in philosophy which, notoriously for some, privilege the abstract 
realm of the idea above the data of sensation and perception. Ahmed 
seeks to appropriate for the study of queer bodies and sexualities ideas 
from phenomenology concerning how human perception relates to its 
objects through the intentionality of consciousness – the orientation 
of consciousness, that is to say, in space and time. Potentially, at least, 
the queer subject for Ahmed has the capacity to orient him or herself 
within these mediums in counterhegemonic or non-normative ways. 
Further, this alternative orientation – disorientation, actually – carries, 
for her, a significance she describes as political. ‘If orientation is a 
matter of how we reside in space’, she writes, ‘then sexual orientation 
might also be a matter of residence, of how we inhabit spaces, and 
who or what we inhabit spaces with’.6 One of the tasks a critical reader 
must therefore set himself is to question how Ahmed makes the link 
between the philosophical understanding of spatial relations and the 
terrain of political conflict.
Ahmed wants to ‘queer’ phenomenology. This means that she 
intends to read the discourse against the grain, discovering moments 
of confusion, for example, in what it says about orientation. To this 
end, Ahmed develops a novel reading of a passage from Husserl, which 
describes the philosopher sitting at his desk, philosophising about 
his consciousness of the objects around him as he writes. Husserl’s 
discussion appeals to Ahmed because it shows how ‘consciousness is 
always directed toward objects and hence is always worldly, situated, 
and embodied’ (544). For instance, Husserl describes how, ensconced 
in his study, he can allow his attention to wander from the page to 
the window, taking into view his grandchildren at play in the garden. 
The example is meant to show how perceptual consciousness is always 
spatially directed, and focusing on, intending, particular objects. For 
Husserl, however, the intentionality of the mind’s attention is also 
mobile; it changes shape in accordance with shifts between objects, 
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just as these objects themselves change in consciousness. Ahmed 
‘queers’ this element of Husserl’s discussion by underlining how 
certain marginalised or forgotten objects will be sidelined or remain 
unperceived. In other words, it’s not only a question for Ahmed of 
the unfixed plasticity of consciousness; that consciousness will bear 
different qualities in accordance with its grasp of different objects. 
More importantly, other objects ‘are relegated to the background’, 
she writes; ‘they are only ever co-perceived’. Ahmed wants to extend 
the phenomenological analysis so that it stops looking only forward 
through the philosopher’s study. Instead, she wants it to turn around 
so that, as she puts it, it ‘faces the back’ (546). 
I have two main objections to the phenomenological tendency in 
queer theory as Ahmed formulates it. The first is philosophical or 
ontological in nature; it has to do with how psychoanalysis questions 
the most basic assumptions of phenomenology concerning the 
subject’s relation to space and time. I’ve developed a version of this 
argument elsewhere in the form of a critique of the resurgence of 
phenomenology in film theory,7 so a brief overview will suffice here. 
In short, phenomenology inadequately problematises the subject’s 
relationship to space, and Ahmed’s presentation of the tradition 
only exacerbates this inadequacy. Lacan argues that phenomenology 
misconceives space as empirical and geometrical.8 As her discussion 
makes clear, Ahmed imagines a subject for whom appearances can be 
taken for granted, a subject whose mastery of space is limited only by 
the objects that remain unseen at any given time. If only this subject 
could see in every direction at once, space would unfurl in a way fully 
given to intentional consciousness. 
For Lacan, in contrast, the subject’s grasp of the world is always 
mediated and limited by language, an elemental fact of human 
existence the impact of which phenomenology consistently 
underestimates. Because of language, according to Lacan, objects 
appear suspicious, ungrounded to the subject, as if they conceal 
something more desirable or satisfying behind them. Freud’s work 
on voyeurism and exhibitionism influenced Lacan to emphasise our 
uncomfortable unconscious awareness of our unmasterable visibility 
in the world, as well as the neurotic resistance we put up against this 
irreducible condition of our existence. 
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Even eminent phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
whom Ahmed cites in her discussion, stresses how the subject is 
fundamentally given-to-be-seen. For Merleau-Ponty as well as for 
Lacan, this condition of general visibility is logically prior to our 
comparatively vulnerable faculty of sight. Further, no psychoanalytic 
critique of phenomenology would be complete without mention of 
the fact that language’s mediation of the world causes objects to appear 
to the subject in a way that’s shaped and distorted by their signifier, 
and even more importantly with this signifier’s associations with 
other signifiers in the unconscious. With its focus on the relation of 
consciousness to the outside world, phenomenology for psychoanalysis 
forgets about what Freud called internal stimulation, that is to say the 
perceptions, linked in a complicated way to both memory and fantasy, 
that manage to break out of the unconscious mind in censored form. 
Husserl’s relation to his table, for example, can be overdetermined by 
its signifier’s relation to other signifiers in his unconscious in a way 
that bears no direct relation to either experience, perception, or even 
‘meaning’ as it is conventionally understood.
More germane to the immediate concerns of queer theory, however, 
is the curious fact that Ahmed’s own orientation towards the term 
‘orientation’ effectively desexualises it. I’ve already shown how 
Ahmed wants to claim queer as a kind of disruptive or against-the-
grain practice of reading – one that seeks to destabilise any semblance 
of order that a text, on this view, might be construed to set up. Ahmed 
advances that what’s queer in phenomenology is its attempt to think 
through what she calls an ‘intellectual experience of disorder’ (544). 
This is arguably the main anti-Platonic objective of the phenomeno-
logical tradition writ large: to allow the object to skew the alignment 
of perception in such a way that the sense data this object sends off to 
consciousness begin to overwhelm the object’s properly ideational or 
intellectual determinations. In Lacanian vocabulary, phenomenology 
wants to prioritise sense data over the signifier. But what exactly is 
to be gained by ‘queering’ phenomenology – that is, by referring 
more or less uncritically to an intact aspect of an existing canonical 
philosophical tradition with a new word, one which it has never used 
itself? In this precise sense, Ahmed’s reading of phenomenology is 
thoroughly conservative. Indeed, a cynic might conclude that the whole 
exercise amounts to a word game enlisted for a marketing strategy: 
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to sell more books, ‘queer’ can sex up a philosophical tradition that 
makes for remarkably dry reading. Misleadingly, however, ‘queer’ in 
this instance has nothing whatsoever to do with sex. 
This criticism notwithstanding, it would be disingenuous to leave the 
reader with the impression that Ahmed fails even to detect heterosexism 
in the texts of phenomenology. To be sure, the identification of straight 
bias in the texts of culture is one of the hallmarks of queer discourse, 
particularly in its less theoreticised, and more pragmatic, cultural 
studies mode. But there’s a problem here as well. Not only does the 
queer tradition overestimate the general political importance of such 
acts of unmasking explicit or implicit heterosexism. Additionally, 
more often that not the force of this heterosexism – that is, its 
powers of determination over the argument’s conceptualisation and 
development – is counterstrategically exaggerated. 
To shed light on this politically problematic exaggeration in her 
work, I propose to examine a personal anecdote Ahmed offers in her 
text as a counter-example to the Husserl-in-his-study scenario I referred 
to earlier. What importance does Ahmed’s drawing out of Husserl’s 
heterosexual investments bear for either his general contribution to 
phenomenology, or the struggle against homophobia? Does Husserl’s 
writing impose or reflect what Ahmed and other queer theorists have 
termed, after Adrienne Rich, compulsory heterosexuality? 
Here is the alternative philosophical scene related in the text. 
Ahmed is seated with her parents and siblings around a family dinner 
table in her parents’ garden. Like the table, and the food and drink 
resting upon it, any given world of things comes along with scripts and 
rituals, Ahmed argues. The objects of the world prescriptively direct 
the attention of those who come into perceptual contact with them. 
Pointing to two of Ahmed’s nephews seated next to the table on the 
grass, one of her sisters exclaims, ‘Look, there’s a little John and a little 
Mark’, remarking on the boys’ physical resemblance to their respective 
fathers, the author’s brothers-in-law. 
Echoing Judith Butler’s development of the role played by 
‘citationality’9 in the perpetuation of gender norms, Ahmed goes on to 
argue that her sister’s utterance is an example of the kind of direction or 
orientation of consciousness which, consolidated through repetition, 
reinforces the power of heterosexual relations. Indeed, the verbal 
acknowledgment of paternity implicitly forges a path leading first to 
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the boys’ own eventual fatherhood, and then to a forever expanding 
family tree. ‘We can think of such an utterance as performing the work 
of alignment’, Ahmed suggests. ‘The utterance positions the child 
and the not-yet-adult by aligning sex (the male body) and gender (the 
masculine character) with sexual orientation (the heterosexual future)’ 
(557). In short, for Ahmed the world of objects in the family abode 
normatively directs the subjects who inhabit it towards a straight and 
reproductive future.
There should be little question that the situation Ahmed describes 
can put tremendous pressure on those who suffer from the burden of 
heterosexual convention. As we’ve seen, the family home for Ahmed 
is a space populated by objects that have the power to set thoughts and 
actions moving in particular directions. In order to describe this space 
as normatively (or even compulsorily) heterosexual, however, Ahmed 
has to extract her own being from it, in effect describing it from the 
outside as if she were an invisible, disembodied and mute presence 
at the al fresco supper party. As an intellectual woman, established 
professor, and ‘out’ (public) lesbian, Ahmed is unusually privileged 
and insightful about her situation as a queer woman in (what I presume 
to be) a traditional family. But, even if we were to replace Ahmed with 
a younger, closeted, vulnerable young woman or girl, her presence 
would still have an impact, phenomenologically speaking, on the way 
the other family members perceive the objects in the room, including 
my hypothetical alternative Ahmed herself. 
Quite clearly, her presence might also help to shape the way these 
objects ‘orient’ the other family members in Ahmed’s sense of the 
term. When the sister points at the boys and makes her comment, 
for instance, my alternative closeted Ahmed might spontaneously 
react by looking away too soon and perhaps refilling her drink. Her 
actions and expression might betray discomfort or unease with the 
familiar patriarchal scene, and the mother, for example, noticing that 
discomfort, might now be forced to re-evaluate her initial perception of 
her other daughter’s remarks. Ahmed’s phenomenological analysis of 
the family celebration remains unpersuasive to the extent that she fails 
to take her own presence at the table into account. 
Readers familiar with Ahmed’s work might object at this point 
that my criticism misses the nuance of her evocative analysis. For 
example, it could be pointed out that Ahmed is always careful to 
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remark that, despite their considerable power, non-alignment with 
the heterosexual orientations she depicts will often occur; as she puts 
it, such non-alignments can have a ‘queer effect’ (557). But Ahmed 
also writes that ‘[straight] tendencies enable action, in the sense that 
they allow the straight body, and the heterosexual couple, to extend 
into space’. By contrast, ‘the queer body does not extend into such 
space’ (559). With these remarks in mind, Ahmed’s reader is left 
trying to make sense of an autobiographical description of a publicly 
known lesbian academic participating in a family gathering at which 
her body strangely fails to extend into space. Elsewhere in her essay, 
Ahmed refers to Merleau-Ponty’s idea that consciousness is shaped 
by the body’s ‘task and situation’ (561), what the philosopher calls the 
virtual body. If only she had applied this notion to her own embodied 
presence at the dinner table, and thought through the transformations 
brought to her own consciousness as it engages with the objects on the 
table, Ahmed might have produced a subtler, more dialectical account 
of what, from the psychoanalytic point of view, is always a necessary 
antagonism between sexual desire and social convention. 
Focusing in such detail on this aspect of Ahmed’s discussion would 
hardly be worthwhile in this context if it didn’t hold a paradigmatic 
importance for hegemonic queer theory writ large. The ritual 
reference to compulsory heterosexuality, here extrapolated by Ahmed 
into a general phenomenological law of spatial extension (i.e. only 
heterosexual objects are allowed extension through space), enables 
the deployment of an at once self-aggrandising and self-victimising 
discourse of injury and transgression. Conveniently sidestepping the 
logical problem of the production of the queer subject, however injured, 
by a matrix qualified as exclusively heterosexual, queer discourse is 
able to denounce a heterosexist world from which it excludes itself, all 
the while claiming subversive political significance for a privileged and 
exceptional queer existence left largely unexplored and unexplained. 
Indeed, the empty political claim enabled by queer’s exaggeration of 
heterosexuality’s power of discursive production and spatial extension 
leaves the status and purchase of this power entirely unquestioned. 
Too often, the logic of queer theory departs from the unpromising and 
unnecessary premise of a compulsory heterosexuality, the existence 
of which is belied by the very existence of the queer subjects whose 
experience it apparently sets out to theorise. 
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Ahmed herself treads onto this terrain when she comments 
critically on conservative literary critic Bruce Bawer’s suspicions 
about the minoritarian and anti-normative thrust of queer theory. In 
his own presentation of the issue at hand, Bawer compares the social 
marginality of the anti-assimilationist homosexual to the placement 
of the kids at the children’s table at the extended family gathering. 
Bawer argues that if homophobic prejudice is the force that banishes 
the queer subject from the adults’ table in the first place, then only 
this same prejudice can account for the desire to stay on the sidelines 
with the children. The tendency towards self-marginalisation 
among members of the queer community, in this view, is the result 
of something like a disavowed internalised homophobia. Citing the 
supreme post structuralist value of difference, Ahmed disagrees. 
For her, Bawer’s strategy implies ‘becoming part of the family and 
becoming like the family, which is itself predicated on likeness (being 
with as being like)’ (568).10 In other words, there is no possibility for 
Ahmed of simultaneously occupying the adults’ table and resisting the 
heterosexist norms according to which it functions. 
Left unexplored in Ahmed’s rejoinder is the invigorating and 
authentically subversive possibility that when the queer subject insists 
on sitting at the big family table, the nature of the table itself, the 
logic by which it operates, changes. The at-the-table queer forces the 
others to re-examine their understanding of the family. Even more 
importantly, queer self-inclusion exposes the family’s own difference 
from itself – that is, the ways in which its members have already 
transgressed the patriarchal rules according to which the family is 
officially supposed to function. Rather than risk such confrontation, 
however, Ahmed’s queer phenomenologists are happy to remain at 
their own small table in the shadows, talking politely and inconse-
quentially among themselves. Even more problematically, Bawer’s gay 
conservative contingent is left to dominate discussion as they are left 
unchallenged as the token gays at the grown-ups’ table.11 
Finally, an even more unfortunate element of Ahmed’s 
phenomenology is its endorsement of a limited and familiar 
lifestyle politics not unlike the politics of the Morland and Willox 
piece considered earlier. Indeed, Ahmed’s work evacuates from the 
understanding of politics any meaning that the Marxist tradition would 
be capable of recognising. The best way to develop this last criticism of 
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Ahmed’s work is to focus on another of her illuminating examples. 
This one speciously puts the Marxian vocabulary to decidedly un- or 
post-Marxist use. Ahmed draws on Adrienne Rich’s work to develop 
what she calls a ‘political economy of attention’ (547). Incorporated 
into Ahmed’s discussion as a counterweight to Husserl’s philosophi-
cally canonical account, the Rich passage in its original context makes 
a strong feminist point about the difficulty mothers of young children 
can face when they sit down to write. In Ahmed’s discussion, however, 
Rich’s valuable insight is ‘phenomenologised’, as it were. That is, 
Ahmed uses Rich’s discussion not to decry the numerous obstacles 
that have confronted women writers historically, but rather to convey 
an abstract theoretical point about how there can be, as she puts it, ‘an 
uneven distribution of attention time among those who arrive at the 
writing table’ (547).
Although Ahmed’s discussion is clearly not without relevance, its 
placement under the heading of a political economy of attention not 
only dulls the edge of Rich’s original materialist, and more significantly 
political, feminist argument. Additionally, this placement brings to the 
fore the failure of Ahmed’s discussion properly to contextualise itself 
with respect to both history and economic relations. Ahmed construes 
labour in phenomenological terms as a quantity of abstract perceptual 
attention which can be directed in a variety of different directions. By 
sharp contrast, Marxism’s more political understanding ties labour to 
the human energy expended in the production process, and quantified 
by capitalism in a way that materially disadvantages the worker. Here 
a properly Marxist feminism – not to mention Virginia Woolf ’s, 
from the heights of its bourgeois Bloomsbury privilege – delivers 
more valuable insights. The alternative Marxist perspective has the 
advantage of adding to both Rich’s original account and Ahmed’s 
appropriation of it much-needed analysis of the material reasons why 
women writers have faced more distractions, have been so much less 
voluminously published, than their male counterparts.12 Marxism’s 
account of the sexual division of labour remains unhindered by the 
philosophical abstraction of Ahmed’s account. Even more importantly, 
it wonders about the specific social conditions that would have left 
Rich no alternative but to try desperately to write while having to mind 
her child.
In short, Ahmed’s discussion of queer disorientation proceeds as 
if the critique of ideology had never taken place. Instead of asking 
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why the queer subject experiences what she experiences in the way 
she does, Ahmed rather takes this experience at face value, assuming 
in the process that politics amounts to a set of lifestyle choices. 
Disorientation, Ahmed writes, is ‘an effect of how we do politics, 
which in turn is shaped by a prior matter – how we live’ (569). Quoting 
Judith Halberstam, Ahmed defines queer politics as ‘the potentiality 
of not following certain conventional scripts of family, inheritance, 
and child rearing’ (569).13 At the root of such formulations is a naïve 
voluntarism that Marxism and psychoanalysis both reject. These 
alternative discourses instead choose a more complex and dialectical 
way of thinking about the relation of consciousness to the real in its 
interrelated psychical and socioeconomic aspects. In the final analysis, 
it’s not at all clear that the decision merely not to follow certain 
conventional lifestyle paths amounts to a politics that will in any way 
threaten the social and economic status quo. 
However we decide to think about what some will insist on 
calling ‘queer experience’, this experience remains both historical 
and overdetermined by the unconscious. Not only is the cultural 
significance of homosexual desire packaged and presented to the 
subject in particular ways at particular times, but this packaging is 
part and parcel of an ideological apparatus that works to dissimulate 
how the mode of production, including our libidinal complicity in its 
workings, functions in the interests of some, against those of many. 
Ahmed sums up her doctrine of queer disorientation by invoking 
the ‘desire lines’ of which some landscape architects speak. These are 
the paths through a landscape design that direct our attention and our 
experience of it, sending us first in one direction and then in another. 
Ahmed’s project aims to trace new, uncharted lines, rather like the 
lines of flight of which Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari memorably 
write.14 The problem, however, is that the space itself stays the same; 
the logic according to which all possible paths can be charted is left 
unaddressed, unquestioned. Instead, the queer landscape needs to be 
razed. Only in this way will paths inconceivable in the old landscape 
make themselves available to thought. 
Queer Affect’s Effects
The affective turn in queer theory shares a number of traits with 
its phenomenological kissing cousin. Significantly, these include a 
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feeling of fatigue with respect to the emphasis in previous-generation 
queer theory on language and discourse. This emphasis was heavily 
influenced by the work of Derrida and Foucault as well as, to a lesser 
extent, by psychoanalysis. The turn to affect can be traced to a desire for 
immediacy; for a way to talk about the experience of our engagement 
with the world. Tired of having to work with heady abstractions 
like ‘the signifier’ or even Foucault’s elusive notion of power, I want 
the chance to talk about myself, about my innermost feelings and 
intimate experience. 
From the perspectives of psychoanalysis and Marxism, this is 
bourgeois psychology by another name. Set free from the need to 
abstract from experience and emotion in order to gain knowledge 
of their unconscious and material determinants, I can engage in a 
practice that feels more authentic, more reflective of my life’s particular 
concerns. The main problem of this approach is that it takes phenomenal 
experience, including the seductive but misleading realm of feeling, 
at face value. It fails in this way to heed the elementary lesson of a 
disappearing generation’s ideology critique: I experience the world in 
the way capital and my ego investments want me to experience it. To 
the extent that I remain at the affective level, I miss the opportunity 
not only to discover how my personal reality functions to dissimulate 
my unconscious libidinal investment in an unjust status quo, but also 
how the world as it appears compensates for violent antagonisms and 
conflicts of interest, which it seeks at all costs to obfuscate and repress. 
The later work of the late Eve Sedgwick gains particular interest in 
this light not only because it presents an unusually intelligent iteration 
of the affective turn, but also because it returns to psychoanalysis 
– a discourse more or less summarily rejected in 1990’s seminal 
Epistemology of the Closet – to question the assumptions of the tradition 
that her earlier work so influentially inspired. Before her untimely 
death, Sedgwick evidently had grown tired of queer theory, and she 
offers a critique of it which, surprisingly, shares some of the views I’ve 
put forward myself.15 Despite the undeniable salience of her diagnosis 
of queer theory via Melanie Klein, Sedgwick’s affective discourse 
exhibits the same inward and in many ways quintessentially American 
political naiveté that has characterised her work from the beginning. 
In the end, Sedgwick’s politics unfortunately retains a properly 
narcissistic resistance to the power of the universal, precisely the sort 
Penney T02732 01 text   26 08/10/2013   08:16
currents of queer
27
of pseudo-politics, typical of queer discourse, that this book sets out to 
leave behind once and for all. 
We can begin by considering the details of Sedgwick’s psychoana-
lytically informed critique of earlier queer theory, including her own. 
As mentioned, Sedgwick draws inspiration from noted Austrian-born 
British analyst Melanie Klein (1882–1960), whose work, despite 
enjoying a resurgence in the past decade or so, hasn’t had an especially 
significant impact on theoretical discourses in the humanities. 
Describing a world of fantasmatic objects – objects internal to the 
psyche – and the usually violent relationships the subject entertains 
with them, Kleinian discourse has much to say about the dynamics of 
intellectual work. Provocatively, Sedgwick speculates that this facet 
of Kleinian analysis in fact explains critical theorists’ reluctance to 
take it up: it hits too close to home. At any rate, the aim of Sedgwick’s 
engagement with Klein is not only to uncover how earlier queer 
theory went wrong, but also to speculate about how its project might 
be renewed. And for Sedgwick, there’s a Kleinian concept available to 
accomplish each of these tasks: the paranoid/schizoid position for the 
first, and the depressive position for the second. 
A central concept of Kleinian psychoanalysis, the paranoid/schizoid 
position describes the original predicament of the subject. Klein’s 
development of the concept borrows significantly from Freud’s idea of 
the oral stage, and the closest analogue in the Lacanian tradition is no 
doubt his concept of the imaginary. The paranoid/schizoid position 
is characterised by the subject’s insistence on dividing up the world 
into two by establishing a firm boundary between what is inherently 
beneficial and what is clearly dangerous. This is the principle that 
supports Klein’s discussion of her well-known notions of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ objects. These two types of object are linked to two opposite but 
complementary compulsions: good objects must be devoured and 
incorporated into the ego; bad objects must be kept at bay at all costs. 
While the subject must incorporate the good objects into itself, the 
bad objects threaten to incorporate the subject, thereby presenting the 
terrifying prospect of its being’s very obliteration. The logic at work 
echoes the binary of activity and passivity that Freud attributes to his 
drives. Similarly, Klein stresses that both the incorporative passion to 
devour and the traumatic prospect of being devoured are vicissitudes 
of the same fundamental fear. This is ultimately the subject’s fear 
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of its own powers of destruction and dominion, powers it wants 
ambivalently to embrace and disavow.
Even readers unfamiliar with this facet of her work may not be 
surprised to learn that Sedgwick goes on to reproach previous queer 
theory for getting psychically stuck, as it were, in this paranoid/schizoid 
position. Famously, Foucault in The History of Sexuality’s introductory 
volume debunked what he calls the repressive hypothesis: the classical 
idea, many will recall, that sex and power work at cross-purposes; that 
power functions to repress sexuality.16 
In her last writing, Sedgwick comes to acknowledge the limitations 
of Foucault’s massively influential displacement of the understanding 
of power from a force that limits and constrains to one that enables and 
produces. Foucault appears ‘to be far more persuasive in analyzing this 
massive intellectual blockage [set up by the repressive hypothesis]’, 
she writes, ‘than in finding ways to obviate it’.17 In consequence, queer 
theory became mired in ‘those circular Foucaultian energies’ (294). In 
Sedgwick’s view, these energies can do no more than insist, however 
correctly, that any attempt to break through the apparently limiting 
force power exercises on sexuality winds up reinforcing the strength of 
the repression that the attempt initially set out to overcome. 
It’s then up to Sedgwick to link this impotent logic to the mechanism 
of projective identification, which Klein finds to be inherent in the 
paranoid/schizoid position. The schizoid subject shows ‘a terrible 
alertness to the dangers posed by the hateful and envious part-objects 
that one defensively projects into the world around one’ (295), Sedgwick 
writes. The provocative implication is that Foucault and his legions of 
queer followers fall into this trap. Their projective identification causes 
them to misperceive the internal objects of their own psychic life as 
external and nefarious productions of power, which seek oppressively 
to normalise heterosexual relations.
It’s to her tremendous credit that Sedgwick stresses the significance 
of the American political context to queer theory’s earliest days. As 
members of the first generations afflicted with the HIV crisis, many 
early queer theorists, Sedgwick included, participated in activist 
groups, which found themselves up against a virulently phobic political 
environment characterised, as she memorably puts it, by ‘prurient 
schemes for testing, classifying, rounding up, tattooing, quarantining, 
and otherwise demeaning and killing men and women with AIDS’ 
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(297). Still, it’s impossible to consider Sedgwick’s rationale for queer 
paranoia in isolation from the affect-based psychoanalytic theory upon 
which she bases her argument. It may be necessary to clarify at this 
juncture that neither I nor Sedgwick (as I read her) is claiming that 
the hostile political situation bravely stared down by first-generation 
AIDS activists and queer theorists was merely conjured up, in whole 
or in part, in their heads. 
In retrospect, however, it’s become clear that the Foucault-heavy 
theoretical lens through which the HIV crisis was initially critically 
analysed, particularly within groups such as ACT UP familiar with 
then-emergent queer academic discourse, wasn’t especially conducive 
to the creative imagination of strategies for countering the effects 
of the deathly state-sanctioned public indifference to the crisis. 
As Sedgwick insightfully argues, this apparatus tended to produce 
a paranoid and abstract vision of power, which actually worked 
against the development of productive strategies of resistance. By 
emphasising the determinative impact of power over the creation of 
positive alternatives, the Foucaultian framework created conditions 
that worked against the negotiation of relations and alliances. These 
alliances might have called into question the entire Orwellian complex 
through which health care provision is distributed, highly differentially 
of course, in the American national context.
The application of Klein’s paranoid/schizoid idea to queer theory 
evidently yields remarkable critical insights. Sedgwick’s appraisal of 
the significance of the alternative depressive position, by contrast, 
betrays the same resistance to politics that we’ve seen in the other queer 
authors considered thus far. Unlike the paranoid/schizoid position, 
the depressive position, Sedgwick writes, ‘is conceived as virtually 
intersubjective, profoundly ambivalent, and a locus of anybody’s 
special inventiveness’ (287). It therefore carries positive implications 
for theoretical work as Sedgwick construes it. 
Unfortunately, however, when it comes to outlining these 
implications, Sedgwick can offer only vague allusions to the overcoming 
of depressive affects through ‘intellectual creativity’, ‘challenges to a 
normalizing universality’, and ‘pedagogy’ (295, 299). At this stage 
in her discussion, Sedgwick misses a golden opportunity to link the 
affective vicissitudes of subjectivity to a more social and political 
understanding of intellectual work and the teaching vocation. This 
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is what’s wrong with Sedgwick’s analysis: the passionate attachment 
to her own archive of feeling tethers her argument to the focal points 
of her limited political knowledge and experience. It seems logical 
to conclude that such passionate investment in one’s own affective 
history discourages interest in locales, times and experiences other 
than one’s own. 
In fact, Sedgwick says as much herself. To introduce her interest in 
the Kleinian understanding of affect, she relates a memory from her 
early childhood. A consideration of Sedgwick’s evocation and analysis 
of this memory will allow for the development of my contention 
about the link between affective self-concern and the elision of politics 
proper in queer theory discourse. Told by her parents that she must 
accept her elder sister’s doll instead of the new, larger one she prefers, 
the young Sedgwick sinks ‘into the awful whirlpool of tantrum mode’ 
(284), convinced that the old doll is much too small for a girl of her 
age. For Sedgwick, the recollection’s significance lies in the evidence 
it provides for what she dramatically calls ‘the almost grotesquely 
unintelligent design’ (285) of the human mind, a design well placed 
to remind us of the fundamental psychoanalytic insight that infantile 
wishes, unanalysed, continue to have their impact on the psyche far 
into adulthood. Sedgwick’s trip down the dark lane of memory leads 
her to quote American author and naturalist Henry David Thoreau’s 
famous surmise that the majority of human lives are led in quiet 
desperation. She proceeds to ask herself ‘whether or not [hers] is part 
of that majority’ (285), going so far as to insinuate this question into 
the heart of her investigation of Klein’s work. 
Sedgwick tells us that she likes to read Klein because ‘she is one of 
the people who most upsets’ her, and Klein does this by reminding her 
of Thoreau’s troubling question. There then follows a line that’s truly 
remarkable in its monumental political obliviousness. Klein unsettles 
Sedgwick’s emotional equilibrium ‘vastly more than Freud or Lacan 
does’, she writes, ‘and even more than the Marxist or anticolonial 
perspectives from which [her] preoccupations are so effectively made 
to feel marginal, even to [her]’ (285). Unfortunately, Sedgwick’s 
professed inability to imagine how her intellectual concerns might 
relate to class struggle and colonial history tells us all we need to know 
about her deepest political convictions. In particular, her inability to 
see any relation between her own involvement in the HIV/AIDS crisis 
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in the United States and the obscene devastation inflicted by that same 
crisis, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, is deeply objectionable to say 
the least.
In fact, one begins to wonder if Klein’s writing proves so seductive 
for Sedgwick not because it allows her to work through or overcome 
the infantile affects that haunt her, but rather because it provides a 
sort of intellectual alibi for wallowing in them, sheltered from any 
reminder that they might in part be determined by forces outside the 
boundaries of her own limited and very bourgeois construction of her 
intellectual identity. In short, Klein allows Sedgwick to take the sense 
data of her feelings at face value, reneging on the political and analytic 
responsibility to question the ideological parameters that set the terms 
of her experience of them. 
Why exactly does ‘girl Sedgwick’ want a doll, anyway? What do the 
qualities of the doll (about which we learn nothing) tell us about the 
young Sedgwick’s position in the social hierarchies and relations of 
power of the day? How does the doll work as a symptom in her psychical 
economy – function, that is to say, as a dissimulated expression of the 
enjoyment about which she would prefer not to know? An interrogation 
of affect isn’t necessarily ancillary to the answering of these questions. 
But they’ll remain unanswered for as long as we fail to move beyond 
the personal realm of affect, psychologically conceived, and into more 
materialist and authentically analytic forms of inquiry. 
The Homonationalist Critique
The recent appearance of Jasbir Puar’s work on the queer theory scene 
was a significant event in the discourse’s history because it introduced 
geopolitical concerns, in particular the question of the racialisation and 
sexualisation of the ‘terrorist’, which, with precious few exceptions, 
have previously been left unaddressed. Indeed, queer work continues 
overwhelmingly to be confined to an ideological landscape dominated 
by a Euro-American history of anti-homophobic activism, a Judeo-
Christian genealogy of attitudes towards homosexuality, and a liberal 
political framework of civil rights and state recognition. By contrast, 
Terrorist Assemblages brings to the fore how globalisation has effectively 
spread anti-homophobic critique and paradigms for activism to world 
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diasporas shaped by religious and cultural traditions that have been all 
but invisible throughout the short history of queer discourse. 
Further, Puar’s book was among the first to acknowledge, however 
critically, the significance of the historically unprecedented reality of 
legitimated queer subjects: men and women fully, although also very 
selectively, recognised by a small number of the most socially liberal 
state regimes. In the past few decades, these men and women have 
been endowed with the legal right to marry or to participate in a civil 
partnership, thereby gaining access to rights of citizenship – spousal 
benefits and tax exemptions, for instance – which were previously 
unavailable to same-sex couples. Deploying a sophisticated, but also 
jargon-heavy and irritatingly opaque, theoretical artillery derived 
from a familiar and trendy mix of Foucault, Derrida and the Italian 
philosopher Giorgio Agamben, this new paradigm in queer theory – 
more worldly; more attuned to differences of race and nation; clearly 
impacted by post-9/11 modulations of Western orientalisms and 
Islamophobia – seemed poised to enable the illumination of queer’s 
scandalous geopolitical blind spots. Here, finally, was a book that could 
talk back to Sedgwick’s spectacularly self-concerned bewilderment at 
how anticolonial theory and the critique of capitalism could possibly 
relate to her own queer-theoretical thoughts. 
Unfortunately, however, despite the undeniable importance of its 
contribution, Puar’s work is too bogged down by the confused obscurity 
of its poststructuralist biopolitical apparatus, and too marked by the 
overwhelmingly inward gaze of its own American academic context, 
to rescue the queer project from its increasingly apparent Eurocentric 
and bourgeois limitations. 
Apart from the significant problem of its complicity with queer 
theory’s inherent reluctance to look beyond America’s borders, 
my main criticism of Puar’s project will be that its adoption of a 
Foucault-derived conception of biopower conditions two main 
weaknesses. First, the relentless emphasis on power’s production of 
both normalised (‘homonational’) and queer (‘terrorist’) subjectivities 
is badly positioned creatively to imagine the new forms of political 
organisation that contemporary socialism so desperately needs at the 
present moment. 
Second, these same biopolitical premises obscure the valuable 
psychoanalytic insight about the properly symptomal18 relation 
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between, on the one hand, the patriotic – and even sometimes 
‘gay-positive’ – construction of the good American citizen and, on 
the other, the ‘queer’ racialising terrorist fantasies on which the image 
of the patriot secretly depends. By positing the latter as the truth of 
the former, psychoanalysis uncovers the disavowed enjoyments that 
support the racist and homophobic fantasies buttressing the US 
imperial agenda Puar so rightly wants to decry. 
A more detailed run-down of Puar’s main argument will prove 
helpful, however, before I proceed to support the criticisms I’ve just 
enumerated. As is widely acknowledged, the biopolitical turn in 
the work of the later Foucault, and further developed by Agamben, 
reconceives the relation between power and subjectivity as productive 
rather than repressive.19 A complex amalgam of state and non-state 
discourses create, and at the same time discipline, possibilities for 
subjectivity not by setting limits, passing laws and constraining 
freedoms, but rather by promulgating notions about optimising the 
possibilities for life through the tethering of the human desire for 
enrichment and improvement to abstractly conceived regimes of 
surveillance and normalisation. 
In short, biopolitical power exercises its force not by limiting or 
threatening life, but rather by creating and then colonising the desire 
to live it to the fullest. On the level of its content, Puar’s project 
intervenes in a variety of US-based ‘multicultural’ or diasporic sites, 
from the complicity of a growing and normalised conservative gay/
queer constituency in both the US and Europe with the racialising and 
Muslim-bating discourse of counterterrorism, to the 2003 Lawrence 
and Garner vs Texas ruling, which decriminalised sodomy between 
consenting adults, only to reinforce norms of citizenship premised 
on the ownership of property and the cultivation of bourgeois, 
psychological ideals of relationship intimacy. 
Tying Puar’s project together is an abiding concern for the way 
in which discourse, in its productive management of the very 
possibilities for life, produces hierarchies of normality for subjectivity. 
These hierarchies separate good citizens from bad by promulgating 
ideals of exceptional citizenship to which we are enjoined to adhere. 
In the process, such hierarchies draw lines even between members of 
the variously conceived non-heterosexual constituencies. An example 
indicative of the general approach is Puar’s analysis of how the efforts of 
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US-based Sikh organisations to defend the image of the turban-wearing 
man against associations with fundamentalist terrorism draw on what 
she calls ‘heteronormative victimology narratives’.20 These are the 
very same constructions that queer and feminist diasporic groups and 
critics routinely condemn as patriarchal and heterosexist.
Puar’s central notion of ‘homonationalism’ develops out of a 
quotation from the work of Amy Kaplan, in which the American 
studies scholar justifiably attacks the conservative appropriation of the 
thematic of ‘coming out’ from modern lesbian and gay politics.21 The 
target is a column by journalist Charles Krauthammer. In this column, 
Krauthammer claims that the taboo discouraging explicit celebration 
of the American empire has diminished or disappeared during the past 
decade, as a result of changes in the geopolitical situation connected 
to the events of 9/11. Kaplan incisively remarks on the political irony 
of Krauthammer’s imperialist coming out party against the backdrop 
of the notorious Clinton-era ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy for the 
US military. 
Although she endorses Kaplan’s criticism of Krauthammer’s 
hawkish militarism, Puar nevertheless reproaches her colleague in a 
familiarly politically correct way for harbouring an implicit racialising 
assumption. Although she offers no evidence to suggest that Kaplan 
set herself the task of addressing the problem of race in the military, 
Puar chastises her for failing to make explicit that ‘the least welcome 
entrants into this national revelation of pride [will] be queer people of 
colour’. Adding a climactic poststructuralist flourish, Puar avers that 
both Krauthammer and Kaplan ‘execute a troubling affirmation of 
the teleological investments in ‘closeting’ and ‘coming out’ narratives 
that have long been critiqued for the privileged (white) gay, lesbian 
and queer liberal subjects they inscribe and validate’ (2). In short, not 
only does the ‘out’ American imperialist inappropriately borrow the 
language of gay pride. According to Puar, he additionally draws on 
a discourse of homosexual affirmation, which implicitly reinforces 
white racial privilege. 
I bring out these details of Puar’s analysis because they set 
the stage for her definition of the homonational with respect to 
‘three imbricated manifestations – sexual exceptionalism, queer 
as regulatory, and the ascendancy of whiteness’ (2). Although the 
discussion lacks clarity, sexual exceptionalism appears to refer to 
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what Puar considers an implicit legitimation of homosexuality in 
Krauthammer’s appropriation of the coming out narrative for the 
millennial celebration of American hegemony. That right-wing 
defences of American economic and military imperialism routinely 
issue from sources with overwhelmingly socially conservative views 
doesn’t seem to be taken into account. At any rate, this is the project 
Puar’s theoretical machinery sets out to realise, one she shares with 
a panoply of similarly pedigreed poststructuralist queer work: to 
uncover the implicit forces of exclusion and marginalisation that 
accompany the various historically unprecedented cultural and legal 
accommodations of homosexual and post-homosexual identities in the 
liberal Western countries. For Puar, even queer discourse effects such 
acts of exclusion. More dramatically, she adds that hegemonic anti-
homophobic programmes carry an unacknowledged and neo-fascist 
genocidal fantasy of racial purification. 
Now, the classical Marxist response to Puar’s nonetheless admirable 
insistence on reading race into the queer problematic would no doubt 
be to reproach it for being too abstract. More precisely, Puar’s approach 
to race, typical of critical race discourse in the US, errs where it abstracts 
racialisation from concrete forms of socioeconomic marginalisation – 
including in particular the histories of colonialism, imperialism and 
slavery – with which race is always intricately ‘imbricated’, to use 
Puar’s own term. 
For Marxism, structural inequalities directly linked to the history 
of the mode of production are then ‘racialised’ at a second moment 
of determination. British racism during the Raj, for instance, can’t be 
considered outside the history of imperialism and colonialism in India. 
The competing view holds instead that an abstract racism is primary, 
and this racism then somehow causes racialised economic stratification 
more or less on its own. In sum, Puar’s vague evocation of a discursive 
force of racialisation does little to improve our understanding of how 
intertwined material and psychodynamic causes contribute to the 
dismaying intractability of racialised hierarchies of economic privilege, 
which are scattered so widely, even universally, across the globe.
Further, surely it’s unhelpful to link the anti-homophobic project as 
such to what Puar insists on calling, against all available demographic 
data, the ‘globally dominant ascendancy of whiteness’ (2). It’s 
imperative that we create a discursive space on the left where it’s 
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possible to decry the bourgeois fetishisation of whiteness in so many 
non-white social contexts, and at the same critically read hyperbolic 
and counterstrategically abstract charges of racism such as the one 
Puar confusedly articulates. 
But the more fundamental theoretical point to make here is that 
Puar’s fashionable set of biopolitical assumptions can only produce 
further identifications of what she calls ‘normative gayness, queerness, 
or homosexuality’ (2). From the psychoanalytic perspective, such 
critical identifications, however valuable and to the point, remain 
stuck in the position of the hysteric, who passionately and unceasingly 
denounces the Other’s imperfections in a way that only exacerbates 
her continued dependence on its sanction. The repressed underside 
of the poststructuralist discourse on heteronormativity and homona-
tionalism is an unrecognised wish to be acknowledged as normal. 
The unconscious desire of this discourse is the creation of a worthy 
Other who will finally be able to recognise all subjects, no matter how 
obscenely ‘queer’, as legitimate. 
Rather than simply join in on Puar’s denunciations of a discourse 
which, on her view, can produce only ‘liberal’ queer subjects with 
questionable investments in whiteness, we must look instead at forms 
of oppositional political subjectivity that have already made themselves 
manifest – from Occupy and the Arab Spring, to the widespread popular 
resistance to the German-led programme of economic austerity in the 
Eurozone. The urgent imperative is to create new ways of transforming 
such subjective emergences into lasting forms of political organisation. 
I’ve already signalled how Badiou has tirelessly argued that the new 
political subjectivity must be universal in its address; must speak to 
the people in a way that communicates indifference to their ‘small’ 
differences from one another, in particular differences relating to 
sexuality. We can describe this form of universality queer – why not? 
– but only on the condition that it doesn’t rest on a facile and pseudo-
political gesture of differentiation with respect to a presumed instance, 
embedded in the very fabric of discourse and power, of heteronorma-
tivity or homonationalism. 
My alternatively universalising form of political subjectivation 
has the added benefit of specifying the logic of the relation, in Puar’s 
argument, between the call to idealised patriotic citizenship and the 
tendency sexually to pathologise the (unpatriotic) terrorist. To clarify, 
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Puar’s idea of homonationalism argues for a relation of complicity 
between what she calls the exception and the exceptional. The ensuing 
discussion reveals that Puar’s appropriation of the exception theme 
in contemporary theory draws from two different sources. The first 
source is the long-standing tradition in American foreign policy of 
attributing, however implicitly, exceptional status to the American 
nation: as Americans, leaders of the free world, we have an inherent 
right to set the terms of international law, and it’s the duty of all the 
other nations to obey it. This ethos of exceptionalism penetrates to 
the very core of the ideology of individualism: the realisation of the 
American dream requires heroic discipline and self-reliance; the 
ideal model of US citizenship is premised on a gesture of distinction 
vis-à-vis the unmotivated, state-dependent masses. The second source 
is the work of Agamben, who formulated the influential notion of the 
‘state of exception’ to signify the naturalisation of technically illegal 
state measures in times of perceived crisis.22 As one might imagine, 
the standard examples are the ‘detention centres’ of the US naval base 
at Guantanamo, Cuba, and the notorious Abu Ghraib prison complex 
in Baghdad, Iraq. 
Puar rightly argues that the two forms of exceptionalism are 
intimately interrelated. As she writes, they work ‘to turn the negative 
valence of torture’ witnessed at Abu Ghraib, for example, ‘into the 
positive register of the valorization of (American) life’ (3). Although 
the logic of the connection is never clearly spelled out, Puar ties the 
attenuation of heteronormativity in the US – she seems to have in 
mind the abolition of sodomy laws and the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage or civil partnership in a select few states of the Union – to the 
thematic of exceptional citizenship. Somehow, it would appear, this 
uncharacteristic manifestation of homophilic generosity is part and 
parcel of a more general programme put in place by the US and its 
allies to enlist support for the occupation of Iraq and the associated 
global ‘war on terror’.
But psychoanalysis makes the same point in a more forceful, 
clearer, convincing and politically salient way. For her part, Puar tries 
to spell out the logic of the relation between the exception and the 
exceptional with a vague reference to Derrida’s idea of ‘hauntology, in 
which the ghosts, the absent presences’, she writes, ‘infuse ontology 
with a difference’ (4). While this reference to deconstruction offers 
Penney T02732 01 text   37 08/10/2013   08:16
after queer theory
38
only a philosophically sophomoric tie-in to the problem of being, 
psychoanalysis, through its concept of the symptom, precisely defines 
the contours of the relation between the two phenomena with which 
Puar is concerned. More specifically, psychoanalysis tells us why the 
fantasy construction of the ideal, counter-terrorist, patriotic and 
respectably homosexual citizen requires as its unacknowledged 
condition the obscene, sadomasochistic jouissance of Guantanamo 
and Abu Ghraib – that is, the flagrant violations of international law 
that have incensed so many around the world. Psychoanalysis teaches 
the invaluable lesson that the construction of the ego ideal – the 
symbolic point from which we can gratifyingly contemplate ourselves 
– goes hand in hand with the repression of a fantasy, which delivers the 
libidinal satisfaction such contemplation can only fail to acknowledge. 
Indeed, it’s precisely this enjoyment, kept safely beneath the threshold 
of our awareness, that fuels our attachment to the ideals of US-style 
militaristic and Islamophobic patriotism. 
We can relate this same logic to Puar’s concern with how the 
fantasy-image of the terrorist is homosexualised. The psychical 
condition of possibility of the virile heterosexual patriotic male is 
the repression of a libidinal investment in his uncanny obverse, 
the subversive queer terrorist. The psychoanalytic wager is that the 
disclosure of this investment has the effect of dismantling the structure 
of the ego ideal. Confronted with knowledge of what actually took 
place at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, the patriotic subject has two 
options: either reinforce the power of repression, which aggravates his 
complicity with the intrinsic violence of the state of exception, or else 
allow the patriotic identification to come crumbling down, making 
possible very different acts of unpatriotic and properly political 
citizenship.
In Puar’s argument, the relation between the exceptional and 
the exception remains unthought, couched in the vague terms of 
an apolitical philosophical ontology. Thankfully, psychoanalysis 
presents a coherent theory that not only outlines how the prestige 
of our highest ideals is maintained by a covert investment in their 
basest libidinal correspondents. Even more importantly, it instructs 
us that the disclosure of this repressed libido can liberate us from the 
tyranny – often of an inherently political kind – that binds us to their 
considerable and backhanded ideological force.





Gay Politics in America
Allow me to indulge in a brief personal anecdote to set the stage for this chapter. Over a decade ago now, in October 2000, just a few weeks before the US presidential election that would 
inaugurate the second Bush era, a young, fashionable, handsome 
man handed me a political leaflet as I crossed Christopher Street in 
Greenwich Village, New York City. I failed to give it much thought 
at the time: I was in transit to the subway and the Port Authority to 
catch a bus back to Ithaca, where I was working as a postdoctoral 
fellow at Cornell University. Weeks later, I had the idea to write the 
first of what would become numerous essays on the (largely missed) 
encounter between Marxism and queer theory. I wanted to make 
use of the pamphlet as an example, but I couldn’t find it. My quite 
hostile original reaction to its content – irritatingly politically correct, 
exasperatingly conservative – had led, unconsciously it seemed, to its 
mysterious disappearance. 
I found the leaflet later, in the chaos of my move away from Ithaca 
to another privileged but terminal postdoctoral position. It occurred to 
me then that my reaction to its reappearance had a hysterical quality: 
I was reluctant to address its traumatic content, unable to move 
beyond my frustration with the inanity of mainstream queer politics 
in America. Writing the original version of this essay, I took refuge in 
my status as a Canadian in the United States, albeit one who, leaving 
upstate New York, had barely even been across the border. At the time, 
I acknowledged, but also finally dismissed, ‘the condescension of my 
fellow Canadian lefties towards the primitive, superficial, liberal (in the 
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worst psychologistic sense), irremediably ideological and thoroughly 
depressing state of American political discourse’.1 
Having come to the end of a six-year period as a foreign graduate 
student in the US, I had become deeply disillusioned with the dominant 
poststructuralist queer theory of the 1990s. That discourse had exposed 
me to the narrow political horizons of many of its most recognised 
practitioners. It had also highlighted the stark differences between the 
trajectories of the elite-educated Americans with whom I associated 
the queer academic project, and my own academic socialisation in 
a sprawling and comparatively underfunded public university in 
Canada, where there are still no private institutions of higher learning 
with any general credibility, and where the neo-Christian right-wing 
lobby has had a currently creeping, but comparatively insignificant, 
influence on social policy.
The general interest of this sort of autobiographical commentary 
is probably limited, so let’s move on. What were the contents of the 
upsetting leaflet? What exactly was my problem with it? Published by 
a coalition of queer voters in New York called the Empire State Pride 
Agenda, its pages presented selective profiles of the main candidates, 
both Democrat and Republican, running for the offices of President, 
Senator, State Senator, and Member of the State Assembly. Each profile 
summarised the history of the aspirant’s policy positions on issues 
of concern to gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered persons. No 
concerted effort was made to document the candidates’ perspectives 
on any other issue: gun control, education, the death penalty, taxation, 
foreign policy or health care (generally speaking, that is beyond the 
specific concerns related to HIV/AIDS and reproductive rights). Only 
policies obviously related to civil rights for non-heterosexual citizens 
were meaningfully broached.
This briefest of summaries makes the leaflet’s general strategy 
quite patent. But the devil, as they say, is in the detail. The Agenda’s 
members made their endorsements on the basis of results from 
a questionnaire circulated to New York state queers. Questions 
covered ‘the following topics: comprehensive civil rights protections; 
protecting students from anti-gay harassment in schools; funding for 
our health and human service needs; anti-discrimination protections 
in the issuing of insurance policies; funeral and bereavement leave 
for same-sex partners; opposition to the state anti-gay marriage bill; 
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support of multicultural curriculum in our schools; age-appropriate 
sex education; HIV transmission prevention and counselling for the 
seropositive; and recognition of our relationships through domestic 
partnership, civil union, and/or same-sex marriage legislation’. Bear in 
mind for the upcoming discussion that several topics on this list express 
interests that extend beyond the queer community strictly speaking, 
however one may wish to define it, to include the citizenry or people 
in general: health care, women’s reproductive rights, multicultural and 
sex education, in particular. 
On the level of its address, however, the pamphlet presupposed a 
specific, clearly delimited community subtracted from the whole. The 
members of this community expressed the interests of an explicit 
‘we’. The issues of health care and health insurance, for instance, 
were approached not as concerns that raise the general question of 
each and every citizen’s access to the benefits they provide, but rather 
as a question of ‘our’ specific needs and right to protection from 
discrimination. 
The exclusivity of the address works well in the instance of sex 
education: we can be confident that in our efforts to have educators 
broach strategies for safer same-sex relations, they won’t forget to talk 
about contraceptive methods. (Note that my ‘our’ is different from the 
Agenda’s in that it’s more than likely that many straight people as well 
will undertake the efforts I refer to). 
The case of health care is probably the one that most clearly brings 
out the strategy’s most troubling political consequences. In the absence 
of any reference to the broad politics of health care as such, we’re 
led to assume that all will be fine as long as we queers are protected 
from the phobic discrimination of private insurance providers and 
the ominously named American health management organisations 
(HMOs). To be perfectly explicit, the health care system’s status quo 
is left entirely unquestioned; the frame is limited to the ambition of 
preventing discrimination against queers in the system as it currently 
stands. Also worthy of note is the tokenistic gesture towards multicul-
turalism, made in acknowledgment of the fact that some of us are of 
colour. Parenthetically, this gives rise to a curious logical difficulty for 
non-queer non-whites, who belong to ‘us’ on the level of their racial 
difference, but are at the same time excluded for being straight.
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The interest of the pamphlet lies in the sort of political subject it 
presupposes. Scandalised, I realised that it enjoined me implicitly to vote 
for the fiscally conservative homosexual or queer-friendly Republican 
(rare, but not non-existent) in favour of capital punishment and low 
corporate taxes, instead of the Democrat pushing for a patients’ bill of 
rights and the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry, but who may 
have spoken out against gay marriage. 
To be blunt, not having the right to vote in the election wasn’t the 
saddest prospect. Yet, it also struck me that on the most fundamental 
level there was something even more disturbing about the picture 
the leaflet painted: its survey of gay-rights issues was utterly devoid 
of any critical or alternative horizon. It simply rehearsed the already 
existing binary of Democrat or Republican options, leaving without 
comment the massively circumscribed field of choices on offer. The 
pamphlet failed to offer any authentic political choice, betraying in 
the process an exasperating blindness. To limit sexual politics to the 
narrow horizon of American liberal democracy is to betray important 
elements of the tradition of sexual activism and critique to which its 
agenda, apparently unknowingly, was indebted. In other words, the 
Agenda’s programme remained totally oblivious to the inspiration 
earlier generations of gay activists drew in both theory and practice 
from the socialist political tradition.
Let’s imagine for a second an intrepid queer archivist of the current 
moment. Wanting to get to the source of what I’m going on about, 
he or she digs up the pamphlet, now already more than a decade old. 
Given the state of contemporary queer politics, I can almost hear this 
researcher raising their voice, objecting to my argument as outlined thus 
far. Does my reading not implicitly attribute a prescriptive dimension 
to a publication deliberately addressed to a specific audience united by 
a single set of concerns? I might also be reproached for a naïvety, for a 
lack of appreciation for certain American political realities. ‘He’s clearly 
unaware of the full diversity of forms of politicisation in the historical 
gay and lesbian movements’, some might interject. There are, after all, 
lesbian Republicans, and an inclusive Pride Agenda should set itself 
the task of providing them as well with the information they need to 
exercise their constitutionally enshrined democratic rights.
Further, sceptics might reason that the leaflet makes no assumptions 
at all about its readers’ other, non-gay-related, political convictions: 
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it simply presents itself as a resource to a constituency united by its 
concern for a particular experience of discrimination or marginali-
sation linked to homosexual desire. The difference of the group of 
individuals concerned, they might add, is different in an important 
way from that of other historically oppressed groups: women, Asian 
Americans or illegal immigrants, for example. The difference at issue 
is tied to the notion that those whom it marks experience desire in a 
way generally deemed inappropriate, and who have, since at least the 
moment of the famed Stonewall riots in New York City, emerged into 
political visibility in unprecedented fashion only during our relatively 
recent and unusually privileged millennial historical moment.
Post-Marxism and Homosexuality
It could indeed be claimed that queer people make up the most 
radically new of the new social movements of which Ernesto Laclau, 
Chantal Mouffe and innumerable others before and since have spoken 
since at least the early 1970s.2 The historical novelty of a group of 
citizens who predicate their politicisation on a notion of sexuality 
could be submitted as evidence. As has been well documented, these 
newly audible political voices have justified, since the dawn of the 
New Left, the reorientation of Marxist and post-Marxist political 
discourses away from what had been, historically, their central 
concerns: a view of social antagonism and cultural production as 
determined predominantly by the economy; a critique of ‘democracy’ 
under the conditions of liberalism as democracy for the bourgeoisie, 
and in that sense disguised tyranny; and a utopian impulse positing a 
reconciliation of class antagonism under a revolutionary and non- or 
post-capitalist mode of production. ‘What is now in crisis’, Laclau and 
Mouffe wrote in 1985,
is a whole conception of socialism which rests upon the ontological 
centrality of the working class, upon the role of Revolution with a 
capital ‘r’, as the founding moment in the transition from one type 
of society to another, and upon the illusory prospect of a perfectly 
unitary and homogeneous collective that will render pointless the 
moment of politics. (2) 
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Replacing these allegedly metaphysical fantasies was an appreciation 
for the new proliferation of different identities. The concrete political 
demands coming from these new identities, it was suggested, were 
couched in a new set of assumptions. These assumptions moved 
beyond the conceptual reach of a Marxist tradition now exposed as 
insufficiently cognisant of cultural and sexual differences. 
While there have been instances of the subversive eruption of 
feminine and minority voices claiming rights in the name of a 
variously configured difference throughout the modern era, including 
within Marxism itself, it’s only since the invention of sexuality as a 
field of scientific inquiry in the nineteenth century that subjects have 
presented their interests in the public sphere as different, not on account 
of any objectively identifiable trait such as race or sex, but rather on 
account of their desire. Since then, this non-heterosexual desire has 
gone on to produce more and more numerous subdifferentiations. It’s 
been in reference to this new sexual paradigm of difference that the 
numerous gay and lesbian movements of the past four decades have 
put themselves3 forward as deserving gestures of cultural recognition 
and legal accommodation. These gestures have aimed to account for 
the particularity of their ways of being, and offer protection from 
social discrimination. 
No doubt it’s uncontroversial – banal, even – to claim today that 
the emergence into full visibility of self-identified sexual minorities 
coincides, in general historical terms, with the collapse of the Eastern 
bloc, the broad discrediting of Marxian political ideology, and the 
ensuing intellectual hegemony of a (neo)liberalism distinguished by 
how it links up in an essential way the purge-crazy totalitarianism of 
Stalinism to the very kernel, libidinal or conceptual, of the socialist 
utopian impulse. Already in the early 1970s, Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari had explicitly linked the ‘deterritorialising’ expansion 
of capital with a post-oedipal destructuring of not only the structures 
of kinship, but also the set of categories that serve to classify sex 
and sexuality.4 
Further, the relative commercial success in the US of a film like 
Before Night Falls (2000), the Julian Schnabel-directed biopic about 
Reinaldo Arenas – an openly gay Cuban literary figure whom the 
Castro regime ‘imprisoned’ in 1973 – highlighted the increasing 
awareness in Western capitalist consciousness of the hostility orthodox 
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Marxist humanism had often shown to homosexual desire and the 
persons who experience it.5 To take this evidence at face value is to 
conclude that you can’t have an official Marxism and actually existing 
homosexuals in the same place at the same time. Further, if capitalism, 
as so much evidence does indeed show, has functioned historically to 
erode the bourgeois-patriarchal family structures that fuel the fires 
of homophobia, then it seems logical to conclude that the best anti-
homophobic strategy is indeed a libidinally exuberant queer embrace 
of unlimited capitalist expansion.
These are perhaps only the most obvious reasons why one has been 
hard put, since the dawn of queer theory, to find an authentically 
radical socialist voice – one that goes so far as to seek after the 
material and historical conditions of possibility of the homosexual 
political movements. While they underscored what we might call the 
socially progressive power of capitalism with respect to conventional 
family forms and gender codes, Deleuze and Guattari influentially 
abandoned the properly Marxist project of capitalism’s critique in 
favour of a celebration of capitalism’s full anarchic potential. 
It’s been an equally challenging task over the past three decades to 
find texts that pose the touchy problem of the dependence of these 
movements on an implicit and largely unconscious acceptance of the 
bourgeois (liberal-democratic) political framework, beyond which it 
has proven so difficult to see. Moreover, those anti-liberal tendencies 
in queer theory that do exist tend towards a knee-jerk anti-statism, 
which implicitly confines their political reach to an ill-defined non-
communitarian community or subculture. 
In sum, since the dawn of queer theory, non-libertarian and non- 
or post-liberal – not to mention explicitly Marxist – approaches to 
homosexuality have been extremely rare.6 Certainly, classical Marxism 
itself hasn’t helped matters. With the exception of a smattering of 
quite banal, decidedly unscientific, homophobic comments in their 
correspondence, Marx and Engels themselves were significantly 
unconcerned with homosexuality. The historical record shows that this 
oversight has since led many major Marxist strategists and theorists 
to the silly conclusion that homosexuality as such is objectively 
reactionary or bourgeois.
Now, the work of Judith Butler immediately comes to mind when 
it comes to the productive encounter that has taken place between the 
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concerns of the radical democratic left and the interests of the historically 
unprecedented sexual minority communities. For this reason, anyone 
who broaches the question of queer theory’s problematic relation to 
Marxism has an obligation to take her work into account. Two of her 
texts from the millennium’s turn – one questioning the implications 
for sexuality and kinship of the structuralist matrix of poststructur-
alist theory; the other presenting scrappy theoretical exchanges with 
two influential left-identified interlocutors – acquired tremendous 
significance by virtue of their effort to hook queer theory up with 
the major currents of progressive political theory at the end of the 
twentieth century. 
It’s become clear in retrospect that Butler’s engagement with the 
category of the universal went a considerable way towards resuscitating 
it from its premature cardiac arrest at the close of a postmodern age, 
guilty of making a fetish of difference. Despite the massive impact 
of Foucault’s reformulation of power on Butler’s work in gender and 
sexuality theory, this turn towards the universal, quite surprising from 
this perspective, helped counteract the troubling inwardness that has 
significantly separated the imagination of queer theory’s political 
future from the crucial debates around the ideas of democracy and 
communism, as well as the forms of national and supranational – 
state and non-state – power to which these categories are tethered. In 
short, the recuperation of the idea of the universal made it possible 
once again to connect the exercise of power to more concrete agencies 
– not the least of which being capitalism – than it was possible 
to do under the paradigm, massively influential for radical queer 
theory, of that omniscient but empty, subjective but non-intentional, 
discourse-power tandem that was Foucault’s final and transformative 
theoretical contribution. 
The publication during the same millennial year of Judith Butler’s 
Wellek lectures on Antigone, and the ‘dialogues on the left’ between 
Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek, was important not only 
because it forced the ‘issue’ of homosexuality onto the broader terrain 
of contemporary political theory. Additionally, it presented, however 
potentially, an exciting opportunity to rescue queer theory from its 
increasing political irrelevance by coaxing it, kicking and screaming as 
it were, beyond the limits of the differentialist horizon within which, 
almost without exception, it had been confined. 
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Moreover, the dominant poststructuralist strand of queer theory 
set itself the goal of tracing the construction of the difference of 
non-heterosexual subjects within the existing discursive order 
without questioning this order’s dependence on its socioeconomic 
base, however this dependence might be conceived. By contrast, the 
reactivation of the universal cleared a space for queer theory to ally 
itself with more politically challenging currents of thought. The 
question I wish to pose in this context is whether or not the neo-
universalism set forth in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality might 
help set the conditions for a more thoroughgoing vision of general 
social emancipation which, ultimately, would be of benefit to everyone 
without exception – queer and unqueer alike. 
Before considering how it might contribute to such a political 
reawakening, however, more details about the parameters of this 
redeployment of the universal will be required. More precisely, it will 
prove instructive to contextualise the nature and consequences of the 
theoretical conflicts that animate the debate, not only between the 
co-authors of Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, but also between 
the radical democratic discourse – in dialogue with both Marxism 
and psychoanalysis – and the dominant assumptions of queer theory, 
as they have influentially taken form over the last quarter century in 
Butler’s work. 
As I work my way through a selection of issues broached in 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, and further developed in Butler’s 
Antigone’s Claim, I’ll aim to develop two main points. First, the battle 
between Butler and Žižek concerning the political stakes of the 
category of the real in Lacanian psychoanalysis, originally pitched two 
decades ago,7 has to my mind been decisively ‘won’ by Žižek. By this 
I mean quite simply that the element of queer theory that has seen in 
the real a nefarious naturalisation of heterosexuality has based itself 
on an unpersuasive reading of Lacan. (There is indeed a low-grade 
heterosexism in the early Lacan, but it disappears in the later teaching, 
and is flatly contradicted in the major work on sexuation in the 1970s.) 
Indeed, it should now generally be acknowledged that Butler is a 
weak reader of Lacan. Further, the inability of Butler’s argument to 
appreciate the agency of the real in sexual difference is closely related 
to her discourse’s unwillingness to proceed to an examination of the 
consequences of the identification of capital or the market as a kind of 
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real, against which the more challengingly welcome anti-liberal aspect 
of her discourse continually runs up. That is, an analogy can be drawn 
between how the real becomes a normative instance for sexuality in 
Butler, and how capital takes form as a horizon beyond which her 
thought chooses not to explore.
Second, queer theory discourse is so entrenched in the presuppositions 
of poststructuralism that it should simply be abandoned – left to 
those content with accommodating the demands of non-heterosexual 
constituencies within the general framework of the ‘third way’ liberal 
democracy originally promulgated in the Anglo-American world by 
Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. The poststructuralist notions that must 
be left behind include its latently identitarian anti-identitarianism 
(paradigmatically, identity is ‘subverted’ only to be brought in through 
the back door as contingent, strategic, multiform, incomplete, partial); 
its minoritarian and absolutist anti-statism (the state by definition 
seeks nefariously to normalise sexuality); and its lack of an anti-
capitalist critical horizon. The current state of rights-based queer 
political activism, including that aspect of it that acknowledges the 
limitations of the liberalist rights framework, is so deeply mired in the 
exploitative logic of capital that the optimal radical strategy is actually 
to declare the whole category of sexual orientation irremediably 
bourgeois. This gesture of negation opens up a space for the creation 
of a different form of political thought in which sexuality plays a new, 
more politically consequential, form. 
Already, I hear indignant protestations. ‘Go back to your Reinaldo 
Arenas example’, some might insist. Does his case not show how a 
‘totalitarian’ regime that rejects rights-based discourse as bourgeois 
inherently tends towards the criminalisation of minority sexualities? 
Let’s assume for the moment that there was indeed systemic 
discrimination against homosexuals in the early Castro era in Cuba. 
Is it not also possible to say that the logic that supports this oppression 
– not uncharacteristic, to be sure, of ‘actually existing’ socialist social 
policy throughout the twentieth century – is symptomatic of the 
Castro regime’s failure to dismiss sexuality as a reliably descriptive 
political, or even sociological, category? In other words, surely it makes 
more sense to claim that the Cuban communists’ error lay in their 
inability to accept a simple fact: if homosexuality is indeed a bourgeois 
phenomenon, then surely heterosexuality must be as well. 
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The objectively reactionary concept is therefore neither 
homosexuality nor heterosexuality, but rather the very idea of sexual 
orientation itself. More precisely, the authentic socialist insight is 
precisely the illegitimacy of the move from an idea of sexual identity 
or behaviour to a determinate political judgment. More strongly, as 
psychoanalysis would concur, the very premise that sexuality lends 
itself to identity categories and their deconstruction is what is most 
essentially bourgeois about the discourse of sexual orientation. 
Post-Post-Marxism and Sexuality
We can now turn to the texts themselves. The three terms of the 
Dialogues’ title – contingency, hegemony and universality – encapsulate 
what’s at stake in negotiations of left or progressive political theory at a 
moment, marked still by the clash between orthodox Marxist historicist 
teleology (capitalism leads inexorably to its revolutionary overthrow) 
and the newer postmodern politics predicated on identity claims and 
their interrogation or subversion. We should also note the significance 
today of the postcolonial context and the question of the recognition 
of cultural and ethnic identities associated with the discourse of multi-
culturalism – a half-century old story in the North American context, 
but still topical and controversial in Europe. A closer examination of 
the terrain occupied by our key titular terms is therefore in order. 
First, contingency: for Laclau, Antonio Gramsci’s significance for 
Marxist theory lies in his suggestion that a political subject, individual 
or collective, will bear no perfectly predictable relation to the material 
situation that surrounds it. Thus, ‘there is no necessity whose 
consciousness exhausts our subjectivity – political or otherwise’,8 nor is 
it possible accurately to identify particular agents who would harbour 
special revolutionary investments in consequence of a putatively 
objective structural position in the mode of production. Laclau’s 
Gramsci precociously deconstructs orthodox Marxism’s idealisation 
of the proletariat as history’s predestined collective actor. Given the 
failure of both second world Soviet-style economies and third world 
developing ones to delink successfully from the logic of global capital 
and the influence of neoliberal trade law, does it still make sense to 
uphold capitalism as a socioeconomic reality that can be transcended, 
overcome? Further, in light of the poststructuralist commonplace that 
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identity claims are historically contingent, structurally incomplete 
or necessarily failed, is the traditional Marxist category of ‘class’ to 
be relegated to the same suspect status as the other, latterly more 
fashionable, iterations of difference, including in particular the 
category of sexuality from which queer theory has ambivalently 
sought an escape? 
Next, hegemony: classical Marxism argued for the determination 
of superstructural social elements (state, civil society, public sphere, 
culture, etc.) by a base of factors constituting a society’s means of 
production of the necessities (including, in late or advanced capitalism, 
the less necessary ones) of life. Laclau and Mouffe’s work strove to 
cloud the transparency of this relation, uncovering the significance 
of what they considered the self-conscious, actively willed instances 
of political organisation that occur at least in part independently of 
structural determination. In consequence, these new political forms 
are able to convey, in their view, an extremely broad spectrum of public 
and private interests. Further, Laclau and Mouffe claimed to find a 
space of indeterminacy or impossibility in the social field characterised 
by an immanent and insurmountable antagonism, calling ‘hegemony’ 
the temporary and contingent filling in of this space by a particular set 
of political interests. 
It’s startling to think that a full quarter century has passed since 
Laclau and Mouffe put forth the view that the hegemony concept 
acts as a kind of vanishing mediator between orthodox Marxist class 
‘essentialism’ and the world of free-floating post-industrial identities 
and competing ideologies which, so they claimed, replaced it. Their 
version of hegemony appealed to social constituencies inclined 
to think that the privileging of class struggle as the prime mover of 
history performs a kind of violence which targets the proliferation of 
differences. These differences should therefore absorb class to create a 
level playing field among the competing signifiers of social identity.9 
Since this view’s popular apogee in the 1990s, however, numerous 
critics, including myself, have concluded that this articulation of the 
hegemony concept was itself a product of the ideologies of liberal 
democracy and multinational capital. We began to wonder if the 
knee-jerk association of the revolutionary or anti-capitalist ‘grand 
narrative’, with the inevitability of crimes against difference, was 
simply one of the forms of liberal blackmail that police the boundaries 
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of political thought. This association effectively forces us to abandon 
ambitious agendas for social change as the price paid for the defence 
of hard-fought victories on the terrain of race, gender and sexuality.
Finally, universality: in the last few decades, cultural critics on 
the left have increasingly argued that the postmodern emphasis on 
difference, specificity and particularity makes us lose sight of: (a) the 
socioeconomic realm, by turning a blind eye to the production of 
difference by a capitalist totality or world system; or (b) the sociopolitical 
realm, by misrecognising the fact that by virtue of the lack of closure of 
the general social field (the barred Other for Lacanians, the structural 
necessity of suture or articulation for the radical democrats) any 
expression of a particular political interest always manifests either 
an implicit call to the universal, or else a formally necessary gesture 
of universalisation. 
But how exactly is this reference to the universal to be understood? 
Is the dimension of the universal akin to a neutral a priori structural 
gap or emptiness, as Laclau argues, whose position is then filled in by 
a hegemonic political formation? Or is it rather, as Žižek suggests, and 
as Butler seems to concur, the result of a primal or original gesture 
of violent exclusion? In the latter scenario, the very field of political 
hegemony depends on such a moment of exclusion, and features in 
consequence an irreducible dimension of historicity. In short, is the 
terrain of the universal a neutral but punctured Habermasian public 
sphere equally accessible to all? Or is it rather a pre-constituted field 
or logic, which decides in advance what is and what is not a legitimate 
candidate for universalisation?
There are some especially telling threads in Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality, which link up not only with the concept of the universal, 
but also with the politics of kinship of concern to Butler in Antigone’s 
Claim, and in queer theory more generally. Indeed, one of the 
motivations behind Butler’s examination of the critical reception of 
the Sophocles tragedy is to develop how Antigone’s defiance suggests 
a radical critique of kinship, one that denounces all efforts on the 
part of the state to normalise family structures through a process of 
selective legitimisation. The examples in question are the still-topical 
controversy in Western public opinion at the turn of the millennium 
concerning the desirability of the legalisation of gay marriage, and 
the more US-specific debate about the rights of homosexuals to join 
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the military and be open about their sexualities (the notorious ‘don’t 
ask, don’t tell’ policy introduced under the Clinton administration). 
Although the gay marriage issue (along with its kissing cousin the 
civil union) has arisen in numerous jurisdictions outside the US, the 
timbre of Butler’s discussion as well as the military element lend it 
a distinctively American feel. Still, the significance of these examples 
extends beyond America’s borders by virtue of the fact that they 
feature (nationally) universal social ‘forms’ (again: marriage and 
military service, or at least the eligibility for it), which are essential to 
most modern liberal conceptions of citizenship. These conceptions 
are designed to dissimulate disavowed exclusions of particular 
constituencies (here: homosexuals).
The question arises as to whether or not the inclusion of the excluded 
particular within the realm of the universal has an inherent political 
effect. There then arises an even more crucial question concerning 
whether or not the very goal of inclusion sidesteps a more foundational 
issue regarding the constitution of the field of universality in the first 
instance. We can take the example of marriage as a means of working 
through these questions. The anti-homophobic critic who sets out to 
answer the first question will inquire after the effects of the extension 
of marriage rights to couples previously deemed ineligible. By contrast, 
the one who addresses the second will instead interrogate the ways in 
which the legal form of marriage, regardless of its particular content, 
discriminates – with respect to taxation and state or corporate social 
benefits, for example – against subjects who by choice or circumstance 
don’t find their lives linked in such a special way to a single person. 
Further, this latter line of inquiry has the benefit of emphasising 
that the discourse about ‘gays in the military’ glosses over the question 
of why they would want to be there in the first place, given in particular 
the long-standing hypocrisy of US foreign policy, the role of the US 
military in shady neo-imperial and terrorist activity around the world, 
and the long-standing and extraordinarily effective taboo against the 
politicisation of the defence budget in American public discourse. 
Butler is justifiably concerned about all of these issues when she 
underscores how the conceptual horizon of inclusion takes for granted 
– leaves unquestioned – the normative framework to which one, as an 
excluded subject, seeks access:
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One might say that the advances that are sought by mainstream 
liberal activists (inclusion in the military and in marriage) are an 
extension of democracy and a hegemonic advance to the extent that 
lesbian and gay people are making the claim to be treated as equal 
to other citizens with respect to these obligations and entitlements, 
and that the prospect of their inclusion in these institutions is a 
sign that they are at present carrying the universalizing promise of 
hegemony itself. But this would not be a salutary conclusion, for the 
instatement of these questionable rights and obligations for some 
lesbians and gays establishes norms of legitimation that work to 
remarginalize others and foreclose possibilities for sexual freedom 
which have also been long-standing goals of the movement. The 
naturalization of the military-marriage goal for gay politics also 
marginalizes those for whom one or the other of these institutions 
is anathema, if not inimical. (160) 
Before considering this argument in detail, I wish to signal one 
underlying problem I’ll have occasion to develop at a later point. Butler’s 
programme to dissect the machinations of power in the normative 
constitution of the universal has recourse to an ideal of sexual freedom 
as an ultimate good, which by default remains outside the realm of 
politicisation. This feature not only indicates how her framework 
never completely steps outside the liberal ideology she attacks, but 
also bespeaks a fundamental and quite dangerous misunderstanding 
of the failures of safer-sex education in the gay community, as well as 
the history of HIV transmission between men. It’s also clear, however, 
that Butler’s point carries a basic and irrefutable significance. To the 
considerable extent that mainstream gay and lesbian politics never 
stretches beyond the horizon of inclusion, visibility and equality, the 
more crucial question of the ideological context in which these ideas 
are posited is left entirely unexamined. 
Take the example of early twenty-first-century US network 
television. Despite the clamorous protestations of right-wing 
evangelical and family-values groups, one can represent gays and 
lesbians – in fact, if one doesn’t one can be subjected to effective 
consumer boycotts by groups such as the very Hollywood GLAAD 
(formerly the Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation)– as long as 
they’re young, attractive, well-paid professionals living in impossible 
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apartments; as long as their lives proceed without friction against the 
dominant corporatist and consumerist ethic; as long as their problems 
stay well within the limits of the familiar comedic-melodramatic, 
properly psychological, terrain of relationships and affairs of the heart, 
intriguing though these can surely be. In short, the legitimate concern 
here is for all those queer subjects who will never see themselves 
on TV. 
Admirably, Butler’s argument underscores how official forms of 
social legitimisation conferred by regimes of state and corporate power 
create a shadowy parallel universe of invisible and voiceless subjects, 
who are concretely oppressed by such instances of normative control. 
Also, and more radically, these subjects remain socially and culturally 
unintelligible; underneath the threshold of representability – that 
which conditions all recognisable forms of viable life. 
In his final contribution to the Dialogues, Žižek latches on to Butler’s 
provocative examples, and makes a subtle but powerful point upon 
which I’d like to elaborate. This point pertains not to the violent primal 
exclusions that a field of universal intelligibility effects as it takes 
form, but rather to the logic of the relation between these exclusions, 
as Butler defines them, and her views – communitarian, anti-statist, 
in short ambiguous – about concrete political agency in an era of 
increasingly unrestrained transnational capitalist expansion. Žižek 
reproaches Butler for harbouring a view of state power excessively 
indebted to late-period Foucault, whose argument (I suggested earlier) 
tends towards a paranoid construction of its unlimited productivity. 
Butler’s construal of power’s operation fails to apprehend how ‘state 
power is split from within and relies on its own obscene spectral 
underside’ (313), as Žižek characteristically puts it. What power thinks 
it’s doing and what power actually does, in other words, are two very 
different things. 
To some, this point might seem like an abstruse theoreticist 
quibble. Does it really make any difference to our understanding of 
politics whether state power is an unambivalent expression of the law’s 
normative reach, or rather a force which is, you could say, structurally 
hypocritical – which depends upon, and works in tandem with, its own 
violation? The best example here is the Catholic church’s institutional 
power. While it tells you how it fosters the spiritual growth of today’s 
youth, and positions itself as a moral authority on the topic of child 
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rearing, it has engaged in an alarmingly systematic practice involving 
the sexual abuse of children. I go along with Žižek when he protests 
that Butler’s qualification of the relation between the normative 
instance of state power (‘the law’, in this context) and its register of 
abject exclusions as one of antagonism rather than disavowed comple-
mentarity, leads the American critic to underestimate the importance 
of addressing the normative instance itself. That is, very often the 
politically effective move involves acknowledging with psychoanalysis 
that transgression is already (unconsciously) taken account of by, 
and is therefore dependent on, the law. In consequence, the tactic of 
praising transgression – of positing a ‘subversive’ effect for the law’s 
violation – can have the unexpected consequence of confirming the 
law’s effective authority. 
Wedded to Subversion
The example of gay marriage illustrates this last point in a particularly 
illuminating way. Marriage conventionally – heterosexually – 
conceived is almost universally viewed in both social and religious 
discourses to be the linchpin of the social bond; the unique relation that 
stands for the cohesion of the total set of relations making up the social 
as a whole. In universalist liberal rights discourse, the right to marry is 
often listed alongside the basic rights to life and liberty. The vocabulary 
of kinship cross-culturally is incomprehensible in the absence of the 
idea of marriage in its stunningly varied forms, including those it took 
in matriarchal societies. This was taken for granted even in earliest 
Marxism, most notably by Frederick Engels in his landmark text The 
Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884). Few would 
disagree that marriage has functioned historically, and to a large extent 
even today continues to function even in the most liberal cultures and 
state regimes, as a precondition of political and cultural legitimacy, 
indeed of full citizenship as such. 
Yet, if we suppose that marriage, considered as a form of state 
or civil discipline, produces as its social effect a set of abject or 
delegitimated subjects who carry subversive potentialities by virtue 
of their mere existence outside the norm, then we simply fail to 
appreciate the significance of how the marriage institution concretely 
enables its own adulterous transgressions. By this I mean not only that 
Penney T02732 01 text   55 08/10/2013   08:16
after queer theory
56
marriage in its modern bourgeois form has always worked at least in 
part in synchrony with the various forms of unfaithful enjoyment it 
enables. (How many such marriages have functioned, for example, as 
preconditions for a spouse’s, usually of course the man’s, heterosexual 
or homosexual dalliances.) Also, just as significantly, contemporary 
bourgeois marriage lays the groundwork for the establishment of an 
idle and dreamy vicariousness through which a spouse disguises his or 
her illicit fantasies about a single friend’s sex life under condescending 
assurances that this same friend will soon find a splendid partner.
It’s in this sense that marriage in its status as a legal contract assumes 
the function Žižek designates with a term from Hegelian logic: concrete 
universality. Marriage presents itself as a sort of allegory of the social 
bond. Yet, in the vast majority of jurisdictions, it’s concretely available 
only to heterosexual subjects of acceptable amounts of generally 
acknowledged attractiveness, a minimal level of material comfort or 
social prestige, and an apparent conventionality of lifestyle. In light 
of this reality, we would be gravely mistaken to underestimate the 
political power that can be exercised when a covertly excluded party 
invades the terrain of universality. 
Given in particular the conservative and deeply patriarchal 
mobilisation of the marriage institution in the US, it isn’t difficult 
to envisage how the inclusion of same-sex couples within the set of 
marriageable partners can potentially discredit marriage in its very 
concept. Indeed, the notion that the legalisation of gay marriage 
will effectively ruin the institution, that it has the power to subvert 
marriage’s very meaning for everyone, is a constant refrain of the 
widely broadcast family-values ditty. Cultural commentators of the 
moral majority persuasion have repeatedly pronounced that when 
same-sex partners are allowed to marry, ‘marriage won’t be marriage 
anymore’. The fact that gay marriage has now existed for several years 
in a number of nation-states, including Canada, without in any way 
destroying the institution, has made only negligible impact on the 
persistence of the dynamic I’ve just described.
The logic isn’t difficult to appreciate. Social conservatives explicitly 
admit to the not-so-hidden truth of marriage when they recognise 
that the concept depends on what we could call its decreasingly 
dissimulated heterosexual essentialism. Despite the widespread 
acceptance of homosexuality in many parts of Europe and North 
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America, the fact that only a handful of nations have legalised equal 
marriage (as opposed to civil union) lends support to this last claim. 
Illogically, conservative pundits often proceed as if one can oppose 
gay marriage and remain immune to charges of homophobia and 
discrimination. Further, queer radicals often insist that arguments 
in favour of gay marriage voiced by homosexuals betray the dreaded 
‘internalised homophobia’. 
In light of these realities, it’s hardly counterintuitive to imagine that 
the apparently banal and conformist image of the suburban upper-
middle-class homosexual couple with one point three children and 
two SUVs has the effect of radically calling into question the terms of 
the social bond as such. I would go so far as to argue that the hirsute 
leather-bound BDSM muscle daddy, or the pierced and tattooed 
biker dyke (also known to be leather-clad), is much less threatening 
to conventional morality than the couple who, despite their shared 
biological sex, look and behave ‘exactly like us’. 
Of course, it would make no sense at all to offer up this troublingly 
normal suburban pair as an ideal of progressive or revolutionary 
political praxis. Still, the paradoxical logic inherent in gay marriage’s 
surprisingly subversive consequences no doubt accounts for the 
comparatively wider acceptance of domestic partnership and civil 
union across the liberal and secular West. The French even invented 
a new form of legal union – the PACS – to keep marriage safe from 
the homosexuals.10 Widespread opposition to same-sex adoption, 
even in jurisdictions where gay marriage has been legalised, further 
underscores the powerful oppositional effects of a culturally normative 
homosexuality. Families headed by same-sex parents, in other 
words, expose the stubborn intractability of the modern family’s 
heterosexual essentialism. Tellingly, in many jurisdictions, the figure 
of a committed homosexual couple raising a child together seems to be 
more threatening than that of a gay single parent. 
These admittedly selective observations make it tempting to 
conclude that the more gay cultures are mainstreamed – not in the 
sense of the emergence of gay ‘markets’ in global capitalism (the ‘pink 
pound’ in the UK for instance) or of the representation of upper-
middle-class homosexual characters on network television, but rather 
with respect to the increasing resemblance of many gay couples and 
families to their heterosexual counterparts across the socioeconomic 
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strata – the more the most foundational assumptions about the cultural 
intelligibility of sexual identities are called into question. 
Contrary to what Butler argues, and counterintuitive though it may 
seem, the best way to attack the marriage form as such may very well 
be through an act of straightforward (no pun intended) conformity 
or imitation. The result of the full integration of homosexual couples 
within the universal set of privileges accruing from the institution 
of marriage might give rise to the dissolution of this very field of 
universality – indeed, to the elimination of the bourgeois family 
unit as the linchpin of mainstream liberal politics. Potentially, the 
definition of marriage could expand beyond the same-sex couple in 
such a way that the institution’s meaning becomes a question merely 
of legal rights and responsibilities between individuals, devoid of 
any normative content whatsoever concerning who these individuals 
must be.
Vicissitudes of Antigone
The political terrain of family and kinship is more broadly explored 
in Antigone’s Claim, where Butler endeavours to trace contemporary 
attitudes on these topics through structuralism and German idealism, 
all the way back to the foundations of Western culture in Greek 
antiquity. Butler’s reading of Antigone re-examines the concept of 
kinship in contemporary theory, its place in culture and civil society, 
and its relation to the forms of state power. Butler views Antigone’s 
defiant action – recall that she contravenes king Creon’s edict by 
burying her brother Polynices, an enemy of the polis – as an ultimately 
doomed effort to ‘defy the state through a powerful set of physical and 
linguistic acts’.11 These acts, for Butler, suggest a new kind of feminism, 
which she hopes will take on the power of the state to set the conditions 
not simply for legitimate kinship relations, but more fundamentally 
for basic political, social and cultural intelligibility. Butler sums up her 
view of the significance of Antigone’s act when she identifies the two 
questions Sophocles’ original play poses to the contemporary reader: 
‘whether there can be kinship without the support and mediation of 
the state, and whether there can be the state without the family as its 
support and mediation’ (5). 
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As many have done before her, Butler finds in Antigone’s defiance 
a protest against a certain authoritarian and patriarchal form of power. 
This power delineates a notion of the universal collective good and, 
through this delineation, sets up conditions of intelligibility for the 
expression of legitimate political interests. Antigone doesn’t merely 
violate Creon’s edict, in other words. More consequentially, she calls 
into question the entire ideological frame through which this edict 
can be read as an exemplar of that collective good. Butler reviews how 
references to Antigone’s challenge are scattered widely across the texts 
that form the Western tradition of ethics (Hegel, Hölderlin, Lacan, 
among others). She traces Antigone’s impact to the way her act of 
defiance exposes the parameters by means of which collective social 
norms are instituted and contested. 
According to Hegel’s famous interpretation of the tragedy in The 
Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Antigone acts in accordance with an 
ethical law connected to both the feminine realm of the household gods 
of the family, and the unknowable dimension of death, the meaning of 
which exceeds the public arena of political citizenship and commercial 
exchange. The ethical law enters into conflict with the masculine 
and political law of Creon, ruler of Thebes, whose legislative edicts 
are designed to ensure the smooth functioning of the polis, as well as 
the limitation of individual freedom in the name of the collectivity’s 
general well-being. A dialectical tension animates the relation 
between the two opposing laws. For Hegel, this tension occasions the 
destruction of the ancient ethical world in which everyone accepted 
their given place in society. This destruction engenders a new set of 
laws and customs with which subjects can no longer spontaneously 
identify. As a result, these laws and customs are newly experienced as 
constraints imposed by an alien authority. Coming into being here is 
the ‘modern’ conflict between individual desire and social law. 
In Butler’s view, the Hegelian reading brings into relief the ethical 
implications of the antagonism between the cultural forms of kinship 
and the regimes of legality enunciated in the state’s name. In his 
seminar on psychoanalytic ethics, Lacan presents a trenchant critique 
of the Hegelian reading.12 Butler takes this opportunity to link, in a first 
move, Antigone’s heroic act to the emergence of the structuralist idea 
of kinship in Lévi-Straussian anthropology (and its enlistment as the 
taboo-as-threshold-of-culture paradigm in Freudian psychoanalysis), 
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and to characterise, in a second gesture, the whole apparatus of 
Lacanian theory as an elaboration of ahistorical premises featuring 
putatively immutable sociosymbolic structures. ‘Lacanians tend to 
sever the symbolic account of kinship from the social’, Butler sums up, 
‘thus freezing the social arrangements of kinship as something intact 
and intractable’ (14).
The problem here lies in Butler’s assumption that the unnamed 
Lacanians to whom she refers are competent readers of Lacan. Butler 
misconstrues Lacan’s concept of the real as banishing particular 
non-hegemonic forms of human life to a domain outside the field of 
culture, and therefore beyond the reach of social change. Further, she 
misunderstands Lacan’s idea of the symbolic order as proceeding from 
the premise of an a priori cultural taboo against both homosexuality 
and the free expression of feminine desire. No wonder, then, that only 
an explicitly patriarchal and heterosexist social economy can emerge 
from Butler’s distorted Lacanian assumptions. Both the symbolic and 
the real are normative in Butler’s Lacan in a rigidly determinative sense. 
In actuality, however, Lacan associated the real with the subversion 
of normativity as such. And as far as the symbolic order is concerned, its 
normative power is limited to the castrating function of the notorious 
father’s name. Belying feminist protestations, this name ultimately 
refers only to the signifier that indexes to the subject, regardless of its 
biological sex, its own unconscious knowledge that it has been ousted 
from its privileged position as object of the mother’s desire. 
Butler’s iteration of Lacanian concepts is based on a misapprehen-
sion of the relation between the symbolic and the real. Indeed, this 
‘relation’ is finally not a relation at all, since Lacan consistently chose to 
evoke the real not as a confirmation of symbolic law, but rather as the 
law’s undoing. The real, for Lacan, manifests the symbolic law’s own 
externality to itself, its self-difference. The real imposes as the symbolic 
order’s destiny the ceaseless repetition of its failure to totalise itself in 
such a way that it might impose a normative matrix for both sexual 
identity and kinship relations. 
Viewed in this light, Butler’s argument against Lacan rests on the 
false premise that an internally limited sociosymbolic structure – a 
structure that isn’t constrained from the outside by power, but rather 
one that effectively subverts itself from within – will dissimulate the 
naturalisation of a normative power regime which transcends history 
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and representation. This premise distorts Butler’s view of what Lacan 
says about Antigone’s defiance of the edict against her brother’s burial. 
On one level, Butler’s error lies in her assumption that the concept of 
the Lacanian symbolic is identical to a ‘structuralist’, putatively Lévi-
Straussian, framework in which every possible sociosymbolic system 
imposes specific conditions of cultural intelligibility overseen by the 
prohibition of incest, the exchange of women between kinship groups, 
and the psychosocial repression of homosexuality. According to Butler, 
Lacanian theorists, despite their protestations to the contrary, readily 
slip from speaking of the normative agency’s properly symbolic forms 
(i.e. the link between the ‘name of the father’ and any actual father 
is contingent) to statements that enforce concretely heterosexist social 
imperatives. ‘The distinction between symbolic and social law’, she 
concludes, ‘cannot finally hold’ (19). 
Although Butler is certainly right to cast a suspicious glance at 
the sometimes quite ridiculous social prognostications of some 
psychoanalysts, Lacanian and otherwise, it’s unclear where Butler finds 
the distinction she names, since Lacan himself never introduced such 
a concept as a properly social law in this sense. Lacan formulated the 
symbolic law’s strange failure to legislate effectively not with reference 
to particular social conventions (which everyone knows are historically 
contingent), but rather vis-à-vis an agency both unchanging and 
resistant to articulation – the real. Indeed, one of the fundamental 
focus-points of Lacan’s mid to later teaching is an elaboration of the 
consequences of the disarticulation of the symbolic from the real. 
This means that all possible sociosymbolic systems necessarily fail to 
conceal the traumatic eruption of the real, a central negativity which not 
only ensures the law’s impotence to legislate against its own violation, 
but which creates complicity between the law’s effective power and a 
supportive realm of obscene, socially disavowed transgression. 
This logic of inherent transgression, which Žižek, for one, has 
vividly evoked in his work, must force queer theory to re-examine 
how its argument presupposes an extraordinarily determinative ‘het-
eronormativity’ against which its programmes of subversion acquire 
their intuitive appeal. To reiterate, a sociosymbolic system is limited 
not by an externally imposed regime of power, but rather by an 
internal impossibility, which splits power’s expression from the field 
of its effects. It’s precisely the ‘space’ of this impossibility, this region 
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beyond or underneath the law, which Lacan wants to claim in his 
ethics seminar for Antigone’s act. Rather than merely transgress the 
law, Antigone’s act exposes, signifies, the disavowed dependence of 
the political good on often brutal programmes of exclusion, which 
selectively and violently delegitimise specific non-hegemonic forms of 
living being.
When he calls Antigone the guardian of her brother’s being, Lacan 
assumes that this dimension of being is what every sociosymbolic 
system lacks. Recall that Lacan defines the subject with reference to 
an essential manque-à-être, or lack of/in being. Crucially, however, by 
insisting that Antigone, through her act, occupies this impossible place 
or limit, Lacan insists not only that the suspension or cancellation of 
any sociosymbolic order is concretely possible and even necessary, 
but also that every social system will in a sense objectively put forth 
how this suspension might be effected. It does this through the way it 
implicitly qualifies as criminal, impossible, or unintelligible particular 
avenues of thought and action. According to Butler, however, when 
Lacan claims that Antigone affirms in defiance of Creon’s edict the 
properly transcendental value of her brother’s being, ‘he forgets that 
Antigone is also committing a crime’ (53). 
Yet, Lacan makes clear that this link between being’s affirmation 
and the dimension of criminality is precisely his point. ‘The fruit of 
the incestuous union [between Oedipus and Jocasta]’, he says, ‘has 
split into two brothers [Creon and Polynices], one of whom represents 
power and the other crime. There is no one to assume the crime and the 
validity of crime apart from Antigone’.13 Just when Lacan insists that 
the function of the ethical act is precisely to demonstrate that the 
sociosymbolic order – the Other – fails to institute the norms we 
ourselves attribute to it, and that, in consequence, anything, including 
in particular the impossible, can happen, Butler falls back on her 
stubborn and unwarranted premise that the Other is a consistent 
structure imbued with powers of sexual and moral determination; that 
the Other has ultimate authority when it comes to the creation and 
recognition of all the legitimate forms of life.
The presence of a field of objective, yet unacknowledged, 
transgression in any social formation is what Lacan wants to argue 
when he develops the idea that Antigone is the defender of the 
legitimacy of crime. In short, Lacan’s Antigone is an advocate for the 
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sacrificial victim burnt at the stake in a doomed attempt to establish 
the coherence of a social system, to create a world in which the law 
could legislate effectively against all exceptions. The paradox, of 
course, is that the law’s violation is a premise of the act through which 
its legislative power is meant to be expressed. Recently, Žižek has 
emphasised the properly symbolic effectivity of both Antigone’s act in 
particular, and l’acte psychanalytique in general. If complicity with the 
exercise of power is conditioned by an unrecognised violation of the 
law with which this power is allied, then the symbolisation of crime, 
that is to say the interposition – creation – of a signifier in the place 
where before there was only power’s secret and obscene enjoyment, has 
the potential and authentically subversive effect of both dismantling, 
and tenuously reconstituting, the entire sociosymbolic field. 
When, in his ethics seminar, he associates crime with what he 
calls the discourse of the father – that is to say, with the incestuous 
criminality of Oedipus – Lacan is not effectively attributing to the 
paternal function a smooth patriarchal command over the social 
world. As we’ve seen, this is the idea Butler attributes to the normative 
influence of a putative Lacanian structuralism. Rather, Lacan’s 
statement acknowledges that the father is always redoubled: the 
reassuring father who gives protection from maternal jouissance and 
indexes language’s mediation of sociality – the father in his imaginary 
and symbolic guises – is always haunted by the obscene father of 
‘primal’, traumatic enjoyment, the real father who inserts a distressing 
gap between the hardly hidden imperfections of actual or concrete 
paternity and the symbolic paternal function as such. In this light, 
Creon’s crime consists in his failure to do what Oedipus does at the end 
of the road, so to speak, when he discovers the truth of his incestuous 
desire, rips out his eyes, and wishes never to have been born. 
Lacan’s Antigone is therefore the figure of his mid-career teaching 
with which he makes precisely the same move Butler’s discourse 
makes at its most challenging moments. For both thinkers, thought 
must move beyond the political discourse of hegemony and its 
implied framework of competing interests struggling for recognition 
or articulation. Both thinkers develop a more radical argument, one 
that aims to spell out the logic by which criminal unintelligibility 
is constituted in the first instance. This disclosure creates a space in 
which it becomes possible to discover new directions for thought and 
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action, directions made unthinkable before the struggle for hegemony 
even began. In other words, Antigone is a name for the subject who 
refuses to accept the terms of life as they are constituted in any social 
status quo. Refusing to give up on her desire, this subject accepts the 
consequences that come with the occupation of a zone of death and 
impossibility in the ‘mad’, seemingly suicidal hope that a different and 
better future might come.
Hardly coincidentally, the radicalism of Antigone’s act also poses 
a crucial challenge to today’s sociosymbolic universe of queer theory 
in crisis. The present-day queer political horizon is, on the one hand 
(even when it says it isn’t), deeply entrenched in liberal ideology and 
its rhetorical apparatus of rights and freedoms – what does sexual 
freedom ultimately mean if not the freedom to elect not to wear a 
condom, knowingly to infect my partner? – and, on the other, limited 
by a negative minoritarianism conditioned by a relation of pure non-
dialectical opposition to its ‘heteronormative’ other. 
In such circumstances, the most politically consequential move, the 
one that would truly constitute an act in the Lacanian sense, might be 
precisely its self-obliteration – the thoroughgoing dissolution of the 
field of intelligibility of queer thought and activism in the Western 
world. Minimally, this would mean rendering the category of sexual 
orientation meaningless without the addition of socioeconomic 
qualifications; without an analysis of the production of sexual identities 
not by ‘discourse’, but rather by the capitalist mode of production. 
More radically, it would mean dispensing with the whole apparatus 
of the politics of sexuality altogether. The new assumption here is 
that the fight against sexual violence and homophobia doesn’t in fact 
depend on either the positing of sexual identities, both essential and 
strategic, or their complicated and ultimately pointless deconstruction. 
It’s perhaps necessary to specify that the point of such a gesture is not 
to cease working towards the most concrete goals of what has generally 
flown under the rubric of gay and lesbian politics. Some of these goals 
– the legal recognition of same-sex partnerships, the extension of 
marriage and adoption privileges to same-sex partners – have in fact 
been questioned, and sometimes clamorously denounced as complicit 
and normative in some activist formations. Others, such as the further 
development of anti-discrimination legislation and, most crucially, 
the integration of responsible anti-homophobic sex education14 into 
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public school curricula, are less controversial, and quite comfortably 
span the theoretical and generational chasm that separates the gays 
and lesbians from the queers.
The point, rather, is to acknowledge two fundamental truths. First, 
the ‘concrete goals’ of gay/lesbian or queer politics mentioned earlier 
aren’t as dependent on identity-predicated iterations of homosexuality, 
or their deconstruction, as we’ve been led to think. Nor does the merely 
theoretical subversion of these identities necessarily provide any 
tangible advantage in their pursuit. In other words, you don’t have to 
presuppose the existence of homosexuals, or else obsessively analyse 
the politics of their discursive construction, in order to argue against 
the expression and effects of homophobia. As Lacan implied about the 
Woman existing only in masculine fantasy, there’s a good case to be 
made that the homosexual exists only in homophobic fantasy, as both 
the traumatically passive male who reminds the man of his latent erotic 
receptivity, and the pornographically archetypal lesbian couple who 
make visible a spectacle of feminine jouissance for a masculine look. 
Second, even in its most post-liberal strains, queer theory has been 
overwhelmingly confined within a narrow political horizon which 
fails to recognise how sexual rights and freedoms, not to mention the 
critique of this discourse of rights and freedoms, never appear at the 
top of the list of priorities of the most concretely disenfranchised the 
world over, queer and straight and everything in between. 
With striking generality, patriarchal despotisms function in tandem 
with an apparatus of sexual repression designed to stifle all forms of 
erotic expression except for the standard male heterosexual one. But 
it’s also true that when you’re starving and jobless; when you know that 
a band of drugged-out soldiers is waiting for night to fall to attack your 
village and rape you; or when you’re a glorified indentured servant 
at a militarised maquilladora patrolled by union-bashing private 
paramilitary units, it isn’t likely that you’ll choose to have your desire 
for emancipation pivot around either the discourse of sexual identity 
or its theoretical subversion. 
Unjust and subtly devastating though it can surely be, the kind 
of homophobia queer theory talks about is a quite refined form 
of oppression – one that develops in comparatively benign social 
formations, from which the more physical forms of sexualised violence, 
from rape to excision to the proliferating forms of torture, have ceased 
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to police and deform sexual relations in the widest sense.15 Meanwhile, 
in other parts of the world, homophobia becomes part and parcel of a 
more generalised masculine sexual violence, which perverts the entire 
field of sexual relations, targeting primarily the sexual expression of 
women. Here, in Salafist Islam for example, it’s less a question of the 
direct oppressive targeting of homosexuality, however prominently 
this features in the programme, than a masculine-perverse protest 
against the very libidinal conditions of human life as such. 
The Queer Big Other Doesn’t Exist
This broadening of queer theory’s typically bourgeois and 
Euro-American horizons has the highly desirable consequence of 
shifting the focus back towards more conventionally materialist 
political concerns. At the end of the day, what could be more bourgeois 
than the conference circuit or cocktail hour subversion of sexual 
convention? In this light, Žižek’s polemic against Laclau, his radical 
democratic followers, and by extension their allies in the queer theory 
camp, acquires its sharp and refreshing bite. 
The ‘radical’ in radical democracy disturbingly signals the finality 
of its abandonment of classical Marxism’s denunciation of the 
material and cultural devastations of capital. In historical terms, 
radical democracy is simply the Menshevik reformism of today. There 
is indeed a quite bitter irony in the fact that the concept of radical 
democracy for classical Marxism referred not to the fullest possible 
extension of the progressive potential of bourgeois liberalism (classical 
Marxism was of course also in favour of this, in principle if not in 
strategy), but rather to the dictatorship of the proletariat – in other 
words, to the only apparently paradoxical truth that true democracy 
is possible only after the destruction of the democratic institution as it 
has taken form through the centuries in the tradition of constitutional 
parliamentarianism. 
While the dictatorship of the proletariat, for basic historical 
reasons, is no longer desirable or even possible in the mode Marx 
himself imagined, one fundamental point remains: it’s imperative to 
affirm the possibility of a truly alternative democracy, one that would 
transform in their totality the conditions of material production. Quite 
necessarily, this alternative must emerge today under the sign of 
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democracy’s denial or negation. Not all so-called totalitarianisms, in 
other words, are created equal. 
It’s important to add that, in the new social order, sexual politics 
must be tied essentially and decisively to an analysis of basic economic 
conditions, or more precisely to an interrogation of the impact of the 
organisation of production, as well as wealth and resource distribution, 
on the lived experience of sexuality. Even more crucially, the properly 
libidinal essence of politics must be pushed to the forefront: what 
unconscious desires and fantasies undergird social programmes, both 
transformative and conservative? Queer theory must proceed to its 
auto-critique, to the traversal of its most intimate liberal fantasies, 
especially within those poststructuralist tendencies where it explicitly 
posits itself as post- or anti-liberal. 
In Lacanian terms, the subservience of queer theory to today’s 
dominant but increasingly fragile reformist ethos on the political left 
is defined by a transferential relation to what we could call the queer 
big Other. This big Other, I’d like to suggest, takes two typical forms. 
First, there’s the liberal version characterised by positive transference, 
by a belief in a potentially benevolent Other: if only we are properly 
included in the spectacle of popular culture, if only we succeed in 
constructing adequate representations of our diversity, then we would 
finally experience ourselves as a strong community, as a fully legitimate 
network of citizens unambiguously recognised by, and integrated 
with, the social system. 
Second, there’s the more fashionable, self-consciously subversive or 
transgressive, post- or anti-liberal variation, which rests on a negative 
transference vis-à-vis an oppressive figure of authority: if you, big 
Other, think you can force your patriarchal heteronormativity on 
me, then you’re sadly mistaken, because I’m going to transgress, in 
concert with my radical friends, all the socially re/productive values 
you hold dear. 
These seemingly contrary and politically irreconcilable structures 
can be qualified as transferential in that they address themselves to an 
idealised symbolic authority presumed either to harbour the power to 
grant or withhold recognition, or else to uphold a disciplinary regime of 
heteronormative desire. That it’s not strictly speaking possible for non-
heterosexual subjects to be socialised in the absence of an often acute 
and painful sense of difference and exclusion, renders this fantasy in 
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both its guises – a sanctioned queer social home; a secret transgressive 
paradise of limitless sexual freedom – all the more irresistible. 
No doubt this line of analysis goes some way towards explaining 
why there has always been an uneasy undercurrent, a sometimes 
desperate and exclusionary conformism, in the various post-gay queer 
movements; an elitist and cliquey, paradoxically normative force, 
which belies their outward rhetoric of diversity and inclusiveness. Is 
it possible that it’s only from the perspective that, despite our quite 
manifest sexual differences, we’re all the same, that it becomes possible 
to cope with radical, genuine difference? The disturbing, uncanny 
difference that pulls the rug out from under my identity, even when 
this identity is defined as impossible, unsustainable and necessarily 
exclusionary? 
The traversal of queer theory’s latent transferential fantasy requires 
us to acknowledge that the idealised queer big Other, who would 
bestow consistency and legitimacy on the various non-heterosexual 
communities, is increasingly the middle-class or upper-middle-class, 
elite-educated, savvy consumer, almost always located in the global 
North, or else the ‘securitised’ enclaves of the megalopolises of what 
we used to call the third world. The visibility of the hypercontempo-
rary queer subject conceals a mass of other ‘queer’ subjects (many have 
probably never heard the term and many others would no doubt reject 
it) very differently positioned with respect to both geopolitics and the 
mode of production. The objective interests of these non-heterosexual 
masses may not fit too neatly within the hegemonic framework of 
queer theory. 
For example, consider the circumstances of a ‘badly’ educated, 
working-class lesbian toiling away at several part-time jobs to support 
her family. Or those of a young, crypto-gay Iranian man contemplating 
a sex-change operation so he can envision a sexual relationship 
without either violating religious principles he may in fact hold dear, 
or risk execution at the hands of the state. That either of these subjects 
should experience a spontaneous frisson of solidarity with a bourgeois 
and staunchly secularist queer movement is not nearly as obvious a 
contention as we might wish to think. 
The experience of the nonexistence of the queer big Other might 
serve to subvert the libidinal logic of ersatz solidarity between 
subjects and constituencies who identify as sharing the same sexual 
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orientation (or simply the same set of assumptions about sexuality), 
redistributing their political awareness along different, more concretely 
socioeconomic, lines. Additionally, it might finally expose the secret 
complicity of the discourses of sexual transgression and anti-generative 
asociality with the normative or disciplinary power it so clamorously 
claims to subvert. 
To return to the anecdote with which I began, it becomes apparent 
that there’s a subtle but insidious blackmail at work in that political 
pamphlet handed to me in Christopher Street that day years ago. 
This blackmail is conveyed through the assumption that my concern 
with my putative sexual rights should trump all other concerns; that 
a candidate’s voting history on gay issues should take precedence over 
her record on poverty or welfare, for instance. It’s in this precise sense 
that sexual orientation is a bourgeois concept. The time has come to 
anticipate a new kind of Marxian unity of theory and practice, which 
would frame its internal impossibility as that species of insipid pseudo-
political literature that greeted me that day in Greenwich Village. 
This urban enclave’s gentrifying trajectory over the past half-century, 
paired with its ideological centrality to the modern (Western) gay 
movements, might now serve – why not? – as a signifier for the queer-
theoretical project, which should now finally step aside to create space 
for a genuinely radical and universal alternative. 
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Is There a  
Queer Marxism?
Missed Encounter
It’s been over 20 years now since Teresa de Lauretis chose to give the title Queer Theory to a special issue of the journal differences on poststructuralist approaches to sexuality studies. A quarter century 
has passed since the publication of the book that in many ways started 
the whole thing, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet. 
What has happened since then? Quite a bit. By now, there are 
numerous book-length introductions to queer theory addressed 
primarily to undergraduates; a panoply of popular trade paperbacks 
on queer culture featuring watered-down paraphrases of the major 
theorists; and regular conferences around the Euro-American world 
that call for papers on queer theory or from a queer theory perspective. 
From time to time, you may even find the occasional advertisement 
that will name queer theory as a desirable field of competence for 
permanent positions in the academy – almost always, however, 
alongside a more general (literary theory or cultural theory, social or 
political theory) or traditionally defined (eighteenth-century English 
literature, the sociology of sexuality) subfield. Indeed, most humanities 
and social science clusters in major Anglo-American universities today 
feature at least one faculty member on whose webpage an interest in 
queer theory will be proclaimed. 
In short, what’s happened in the past quarter century is that queer 
theory has become institutionalised. Especially remarkable, despite its 
no doubt imperfect and scattered qualities, is the fact that this insti-
tutionalisation has occurred in tandem with a widespread, and much 
lamented, decline of the humanities and social science disciplines 
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in the university writ large. These disciplines carry negligible 
institutional weight in comparison to other, more pragmatic and 
economically justifiable units, which bring in significant revenue from 
the private sector. 
Viewed in this light, the queer theory phenomenon poses intriguing 
questions. Why now? Or, more precisely: why have queer theory and 
queer scholarship in general gained ascendancy in the university at the 
present historical moment? Or again, posed in a more materialist way: 
what features of university life today – its various social, economic and 
political determinants – have allowed for the entrance of this seemingly 
untoward object of study into the hallowed halls of the academy? After 
all, this academy historically has defined itself as the preserver of 
cultural tradition and defender of the social status quo. Further, this 
tradition has never, until very recently, thought of organising the study 
of culture and society from the point of view of sexuality. 
Beginning in the 1960s with the birth of cultural studies in the 
Birmingham school, and the publication of the first French texts 
that would be grouped under the post/structuralism rubric, cultural 
studies rebelled against a past it newly conceived as staid, stuffy and 
conservative – in short, as resistant to the very social and political 
realities that created, in the form of feminism and the gay movement, 
the conditions of possibility for the vulnerable emergence of women’s, 
gender and sexuality studies. 
Less commonly acknowledged in such exercises in casual histori-
cisation, however, are the voices of dissidence and resistance. These 
voices tried to make themselves heard in a context dominated by the 
mutually reinforcing influence of, on the one hand, the New Left 
social movements that accompanied the unprecedented expansion 
of the university sector in the 1960s and 1970s, and, on the other, 
elite theoretical and philosophical discourses, in particular Derrida’s 
deconstruction and Foucault’s new historicism, which provided 
theoretical frameworks for the new scholarly approaches. These 
latter discourses were the ones that most directly fed into the queer 
theory project. Like the figures who inspired it, queer scholars sought 
to break with the more directly politicised sociohistorical approaches 
characteristic of the work of numerous gay and lesbian studies pioneers 
of the 1970s and 1980s.1 
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Viewed in this light, it’s impossible to deny that queer theory played 
a major role in the emergence of the ludic motif in postmodernity that 
Teresa Ebert mercilessly criticised in the mid-1990s from her historical 
materialist perspective. For Ebert, the poststructuralist feminist current 
with which dominant queer theory was allied participated in a general 
theoretical regression away from concrete socioeconomic analysis, and 
towards a politically retrograde concern for the vagaries of language, 
discourse or signification.2 
The significance of Ebert’s book for my purposes is that it reminds us 
how mature queer studies – by which I simply mean to signal the body 
of work that has placed itself under this rubric over the last couple of 
decades – has repressed the historical memory of the inaugural break 
with the Marxist tradition, by means of which the discourses from 
which it draws came into being. The difficulty of linking queer theory 
up with the Marxist tradition is the direct result of this phenomenon; 
it’s to Ebert’s tremendous credit that her work brings this repression to 
our attention. 
In general terms, queer theory has shown reluctance to historicise 
itself. More precisely, it has failed to question retrospectively the 
political stakes involved in the game-changing theoretical move away 
from Marxism and materialist analysis that accounts for its very 
existence. In other words, queer theory’s paradigmatic interest in the 
link between sexuality and questions of identity and meaning not only 
displaced the previous generation’s tendency to consider sexuality in 
the same context as the social organisation of production. Additionally, 
it worked to erase the very traces of this move, in some cases going so 
far as to portray materialist methods as detrimental to the expression 
of its own, more properly cultural, concerns. 
Even in the best cases, for instance in Judith Butler’s influential 
analysis of drag performance among poor African-American youth, 
interest in the impact of socioeconomic determinants is characteristi-
cally reduced to the occasional mention of class.3 Indeed, as is the case 
in poststructuralism more generally, class in queer studies is routinely 
refigured as merely another aspect of the cultural work effected by 
the play of signification and power. Such a gesture leaves the material 
determinants of culture, that is to say culture’s production in and by a 
properly capitalist system, entirely out of the equation. 
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To be sure, there are very few places one can go in the repertoire of 
queer discourse to find critical assessments of this unspoken shift from 
economics to discourse, from history to performativity. Even more 
egregiously, queer theory has failed to entertain the possibility that its 
appearance at the present historical moment is a symptom of capitalist 
social relations in their most recent, supermobile and globalised phase. 
This phase is characterised by the shift of material production from the 
historical locations of industrial production in Europe, North America 
and Japan, to the global South. Concurrently, the forms of labour in the 
global North have become increasingly virtual-immaterial, ‘cognitive’, 
transient and precarious. 
In such a context, it becomes positively crucial to examine the few 
key exceptions to the non-engagement of queer theory, including its 
pre-queer antecedents, with the Marxist tradition. Through such an 
initiative, we can gain a broader perspective on the political significance 
of the transformations of sexuality studies over the past half-century 
than can be established from within the horizons of dominant queer 
discourse itself. 
Foremost among these transformations, in fact the very hallmark of 
queer theory, is surely the undermining of the long-standing premise 
that sexuality has been liberated through (at least the appearance 
of ) the relaxation of taboos and prejudices against the expression 
of feminine and non-heterosexual sexualities. If my own classroom 
experience with young students in Canada is any indication, this 
smugly unhistorical premise is shared virtually universally by today’s 
generation of university-age youth. The later work of Michel Foucault 
was instrumental in calling into question the assumption that we’ve 
emancipated sexuality from repression. Much less commonly 
acknowledged, however, is the fact that Foucault’s decisive turn away 
from the Marxist tradition before he undertook his History of Sexuality 
project is significantly responsible for queer theory’s general allergy to 
materialist analysis. Indeed, I would suggest that Foucault’s conception 
of sexuality as discourse/power in that book assumes a rejection of 
influential Marxian theories of ideology, in particular Althusser’s, 
which had previously had tremendous impact on that generation of 
thinkers. For these reasons, it will be helpful now to consider exactly 
how the massive impact of Foucault’s work on sexuality has rendered 
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the prospects of a contemporary queer Marxism remarkably, even 
irremediably, dim. 
Few today would dare to question that Foucault was correct to argue 
in the late 1970s that sexuality is an invention of late modernity – the 
mid-nineteenth to late nineteenth century, to be precise. This was the 
time when sexuality became an object for science. The purpose of 
this shift was to inaugurate a form of knowledge of a properly sexual 
kind, and to tie this new quest for knowledge to an ambition of truth 
which, for Foucault, shifted the agency of power from its previously 
constricting and repressive force to a new, productive logic of biopower. 
In light of this thesis, it would appear uncontroversial to claim that 
the queer theory phenomenon brings to its logical conclusion the 
‘incitement to discourse’ that Foucault brilliantly traced back to the 
birth of sexology and, even further, to the institution of the confession 
in Christianity.4 Queer theory brings this logic to its endpoint with 
the argument that sexuality discourse is a productive and disciplinary 
instrument of biopower. Indeed, if the ‘old’, sovereign form of power 
gained ascendancy by virtue of the crown or the state’s authority to 
mete out the death penalty, then sexuality is the emblem of Foucaultian 
biopower – that is to say, the very incarnation of its authority to 
regulate not the destruction, but rather the production, of human life 
as such. For Foucault, modern science’s epistemological thrust into 
sexuality was a fundamental component of the shift towards a new 
social logic of bureaucracy and management. This new logic functions 
by instrumentalising the forms of knowledge as a means of producing 
and disciplining human life.
Rereading The History of Sexuality’s introductory volume today, at a 
time when its main theses have already completed their drip through 
the grains of elite queer theory, I’m left with an indelible sense of 
Foucault’s dismay at what we can retrospectively call the sexological 
turn: that epochal shift that transformed sex from a matter of acts and 
behaviours to a question of desires and identities, of what Foucault 
called the truth of the self. 
If we accept Foucault’s premise that sexuality discourse is essentially 
an elaborate ruse designed to have us chatter endlessly about sex, all 
the while further tethering ourselves to the omnipotent forces of power, 
then clearly the conclusion is warranted that the very existence of queer 
theory can be read as a demonstration of this ruse’s spectacular success. 
Penney T02732 01 text   74 08/10/2013   08:16
is  there a  queer marxism?
75
No doubt there is a cutting irony here, and it comes at queer theory’s 
expense. That elite queer theory has shown itself to be hyperaware of 
the trap to which the coupling of sex and truth inevitably leads, has not 
evidently led it to abandon the project of a discourse about sex. 
This is indeed the inescapable paradox of the sex-as-discourse 
premise common to later-period Foucault and the mainstream of elite 
queer theory. If sex is coterminous with a discourse/power tandem 
complicit with a disciplinary regime of truth, then one can only succeed 
in furthering one’s disciplinary subjection as one tries to expose 
the effects of the discourse, the workings of the regime. Those who 
depart from Foucault’s enigmatic reference to ‘the claims of bodies, 
pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility 
of resistance’ (157) at The History of Sexuality’s conclusion, fare little 
better. Inevitably, they can only produce yet another discourse on the 
body, another discourse on pleasure, which inevitably will be subject 
to the same old accusations with respect to their hopeless complicity 
with power. The concept of power attains such grandiose heights of 
abstraction in late-period Foucault that any neo-materialist attempt to 
reconnect power with capital becomes the very emblem of retrograde 
theoretical naïvety. 
Yet, it can’t be denied that Foucault’s association of sexuality discourse 
with the design of power effected a paradigm shift that changed the 
very nature of the inquiry into sex. The difficult but necessary ‘what is 
sexuality, and how does it intersect with politics? ’ questions gave way to 
the more manageable, but less consequential, ‘why have we now decided 
to pose that question? ’ Foucault’s work provided, or at least appeared to 
provide, a persuasive answer: power made us ask it. That this answer 
was ever deemed capable of explaining much of anything is the aspect 
of queer theory’s history that remains difficult to explain. 
In retrospect, it’s now possible to say that this answer provided a 
reactionary alibi for the treasonous abandonment of the Marxist 
tradition of ideology critique. As I’ve argued elsewhere, what is so 
undesirable about Foucault’s idea of power is that it prevents us from 
linking its exercise to concrete sociopolitical and economic interests, 
however conscious or unconscious these might be.5 There can be little 
doubt that for the queer theory generation, Foucault’s strange and 
paranoid notion of power effectively replaced the old Marxist idea of 
ideology, going so far as to imply that all the crucial work the latter 
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concept made possible relied on an obsolete, sovereign understanding 
of the exercise of social control. In my view, cultural theory has yet 
to come to grips fully with the complicity of, on the one hand, this 
wide-scale retreat from ideological analysis and, on the other, the 
collapse of not only so-called actually existing socialism, but also (and 
more importantly) the very credibility of the idea of communism and 
the entire anti-capitalist project.
The dominant narrative of socialism’s collapse in the last decades 
of the twentieth century forgets what was perhaps Marx’s most basic 
lesson: people make history. To which a Freudian is obliged to add: but 
they don’t know what they’re doing. The now-familiar complaint on the 
left is that this dominant narrative assumes that we moved away from 
ideology critique in response to, and in order better to take account of, 
the putatively objective failure of socialism during the final decades 
of the last century. As if, that is to say, we had no role to play in that 
failure, as if we didn’t sabotage the project ourselves. 
Cultural theory has failed to come to terms with the extraordinary 
convenience of the fact that, at the precise moment when power was 
being reconceptualised as diffuse and all-pervasive, as intentional 
but non-subjective, the political and economic mechanisms that used 
to provide some protection from the unshackled ravages of capital 
were being systematically dismantled in front of our very eyes. Even 
the old-fashioned idealist assumptions of intellectual history are 
more instructive here: the material structures inspired by socialism 
collapsed for no other reason than because we chose to discredit the 
idea; because we agreed to allow the master signifier ‘capitalism’, with 
its indelible tie to Marxist economic historicisation, to be replaced by 
another, insidiously naturalising, term: ‘the market’. We have allowed 
this signifier to impose itself as an objective description of a natural 
law, one that conveys a direct knowledge of the economic real as such. 
Certainly, there’s nothing novel today in asserting a link between the 
proliferation of sexual identities during the twentieth century and the 
expansion and globalisation of capitalist relations. Indeed, Deleuze 
and Guattari did precisely this when they wrote their magnum opus 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia in the early 1970s, not coincidentally the 
time that brought the period of creative and experimental efflorescence 
of the last century to a dramatic close. I’ll have much more to say 
about Deleuze and Guattari, and more specifically their important 
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proto-queer disciple Guy Hocquenghem, in the following chapter. 
However, here I’ll simply remark that the anti-oedipal argument, as 
Deleuze and Guattari develop it, forms, disciplinarily speaking, a kind 
of underground current in queer theory. Since the heady early days 
of this discourse, numerous critics have come to the conclusion that 
this current provides a preferable alternative to what they consider 
the residual, difference-eradicating and perniciously universalising 
Hegelianism of Judith Butler’s work, for instance.6 
In contrast to Foucault, whose late work severs any link his thought 
may once have had to the Marxist tradition, Deleuze and Guattari, on 
the level of their enunciation at any rate, retain a properly Marxian 
ambition to develop tools for the undoing of the repressive or 
exploitative side of capital, even if capital as such for them remains 
an immanently utopian deterritorialising force. Too infrequently 
acknowledged in the ever-expanding ‘D and G universe’, however, is 
the fact that even their thesis was hardly a new one. 
As they well knew, Marxist thinkers before them, not to mention 
Marx himself, had already linked capitalism’s obliteration of old 
social forms – not only the rigid systems of obligation in feudalism, 
but also the bourgeois world of industrial production and the nuclear 
family – to what Herbert Marcuse, for one, previously and famously 
referred to as the ‘repressive desublimation’ of sexuality – that is 
to say, the absorption by consumer society or fascist ideology of 
libidinal satisfaction.7 Indeed, fascism for the Frankfurt School was 
a paradigmatic example of the way in which enjoyment on a general 
social scale can work in tandem not with emancipation, but rather with 
ideologies of domination and oppression. 
Lacan’s intervention into the complicated legacy of Freud’s superego 
concept has led to the relatively recent development of a Lacanian 
version of the repressive desublimation argument, which runs roughly 
as follows. In bourgeois Vienna at the dawn of the last century, the 
price paid for the stability of the social link was the proliferation of 
what Freud in 1908 called ‘modern nervous illness’, which in his view 
resulted from the imposition of the constraints of ‘sexual morality’.8 
Although it’s also possible to find in Freud’s texts the grounds for a 
more structural version of this argument, according to which the 
neurotic symptom would rather be an inevitable facet of psychic life 
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as such, it remains the case that Freud explicitly argued for the more 
sociological version on more than one occasion. 
By the time he addressed the crypto-Maoist student rebels who 
made their disruptive presence felt in his seminar around 1969–1970, 
however, Lacan was arguing that a new, superegoic injunction to 
enjoy had begun to permeate social life. Further, the predominant 
affect of shame, which had previously accompanied the experience 
of enjoyment, had now been replaced, in the context of the ‘sexual 
revolution’, by a generalised ethos of impudence. Whereas previously, 
in other words, social shame accompanied the admission in polite 
company of an inappropriate sexual dalliance, today shame accrues if 
one admits to not being interested in sexual (and back then, political) 
transgression; if one confesses that one’s sexual experience has never 
quite extended to flavours beyond vanilla. 
The shift from the old to the new politics – from the politics of 
sovereign power to biopower, to refer to Foucault’s original idea, later 
influentially taken up by Giorgio Agamben as well as Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri – emerges when we consider that for both the 
Frankfurt School and Lacan, desublimation and the injunction to enjoy 
are properly critical concepts. Marcuse thought that desublimation 
worked hand in hand with the fascist phenomenon; Lacan chastised 
the crypto-Maoists for playing into the hands of the decrepit French 
educational bureaucracy. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, in contrast, the de-Oedipalisation 
resulting from late capitalism’s dissolution of the old feudal, bourgeois 
and nuclear-familial ties that bind is desirable because it creates 
possibilities for new ‘deterritorialised intensities’, ‘bodies without 
organs’, ‘lines of flight’ and other such themes, the concrete political 
implications of which have never to my mind been made clear. 
What separates Deleuze and Guattari from what I would call the 
mainstream of the Marxian tradition is their profound belief that what 
requires liberation is not human labour from capitalism, but rather 
capitalism from its own external hindrances – that is, the forces of 
stasis or immobility that prevent it from reaching its full transformative 
potential. That such a theory should come to prominence at a time 
when the obscenely destructive forces of capitalism have been allowed 
to appear in ways unseen since the industrial revolution is surely a sign 
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that the fashions of cultural theory are as beholden to ideology as any 
other aspect of human activity. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the Deleuzo-Guattarian anti-oedipal 
thesis appears as perhaps the most wildly and naïvely utopian gesture 
of the poststructuralist moment; the strongest, least ambivalent 
statement in support of the claim that there need not be a contradiction 
between, on the one hand, emancipation from the constraints of 
gender and sexuality and, on the other, the de-alienation of human 
labour. The deep simpatico between Deleuze and Guattari’s desiring-
productive utopianism, and the sexual vanguardism that queer theory 
inherited from the 1960s sexual liberation ethos and the Stonewall 
moment, seems clear enough when viewed in this light. The agency 
of capital in all this sexual deregulation is rarely discussed in queer 
appropriations of Anti-Oedipus. 
Instead, queer theory tends to enlist Deleuze and Guattari in 
support of the argument that a defining feature of the contemporary 
period is a perhaps unprecedented opportunity to supplant all existing 
impediments to the full expression of sexuality and gender identities. 
Or rather, perhaps more accurately, what is unprecedented is the 
investment in, or aspiration towards, such a liberation – in other words, 
the articulation in thought of the notion that sexuality’s entanglement 
with what Lacan calls ‘the defiles of the signifier’ is merely a historical 
contingency. 
For other, ‘stodgier’, writers on the cultural-theoretical left, however, 
the new sexual utopianism went hand in hand with a large-scale retreat 
from reformist and revolutionary ideologies, which were sharply 
critical of the neoliberal impetus to unshackle the forces of capital 
from the tenuous mid-century constraints that held it back. Today, 
any critical intersection between this tradition, which maintains its 
fidelity to the original Frankfurt School insight about the complicity 
of libidinal spontaneity with ideology or political domination, and the 
various queer developments in sexuality theory of the last two decades, 
is decidedly difficult to discern. Examples of such work, therefore, are 
of paramount interest. 
The remainder of this chapter (and the following one as well) will 
explore the work of the few writers who have bravely engaged in 
this obscure project of talking about politics and sexuality, sexuality 
and politics, from within the Marxian horizon. Is there, then, a queer 
Penney T02732 01 text   79 08/10/2013   08:16
after queer theory
80
Marxism? The answer, disappointing in its vagueness, can only be: 
‘sort of, not really’. 
In their attempts to shift the course of queer theory in a more 
politically radical direction, the authors of concern have been required 
to forget about sex, to occlude desire. In so doing, they’ve committed 
the fateful error of heeding the bad advice Jung famously offered to 
Freud on their 1912 sea voyage to the United States. They’ve had to 
gloss over the importance of sexuality as psychoanalysis theorises it 
in order to secure its compatibility with hegemonic understandings of 
culture, politics and history. 
Varieties of Totality
Among the few recent attempts to develop a Marxist alternative for 
queer theory, Kevin Floyd’s The Reification of Desire stands out for 
its scope, novelty and theoretical rigour. Drawing on the writing of 
strange bedfellows Georg Lukács and Michel Foucault, Floyd bases 
his argument on the notion that both queer theory and Marxism 
are forms of what he calls totality thinking. Despite the tremendous 
contribution Floyd’s book makes to the project of connecting queer 
theory to Marxism, however, its main premise errs where it mistakenly 
reads as potentially complementary two distinct ideas of totality based 
on vastly different assumptions about political power. 
In what follows, I’ll also suggest that whatever value the Lukácsian 
reference might have in promoting the reintroduction of historicised 
class analysis, or an updated version of it, to the study of sexuality, 
Floyd’s discussion falls prey to a paradigmatic, and ultimately self-
defeating, assumption about the purchase of ‘heteronormativity’. As 
we’ve seen in previous chapters, this assumption creates a false enemy, 
one that, in this context, a considerable theoretical artillery is deployed 
in order to destroy. For psychoanalysis, desire can hardly be described 
as heteronormative. Yet, this statement doesn’t imply that there’s no 
such thing as homophobia. Despite its professed queerness, in the 
final analysis Floyd’s challenging discussion is conspicuously devoid 
of sex. It will be necessary, however, to delve into certain of its details 
in order to discern not only where exactly sex is missed, but also the 
consequences of this miss for how we think about the problematic 
(non-)relation of queer theory to Marxism.
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Floyd’s discussion fails adequately to address the fact that its 
Lukácsian, and properly Marxist, investment in the idea of a totality 
of social relations determined by capital can’t be reconciled with the 
Foucault-derived notion of knowledge as power, by means of which 
Floyd conceptualises the process of social differentiation. The hallmark 
of Lukács’s work, for Floyd, is the way it insists on considering society 
as a historical whole, every part of which is shaped by the social 
organisation of production. The consequence of this is that no social 
phenomenon can be legitimately considered in isolation from any 
other. Further, capitalist relations leave their mark on every one. 
For its part, the queer studies discipline distinguishes itself by what 
Floyd calls ‘a refusal of sexual particularization, a refusal of sexuality’s 
routine epistemological dissociation from other horizons of social 
reality’.9 The slippage in Floyd’s totality thinking emerges here. As far 
as the force of determination goes, we move from a properly materialist 
concept of social production in the Lukácsian version of totality, to a 
politicised (implicitly Foucaultian) epistemological framework in queer 
theory. From the Marxist perspective, the imperative isn’t simply to 
avoid considering homophobia, let’s say, in isolation from evangelical 
Christianity. Rather, the methodological obligation is to consider both 
as part and parcel of a social totality, of which the capitalist mode of 
production is the dominant organising principle. Going missing in 
the transition from Lukács to queer studies is the classical Marxist 
conviction that knowledge of social reality is deeply connected not 
to an abstract discourse/power tandem, but rather to the position in 
the mode of production from which one sets out to know. Left to its 
own devices, for example, as a tenured professor my knowledge of the 
conditions of academic labour will be very different from that of the 
precariously employed contract instructor. The whole point of Marxist 
education, of course, is precisely to eliminate this difference.
This same point can be made in a more contextually salient way 
by examining how Floyd’s queer Marxism approaches the specific 
problem of sexuality. Succinctly put, sexuality features in Floyd’s 
argument as one among many ‘social and historical horizons’ (8), 
which together make up his particular understanding of the social 
totality. With this gesture, Floyd effectively places sexuality on the 
same level as all the ‘other axes of hierarchized social differentiation’ 
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(8), by which he understands the familiar left cultural-theoretical list 
including race, gender, nation and of course class. 
Under these parameters, the task of queer Marxism becomes the 
‘critique of various forms of heteronormative assumption’ embedded 
within these various knowledge systems. Importantly, for Floyd, this 
critique can then annex itself to the critique of capital, since all of these 
critical initiatives converge on the level of their ‘common critique of 
epistemological particularization’, which in turn is based on an 
‘impulse of generalization’ shared by all (9). In simpler terms, Floyd 
wants to update Lukács’s insistence that no social phenomenon can be 
isolated from the shaping influence of capital. He does this by adding 
to ‘class’ more recently acknowledged categories of social difference, 
most importantly sexuality. 
Considered in these terms, the strategy of queer Marxism must be 
to introduce the critique of heteronormativity, alongside the other 
pernicious flatteners of difference targeted since the advent of the 
New Left, into the critique of capital. Because, under the assumptions 
of Floyd’s totality thinking, every social difference is horizontally 
connected to all the others in a sort of rhizomatic whole, the critic 
can, and therefore must, move freely from one to the other without 
concerning herself with the outmoded orthodox methodological 
question of the primacy of determination. 
Some examples: Floyd’s queer Marxist might choose to link HIV 
policy in India to the struggle against so-called Islamic fundamentalism; 
or else, the death sentences issued against homosexuals in Iran to 
this nation’s position in the global petroleum market. (These are my 
examples, by the way, deliberately chosen to contrast against Floyd’s 
decidedly US-centric ones.) Epistemologically speaking, the enemy for 
Floyd is ‘particularisation’, by which he means the consideration of any 
axis of social difference – class let’s say – in isolation from any other: 
here, sexuality. As a self-professed Marxist, Floyd places the emphasis 
on global relations of capital. Under the general assumption of a social 
totality, these relations have an effect of determination on all the other 
forms of social difference, which themselves then impact back upon 
capitalist relations, forming a complex network of multidirectional 
influence and impact. 
It must be said, however, that no major Marxist current before the 
1960s, even and including the work of Gramsci, ever indulged in such 
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a thoroughgoing relativisation of social determination. Clearly, Floyd 
shares with Gramsci a desire to loosen the causal knot with which 
orthodox Marxism ties economic production to social and cultural 
phenomena. Unlike Floyd, however, Gramsci never questioned the 
assumption that social production lay at the base, as it were, of the 
ideological struggle for hegemony. The Gramscian totality remains 
divided, although less distinctly than in classical Marxism, between 
economic and cultural factors in such a way that the former retains a 
modicum of priority over the latter. In Floyd, however, the relations 
of production threaten to become merely another form of social 
‘knowledge’, like Danish neo-fascism or lipstick lesbianism. In stark 
contrast, classical Marxism disparages as revisionism, reformism, 
or social democracy any concession to methods of analysis that 
deprioritise the power of the mode of production (capitalism) to 
create a form of social differentiation (class) which overdetermines, or 
transects, all the others in however complex a fashion. 
To his credit, Floyd shows an awareness of this issue from the outset. 
Indeed, he introduces his book with an anecdote about the apparently 
infamous 1996 appearance of Judith Butler at a Rethinking Marxism 
conference – the most significant multidisciplinary gathering of Marxist 
scholars in the United States. At this conference, Butler delivered 
her noteworthy ‘Merely Cultural’ paper10 which, unsurprisingly, was 
attacked by the more orthodox (or faithful) attendees for effecting 
precisely the move of epistemological relativisation that Floyd wants 
to set alongside Marxism under the premise that both traditions, the 
queer-theoretical and the Marxist, base themselves on the idea of a 
social totality of seamless interconnection. 
As Floyd acknowledges, this ‘Butler among the Marxists’ affair made 
manifest ‘a schism between Marxism and queer theory’ (2) at its own 
mid-1990s theoretical moment. On his reading of the development 
of queer theory since that time, however, this schism has become less 
pronounced, and Floyd clearly wants to position his project as one that 
aims to bring the two camps even closer together. 
In my view, however, Floyd aims to effect this reconciliation of 
queer theory and Marxism with a gesture that merely reiterates the 
standard feminist, gay and postcolonial objections to Marxist discourse 
already fully articulated in New Left doctrine almost a half-century 
ago. To summarise what I’ve paraphrased of his discussion thus far, 
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the relation between Marxism and queer theory for Floyd features 
points of divergence and convergence. They converge in their 
common ambition to analyse social relations as a field in which every 
phenomenon permeates every other. But they diverge in the particular 
way they conceptualise that totality, with Marxism, of course, 
classically positing the mode of economic production as the ‘ultimately 
determining instance’ of social phenomena. 
On this basis, Floyd frames his contribution to the debate as 
an exploration of how it becomes possible to ‘see this divergence’ 
between Marxism and queer theory ‘in a different light’ – that is, to 
depart from queer theory’s alternative conception of totality to identify 
‘the limitations of Marxian categories’ (9). Here he provides his own 
illuminating specification of what this might mean for the study of 
sexuality. ‘What if ’, Floyd asks, Marxism ‘tried to account for insights 
produced within queer theory rather than always framing sexual 
questions in classically Marxian terms, assuming that capital mediates 
sexuality in terms of traditional understandings of privatization and 
commodification, for example?’ (9). Floyd’s mediating response to the 
dispute between Butler and the ‘non-cultural’ Marxists is ultimately 
a rather banal ‘you’re both right!’, which glosses over an underlying 
theoretical incompatibility. How, we might ask, could Marxism itself be 
asked to account for sexuality other than in ‘classically Marxian terms’ 
without betraying its methodological commitment to the determining 
power of the social organisation of production? Even more importantly, 
from the psychoanalytic perspective, Floyd’s argument fails to consider 
how Freud’s idea of the unconscious throws a wrench in the theoretical 
machine that isolates economics from sexuality in the first place.11
Floyd also draws from Lukács’s work a further basic strategy for 
realigning queer studies with Marxism. The Reification of Desire takes 
not only the aspiration to an understanding of social relations as a 
unique totality, but also the key notion of epistemological privilege, 
from Lukács’s 1923 classic History and Class Consciousness. Floyd 
conveys the idea’s significance with a reference to Fredric Jameson’s 
influential endorsement of the centrality of Lukács’s text to the 
Marxist tradition of cultural analysis. According to Floyd’s paraphrase 
of Jameson, this centrality consists in how it creates a new way to think 
about ‘the epistemological priority of the experience of various groups 
or collectivities’ (10), specifically those that Marxism has associated 
Penney T02732 01 text   84 08/10/2013   08:16
is  there a  queer marxism?
85
in a variety of internally controversial ways with the working class or 
proletariat. As might be expected, Floyd aims to position heteronor-
mativity’s victims among those groups. That is, he claims that by virtue 
of their socially marginal position, non-heterosexuals acquire a variety 
of social knowledge that will deliver potentially subversive insights 
about the mechanisms of domination in society as a whole. 
As we’ve already considered, Foucault strongly argued in the 1970s 
that the creation of sexological science in the nineteenth century 
helped to consolidate a sort of paradigm shift by means of which non-
heterosexual erotic activity was transformed from a set of performable 
actions into a panoply of psychological identities. The act of sodomy, 
for instance, previously performable by anyone succumbing to 
temptation, became embodied in the person of the sodomite. To be 
sure, it’s impossible to overstate the formidable extent to which elite 
queer theory, with respect to what it has argued concerning both 
gender and sexuality, has defined itself, through the enlistment of such 
notions as the performative, for example, as the attempt to subvert the 
relation of both terms to notions of psychological identity – to what 
Foucault called the ‘truth of the self ’. 
In light of the historical invention of the homosexual, then, Floyd’s 
argument implies that the sexological turn initiated a form of epis-
temological deprivileging, which Lukácsian methodology can then 
reprivilege. It’s easy to see how the notion of a homosexual knowledge, 
for instance, is only conceivable once there’s an identifiable group of 
persons in whom that knowledge might be embodied. According to 
Floyd, homosexual knowledge, privileged by virtue of its subaltern 
position in the social totality, can then be articulated, presumably in 
tandem with sexuality’s other non-heterosexual forms, in a way that 
calls into question the social order as such. 
Yet, we’ve seen on a number of occasions already in this book that 
queer effects a decisive and universalising exit from the regime of 
sexual identity. In this perspective, the link to epistemological privilege 
then becomes illegitimate, seeing as we’ve assumed that everyone is 
(potentially) queer. As a result, queer knowledge becomes indistinct 
from any other variety of social knowledge. Floyd’s idea of queer epis-
temological privilege therefore rests on an underlying ambivalence 
concerning the relation of this knowledge to the historicity of the 
homosexual identity. 
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This insight brings to bear a related, but more concrete, question. 
Above and beyond the problem of sexuality’s historicity, to what 
extent is it even legitimate to characterise queer knowledge today as 
an example of what Lukács calls the proletarian standpoint? Lukács 
assumes that the subordinated social position of the proletarian 
determines a perception of the social world fundamentally different 
from the perception held by its more privileged counterparts. In short, 
the proletarian’s knowledge is more likely to generate accurate ideas 
about the social totality’s organisation, simply because its subordinate 
position in the mode of production means that it directly confronts the 
concrete effects of capitalist social relations. That is, the proletariat has 
a vested interest in learning how the system works simply because the 
system mercilessly exploits it. By contrast, it’s in the interests of the 
bourgeoisie to dream up inspirational odes to rights and freedoms 
as a means of masking that same exploitation from both the workers 
and itself. 
The difficulty with the place of sexuality in this logic now, quite 
glaringly, appears: how exactly does sexuality correlate to social 
position in the organisation of production? Short answer: it doesn’t. 
Longer answer: this correlation, especially in the indigenous 
geopolitical locale of queer theory, varies tremendously. At any 
rate, as we’ve already seen, the correlation doesn’t even apply to the 
period before the modern invention of sexual categorisations and the 
identities they produced. Before this invention took place, it simply 
wouldn’t have been possible to think about how social privilege might 
vary in accordance with a sexual identity that had yet to see the light 
of day.
Further, Floyd’s Luckácsian argument hardly becomes more 
convincing even once we acknowledge the appearance of the modern 
homosexual on the historical scene. Is there any consistent empirical 
evidence to show that self-identified homosexuals have been 
concretely marginalised in properly socioeconomic terms? How, in any 
case, would we figure into the equation all those extremely numerous 
persons widely scattered across the globe who engage in same-sex 
activity, but who, for whatever reason, don’t identify as homosexual, 
let alone as queer? Even today, many of these persons live in cultural 
contexts in which such an identification is either discursively or 
socially impossible. The entire set of assumptions concerning how 
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homophobia maintains a regime of the closet is simply ethnocentric, 
not to mention unhistorical. Indeed, ‘coming out of the closet’ 
requires acceptance of a narrative of sexuality that is both culturally 
and historically specific. In my view, it also implies tacit acceptance 
of the mainstream commercial gay-queer culture to which any queer 
Marxism worthy of the name should stand opposed. Quite literally, 
not everyone can afford to come out. 
Without question, the liberal and post-industrial global North is 
the habitus of queer studies. Far from being subjected to systematic 
socioeconomic disadvantage, the evidence suggests that self-identi-
fied homosexuals and queers in these regions demonstrate average 
earnings significantly above the norm. Indeed, it’s hardly possible to 
consider the queer phenomenon broadly understood without taking 
into account how capital has increasingly, over the last few decades, 
identified the various non-heterosexual communities in the ‘advanced 
economies’ as privileged markets for the most highly profit-generating 
commodities. 
Moreover, at least on the level of its cultural visibility, homosexuality 
prior to its late modern forms shows a strong link with the aristocracy 
and, later, the upper bourgeoisie. Think, for instance, of the numerous 
European royals known to have been homosexually inclined; or Proust 
at the moment of the European aristocracy’s historical collapse. In this 
light, it hardly makes sense to link homosexuals or homosexuality in 
any general way with the Marxian notion of the proletariat. Further, 
there’s every reason to think that the appeal of Western queer 
discourse in the global South would largely be limited to groups 
already thoroughly ‘Westernised’, or at least favourably positioned 
with respect to the international relations of capital. 
To summarise, Floyd’s analysis makes two main errors. First, 
the analogy it formulates between, on the one hand, the mode of 
production or structure of social relations and, on the other, the realm 
of sexuality, is a false one from Marxism’s perspective. The analogy 
is false because it obfuscates, or simply discards, the causal relation 
between the two. It’s hardly necessary to defend the ultraorthodox 
view that the economy single-handedly determines everything in 
the social and cultural spheres to recognise that Floyd’s analogy 
de-emphasises the epistemological or methodological centrality of 
economic organisation in a way that only reiterates the signature 
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post-Marxist move that the Gramscian work of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe, for example, accomplished in the 1980s.12 In short, 
there’s nothing more ‘Marxist’ about Floyd’s set of assumptions than 
those that have generally informed the work of the left-liberal post-
structuralist contingent of cultural theorists since that time. 
Second, Floyd’s contention that queer critique is universal or 
totalising because ‘heteronormativity’ shares these characteristics is 
indefensible in the most basic logical terms. Indeed, if heterosexism 
totally saturated the social field with its normative command, there 
would be no queer perspective from which this heterosexism might 
be questioned. As the more convincing psychoanalytic accounts 
consistently stress, what lies at the root of heteronormative power – or 
more properly of the resistance to homosexuality, of homophobia – is 
already a displaced, repressed form of homosexual desire itself. 
Finally, there’s a glaring lack of evidence to show that the queer 
phenomenon, in concrete class terms, is anything but bourgeois. The 
fact that there’s no direct correlation between sexuality and social 
privilege should force us to admit that whatever social knowledge we 
might consider to result from the homosexual or queer experience isn’t 
likely to deliver helpful general insights about how the workings of 
global capital enforce relations of domination and exploitation. 
Queer Historical Materialism, Actually Existing!
Readers who go along with my argument that Floyd’s work fails 
to provide an alternative to the reformist or left-liberal tenets of the 
‘post-Marxism’ of the past few decades might be interested to know, 
if they don’t already, that an alternative queer Marxism exists: one 
whose main purpose, it’s not an exaggeration to say, is precisely to 
return the analysis of sexuality to the orthodox – or vulgar, some will 
say – Marxist emphasis on the mode of production’s primacy. 
One of the few places to go to find such a classically Marxist 
alternative in queer theory and sexuality studies is to the work of 
Donald Morton, comrade-in-arms of the previously mentioned Teresa 
Ebert. In 1996, Morton published an invaluable anthology entitled The 
Material Queer, for which he wrote an uncompromising introductory 
essay. This invaluable piece systematically denounces the wide panoply 
of post-Saussurean semiotic or semiological paradigms in cultural 
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theory. These are the methods that substitute language-premised 
methods of cultural study for traditional materialist approaches, which 
work with a Marxian understanding of the underlying socioeconomic 
organisation of production. 
Morton and his allies offered their refreshing (and under-read) 
anthology as a self-consciously historical materialist alternative to the 
anthologies on poststructuralist sexuality studies then proliferating, 
such as Routledge’s The Gay and Lesbian Studies Reader, published 
three years earlier in 1993.13 The underlying premise of Morton’s 
argument is that the political inadequacy of the contemporary study 
of sexuality can be boiled down to two main incorrect assumptions: 
first, that sexuality should be methodologically ‘primary’ in cultural 
analysis; and second, that desire is ‘autonomous’, that is ‘unregulated 
and unencumbered’.14 
My own argument in this section will be that although Morton’s first 
criticism is justified, the second is well intentioned but unfortunately 
faulty, although for decidedly unpostmodernist reasons for which 
he might have some sympathy. To set up my intervention, it will be 
necessary first to bring out the details of Morton’s against-the-grain 
discussion.
For Morton, queer theory is a fundamentally flawed subspecies 
of postmodernism, that goes off the rails where it gives sexuality 
methodological primacy and adopts a faulty, that is to say bourgeois, 
understanding of desire. Let’s take the former point first. In his 
presentation of the postmodernist current for which he wishes to offer 
an alternative, Morton names some of the central figures of late twen-
tieth-century cultural theory – Eve Sedgwick, Deleuze and Guattari, 
Roland Barthes. Taking it as one of the foundational texts of queer 
theory, Morton attacks Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet for setting 
the stage not only for queer theory’s monumental overvaluation 
of the general political significance of sex, but also for the way it 
transforms sexuality into a methodological fetish in cultural analysis. 
‘An understanding of virtually any aspect of modern Western culture 
must be, not merely incomplete, but damaged in its central substance’, 
Sedgwick memorably wrote on Epistemology’s first page, ‘to the degree 
that it does not incorporate a critical analysis of modern homo/
heterosexual definition’.15 
Penney T02732 01 text   89 08/10/2013   08:16
after queer theory
90
Although this statement was declaimed well before queer theory or 
sexuality studies had accumulated any significant amount of academic 
capital, it’s difficult not to read it with the benefit of hindsight as a 
hubristic instance of disciplinary self-privileging; as a performative 
utterance designed to secure a position within the academy for a 
particular kind of cultural study. More significantly, however, this 
institutional ambition was shot through with a particular ideological 
conception of sexuality, premised on a suturing of sexual knowledge 
to identity. In other words, the goal of Sedgwick’s project wasn’t to 
explore in general terms the possibility or nature of sexual knowledge, 
but rather to inaugurate, and effectively sanctify, a new form of 
homosexual knowledge for which the homosexual identity, however 
(ambivalently) problematised, could serve as the ground. 
In Morton’s view, Sedgwick’s manifesto-like introduction to the 
book mistakenly singles sexuality out, thereby isolating it from 
other methodological concerns – most especially those, like the ‘old-
fashioned’ idea of class, that relate directly to the socioeconomic realm. 
To be sure, this feature of Morton’s discussion anticipates Floyd’s 
argument against epistemological particularisation in The Reification 
of Desire. Sedgwick’s work continues in the long feminist tradition of 
politicising sexuality when, as I argue in a variety of ways throughout 
this book, we should rather move to sexualise the political – that is, 
inquire into the ways in which political questions and controversies are 
shot through with libidinal interest and the vicissitudes of unconscious 
desire. In this precise sense, Morton’s argument against Sedgwick that 
Epistemology’s political error lies in its foregrounding of sexuality as 
such misses the point. 
I based my major criticisms of Floyd’s project on the tenets of 
Marxism itself, concluding that it remains complicit with the general 
culturalising reaction against Marxism, which took place during the 
last few decades of the past century. By contrast, my concerns with 
Morton’s argument aren’t political in nature. They stem, rather, from 
my investment in psychoanalysis. Ultimately, we disagree about what 
we might call the nature of the human predicament. 
As I’ll develop in detail, the weakness of Morton’s approach lies in its 
assumption that politics can be separated out from sexuality. However 
counterintuitive it may sound, however, Morton is justified in arguing 
against Sedgwick that to take sexuality as the primary and exclusive 
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focus of cultural analysis is already to depoliticise it. This is so because 
the gesture of directly politicising sexuality has the paradoxical effect 
of desexualising politics, of effectively reneging on our responsibility 
to consider the impact of the unconscious on the negotiation of 
political antagonisms; to consider, that is, the unconscious of the social 
formation as such. Again, the mistaken assumption is that politics 
and sexuality are separable; that the very arena of politics itself is not 
already shot through with sexuality.
To do the argument justice, however, we’ll need to consider in 
detail how Morton qualifies his position against the prioritisation 
of sexuality in cultural studies. Morton cites Deleuze and Guattari 
as the main proponents in postmodernity of what he calls the 
‘deregulation of desire’, a thematic that assumes, he specifies, that 
sexual desire is ‘autonomous, unregulated, and unencumbered’ (1), 
particularly in relation to the material constraints imposed by labour 
time and the radically unequal quality of its remuneration. Morton’s 
historical materialism stands opposed to the structuralist-poststruc-
turalist paradigm according to which it’s the signifier, not the mode 
of production, that shapes, distorts or represses sexual desire. In this 
vein, Morton goes on to condemn the later work of Roland Barthes for 
introducing into the study of culture a preoccupation with jouissance 
or enjoyment – that is, with the way in which sexuality’s excessive 
stimulation of the body disrupts the stability or coherence of meaning 
in language, in the texts of culture. 
To support his contention, Morton cites The Pleasure of the Text 
(1973), a book widely read by first-generation Anglo-American post-
structuralists. In this book, Barthes influentially evokes what he calls 
the ‘grain’ of the voice in cinema by referring to ‘the fleshiness’, ‘the 
breath, the gutturals’ of the lips ‘in their materiality, their sensuality’, 
for example (2). This Barthesian concern for the body, this ambition to 
capture the experience of embodied being in thought, in language, is 
without question one of the central preoccupations of cultural theory in 
the twentieth century’s last few decades – the same ones that witnessed 
the emergence of queer theory. The philosophy of Descartes, or rather a 
simplified and misleading obfuscation of the Cartesian project (see the 
notorious ‘mind/body split’), was, for this tremendously broad current, 
enemy number one. The resurgence of phenomenology, as well as the 
continued impact of the work of Deleuze, are surely symptoms of this 
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effort – not only anti-Cartesian, but surely also anti-Marxist – to ‘think 
through the body’, as Jane Gallop influentially put it at the time. 
Now, we should acknowledge that the Marxist tradition is not 
without its puritanical aspect. Indeed, a deep suspicion of embodied 
experience can from time to time be found there insofar as it might 
compromise, or so it was feared, those (allegedly) supreme Marxian 
values of productivity and utility. As Julia Kristeva was prone to point 
out in the 1980s, the resurgence of psychoanalysis and the body in 
French thought was in many ways an attack on a (perceived) hyper-
rationalism in the Marxist tradition. 
To be sure, Marx and Engels engaged in decidedly unscientific 
commentary on the topic of homosexuality in their correspondence, 
and both were arguably also guilty of an idealisation of the 
heterosexual bond in post-revolutionary society. Still, I want to argue 
that it’s a mistake to associate Morton’s invective against jouissance 
with the Marxian neurosis. Morton’s discussion makes clear that it 
isn’t concerned with pleasure or desire as such (leaving aside for now 
the complication of these terms in psychoanalysis), but rather with 
the particular conceptualisation of these ideas in postmodernity as he 
construes it. In his own words, Morton’s target is ‘the primariness of 
sexuality/libidinality, the autonomy of desire, and the freedom of the 
sexual subject from all constraints’ (2).
Indeed, it’s easy to imagine how the argument against Morton’s 
opposition to postmodernity’s concern with jouissance might proceed 
by dismissing it as mere envy or ressentiment. From this point of view, for 
which psychoanalysis could certainly be enlisted for support, Morton’s 
commitment to historical materialism does indeed require a sacrifice 
– a renunciation – of enjoyment, and the truth of this commitment 
would be the condition that everyone else must do the same. Hence, 
the story might continue, the inability to tolerate the obscene pleasure 
Barthes, for instance, takes in his text. Morton’s reader might sense 
that there is indeed, for him, something obscene about the idea of 
so many young, carefree, Ivy League-educated bourgeois American 
academics sitting back in their comfortable office chairs, gazing out at 
bucolic campus surroundings, sipping their organic green tea, taking 
a break for a few yoga poses, and musing irresponsibly about sex in a 
way that has nothing to do with the world’s more unpleasant realities.
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However problematic the psychodynamic determination of this 
sort of fantasy may be, it carries a core political salience nonetheless. 
To an alarmingly significant extent, queer theory is a symptom of 
the radical disjunction that separates the (relatively) comfortable 
material conditions of academic life in the industrialised world 
from the very different conditions that define the lives of the vast 
majority of the world’s population. Sex is surely a universal concern: 
no subject, no matter how materially deprived, can truthfully profess 
to be unperturbed by the conundrum it poses. Yet, it’s doubtful that 
one tends actually to worry much about its concept if one isn’t sure 
where one’s next meal is coming from. It’s in this precise sense that the 
methodological foregrounding of sexuality is objectively bourgeois. 
The second theoretical objection Morton raises against postmodern 
theories of sexuality targets the notion that desire is, or can be, free of 
constraint; that it carries an irreducible autonomy with respect to all 
those extraneous forces that would determine it. Against the idealism 
inherent in such accounts of desire, Morton invokes a contrasting 
materialist interest in how desire is conditioned; how it emerges, that 
is, as a properly historical phenomenon shaped by social, political and 
economic forces. 
In accordance with this contextualist definition of desire, Morton 
limits the formulation of his anthology’s project to his own American 
context. As he puts it, the book aims 
to place these two traditions [the idealist and the materialist] against 
one another in order to reveal that the social injustices that persist 
today are not due to the moral failures resulting from ‘bad attitudes’ 
or ‘prejudicial opinions’ but are related to the operations of ideology 
in U.S. society that occlude questions of need by promoting an 
obsession with desire. (3, my emphasis)
In other words, sexuality must be recontextualised not as a utopian 
instrument of subjective liberation or deterritorialisation – as the royal 
road to a non-complicit or revolutionary psychic structure – but rather 
as yet another vehicle of ideology, a further ideological state apparatus, 
to use the now old-fashioned expression of Althusser. The ideology 
of desire dissimulates the deep connection between the way we 
experience our sexual needs and the social organisation of production. 
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To demonstrate how foreign this argument is to contemporary queer 
theory, we can cite as an example the Marxian theory of Victorian 
homophobia outlined in a Canadian-authored collective pamphlet 
featured in The Material Queer.16 British industrial-age homophobia 
emerged not as a symptom of the generalised prudishness Foucault 
famously debunked in The History of Sexuality, but rather from purely 
material concerns. 
In short, homosexuality threatened the nineteenth-century 
bourgeoisie because the prospect of sexual enjoyment outside the 
confines of the heterosexual family unit threatened to sabotage the 
bourgeois state’s project to assign responsibility for the provision of 
social services to the private sphere, organised around the unstable 
institution of the patriarchal nuclear family. The Victorian working-class 
man had no choice but to adopt the protestant work ethic because he 
had a wife and family to take care of at home, knowing full well that 
the state would decline to take over responsibility for the family should 
he prove unwilling or unable to do so himself. Bluntly, if the father is 
busy cruising men at the public toilets, it’s not clear who’s going to be 
bringing home the bacon. Properly socialist pressure on the state to 
provide public services then threatens to emerge. 
Despite his concern for tying sexuality to what, in his view, are 
its exclusively material conditions, Morton shares not only with 
psychoanalysis, but also with the anti-Marxist work of the later 
Foucault, the ambition to wrest sex from psychology. Both Morton and 
Foucault reject as a bourgeois illusion the claim that there’s any truth 
of the self to be discovered in sex. But, there’s a fundamental difference 
distinguishing their arguments from one another. Whereas Foucault 
relegates sex to the abstractly conceived productive forces of discourse 
and power, Morton instead wants to show how the convoluted and 
intellectualist musings of queer theory are significantly conditioned by 
the comfortable material circumstances of its proponents. He goes on to 
argue, for example, that queer discourse’s 1990s move towards themes 
such as the virtual and the technological (cyborgs and cybersex) only 
underscores its constitutional aversion to the nitty-gritty of material 
life, in particular as it features in such contexts where its necessities 
are in penury. 
Judith Butler, say, can view desire as something more, or other, than 
what is contained at the level of basest material need, only because the 
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conditions of her own existence ensure that her material necessities are 
already properly taken care of. For Morton, all the essential tenets of 
queer theory are based on specific assumptions about sexuality, which 
only those persons with the required leisure time and income level 
will develop. Later, I’ll argue that this view is incorrect. It’s impossible 
to deny, however, that there’s a substantial grain of truth in Morton’s 
discussion, however glibly it might come across. For this reason, it 
will prove helpful to delve into its theoretical substance as a means of 
leading up to my own critique of Morton’s position.
The work of two icons of 1970s- and 1980s-era French theory, Jean 
Baudrillard and Jean-François Lyotard, emblematises for Morton 
a turn in the Marxian tradition that effectively betrayed its political 
project. This betrayal, writes Morton, put into place ‘the displacement 
of the economic account of need by the linguistic account of desire’ 
(4). This concise formulation encapsulates the immanent antagonism 
that any theoretical project working in the wake of Marx and Freud 
must inevitably confront. Morton’s reading of Baudrillard and Lyotard 
targets the analogy their work develops between the Marxist realm 
of political economy and the structuralist-cum-poststructuralist, 
semiotic-linguistic terrain of the sciences humaines. The classical 
Marxist distinction between exchange value and use value is 
famously compared to Saussure’s differentiation of the signifier from 
the signified: exchange value is to the signifier as use value is to the 
signified. A detailed look at a substantial chunk of Morton’s text, 
which quotes from Baudrillard’s influential For a Critique of the Political 
Economy of the Sign (1972), is in order:
Capitalism, which needs exchangeability or equivalence between 
commodities, is founded on exchange value and is driven by the 
need to produce from exchange value a surplus value that is itself 
responsible for the difference of class. Overcoming capitalism would 
involve a return to the more fundamental level of addressing human 
need, represented by use value, and a consequent cancellation of all 
those (needless) desires produced by capitalist commodity fetishism 
at the level of exchange-become-surplus-value. But, against Marx, 
Baudrillard argues that ‘use value is [also] an abstraction. It is an 
abstraction of the system of needs cloaked in the false evidence of 
a concrete destination and purpose, an intrinsic finality of goods 
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and products’ and thus that both ‘use value and exchange value’ are 
‘regulated by an identical abstract logic of equivalence’. (4) 
In short, the so-called linguistic turn of semiotics and structuralism, 
for Morton, is a symptom of critical theory’s regression back from 
historical materialist analysis. The growing emphasis on language in 
twentieth-century thought, on the construction and deconstruction of 
signification or meaning, is to be understood as part and parcel of the 
increasing hegemony and widening globalisation of capitalist logic. 
Capital superimposes an obfuscating but profit-generating cloak of 
empty value on the material conditions of production. Analogously, 
linguistic, textual and discursive modes of analysis introduce a 
distracting emphasis on rhetoric and representation into the more 
concrete political and historical problem of human need’s satisfaction. 
For a critic of my generation unsatisfyingly acculturated into the 
postmodern academy, at a time when historical materialist analysis 
was an activity performed only by those hopelessly out of touch, 
Morton’s argument is a seductive one. Undeniably, for the majority 
of the human population today, and even for many in the most 
‘advanced’ post-industrial societies, the satisfaction of basic needs is 
still the primary problem of day-to-day life. And generally speaking, 
the cultural theory of the last few decades is not the sort of place 
where one might expect to be confronted with this difficult truth. 
Morton’s theory communicates the noble wish to theorise away our 
ridiculous fascination with impossible desires and ineffable exchange 
values, finally focusing squarely on the satisfaction of our most basic 
species needs.
But there’s a problem. As much as I want to agree with Morton, 
I have to grant Baudrillard his argument, albeit while distancing 
myself from the consequences he draws from it. Over a century of 
psychoanalytic experience provides inconvenient but overwhelming 
evidence that even at its basest or barest, human life can only fail to 
limit itself to the dimension of biological or physiological need. The 
argument that psychoanalytic experience shows this because it’s only 
the bourgeoisie who ever get analysed fails, unfortunately, to convince. 
Here is the basic lesson of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1922): 
the essence of human life is its own excess over itself; an inhuman and 
immortal drive which, zombie-like, persists beyond mere biological 
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death.17 Similarly, as Lacan argued in the aftermath of the sociopolitical 
tumult of the late 1960s, surplus value, which he translated into the 
neologism plus-de-jouir (surplus enjoyment), survives the socialist 
revolution. As impractical and politically irritating as the statement 
surely is, Baudrillard is entirely correct to argue that use value is an 
abstraction. Objects of experience never appear to the sexuate human 
subject in purely practical or utilitarian terms, unsullied by a stain of 
excessive and unconscious libidinal interest. Use value can never be 
reconciled with the immaterial vicissitudes of human desire. 
For psychoanalysis, desire is indeed useless and pointless. Utopian 
socialism – that is, the socialism that posits a return to a natural 
balance of need after capitalism’s fall – would be a feasible project only 
if we, as speaking human subjects, were satisfied by the satisfaction 
of our needs. As everyone knows, the infant can go on wailing even 
after he’s changed and fed. The sobering psychoanalytic lesson is 
that the baby’s cry indexes every human’s constitutively denatured 
essence, or being-towards-death. In fact, there’s something in the 
prospect of satisfaction that repels us. This is the sense in which desire 
is essentially perverse: constitutively out of balance with both the 
environment and the organism itself. What we desire, in fact, is non-
satisfaction; satisfaction’s indefinite postponement. Simply put, the 
purpose of desire is to ensure that we are never definitively satisfied; 
that every object presented to us to satisfy our needs is finally deemed 
insufficient, unsatisfactory. 
To the psychoanalytic claim about desire, which we could call a 
truth of human nature if desire wasn’t precisely what separates us 
off from nature, the historical materialist will offer the rejoinder 
that Freud only made it because he was a product of the Viennese 
bourgeoisie, of European capitalism at the height of its imperialist 
phase. Yet, the psychoanalytic claim about desire isn’t historical. 
Because it’s ultimately devoid of content, because its essence is in 
effect correlative to every object’s failure to extinguish it, desire as 
such can’t be historicised. As far as queer theory is concerned, the 
necessary corollary of this is the truth that homosexual desire can 
manifest itself when there is no discourse to support it; nothing on the 
level of concrete historical actuality – social formations, institutions, 
identities, writings – through which it might, as it were, be given body. 
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With respect to Marxism’s political ambitions, the claim that the 
essence of desire isn’t historical shouldn’t be taken to mean that the 
implementation of a social alternative to capitalism is impossible in 
any a priori way. It only indicates that if we were someday to eradicate 
capitalism, whatever that might mean exactly, it doesn’t follow that 
we would suddenly cease to be creatures of desire. Again, the human 
subject will always remain unreconciled with its basic animal needs. 
This being said, Morton is correct to argue that the paradigmatic 
shift Baudrillard’s work helped to effect in cultural theory – from mode 
of production to mode of signification – is politically unfortunate, 
by virtue of its participation in the disturbingly wide-ranging 
abandonment of the critique of surplus value in the post-1968 period. 
It’s one thing to claim that desire is inextinguishable; it’s quite another 
to conclude from this that nothing can be done about the tyranny of 
exchange value. 
Who could deny that we’ve allowed increasingly complex and 
speculative systems of value not only to obfuscate, and therefore 
legitimate, ever more scandalous social inequalities, but also to 
determine our very collective material destinies? Even the day-to-day 
realities of university life in both the private and public sectors – 
student loans and faculty research funds; student–instructor ratios; 
the availability of digital and paper-based forums for publication, 
‘research dissemination’ and ‘knowledge mobilisation’; even, and 
especially, course content – are in the most intimate way intertwined 
with the wildly unpredictable vicissitudes of global capital. It’s almost 
superfluous to add that the increasingly stressful world of academia, 
or at least those parts of it that show resistance to its instrumentali-
sation by the demands of capital, is the very same environment that 
right-wing pundits routinely lambaste as hopelessly out of touch with 
real-world economic ‘realities’.
Who’s Afraid of Transsexual Marxism?
Both Floyd’s uncomfortably poststructuralist Lukácsian Marxism 
and Morton’s orthodox historical materialism suffer from their 
unwillingness, or inability, to take account of the contribution of 
psychoanalysis to our appreciation of human desire. Indeed, from 
the psychoanalytic perspective, there’s nothing at all queer in either 
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theory, if we understand by that term how Lacan described the sexual 
drive as irreconcilable with discourse and meaning. 
It’s probably not coincidental that we must step outside the 
Anglo-American world to find examples of anti-homophobic Marxian 
theoretical initiatives that find in psychoanalysis not an obstacle, but 
rather a tool. The two most important such examples are the writings 
of Guy Hocquenghem (to whom the next chapter is dedicated), and 
Mario Mieli. Intriguingly, these remarkable, and certainly under-read, 
efforts to acquaint Marxism with an anti-homophobic critical project 
date back to a time well before queer theory’s pioneers even appeared 
on the scene. 
A central figure of Italian gay politics in the 1970s and self-described 
‘outrageous queen’, Mieli founded the Fronte Unitario Omosessuale 
Rivoluzionario Italiano (United Italian Revolutionary Homosexual 
Front) in 1972. In 1977, he published an important book adapted 
from a dissertation he wrote for a doctorate in moral philosophy 
(of all things), translated into English in 1980 as Homosexuality 
and Liberation: Elements of a Gay Critique. Ignored even by most 
self-professed queer Marxist critics writing in English, this text without 
doubt figures among the most important works ever to address either 
the significance of homosexuality for Marxism, or the implications of 
Marxism for the gay movement and its subsequent offshoots. 
The Mieli story is a heroic but tragic one. He committed suicide 
in 1983 at the young age of 30, apparently unsettled by the negative 
reception he anticipated for the autobiographical work, Il risveglio dei 
faraoni, he had just finished writing. We can reasonably speculate that 
the reactionary Stalinist ‘family values’ ethos of post-war European 
institutional communism played a significant role in Mieli’s demise. 
More certain is that no work on queer Marxism can afford either to 
ignore the immense contribution of Mieli’s singular text, or to wonder 
about, and speculate on, the future directions his work might have taken 
had his provocative writing career not come to such a premature end. 
Because the text is too long and significant to broach in general 
terms in the present context, I’ve chosen to focus on the element that 
most directly invokes Marxism and the Marxist tradition. From this 
angle, the most important aspect of Homosexuality and Liberation is its 
insistence on linking homophobia to the relations of capital. Therein 
lies Mieli’s undeniable significance for my own project. Read retrospec-
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tively from over three decades on, his book glaringly exposes dominant 
queer theory’s failure to establish this link, or even to acknowledge that 
it had ever previously been made. Even worse, in this perspective the 
queer project gains the patina of a patent regression, for homophobia’s 
implication in the logic of capital is already the starting point of Mieli’s 
discussion – indeed, its most central framing assumption. 
To be sure, we should take this fact today as evidence of the 
remarkable extent to which Marxist critical assumptions have 
disappeared from the discourse on sexuality since Mieli wrote his 
text. Although Homosexuality and Liberation puts forth arguments 
both explicit and implicit to support the capital–homophobia link, the 
text’s mode of address and ensemble of references together convey a 
reality that has become decidedly unfamiliar. At the time of the book’s 
publication, there existed a group of activist and academic readers 
in Italy and the UK (Mieli was also active in London’s revolutionary 
left gay scene), however small or marginal, for whom it went without 
saying that the liberation of homosexual desire must necessarily go 
hand in hand with a radical transformation of the capitalist status quo. 
In the contemporary situation of queer studies, Mieli’s text 
gains even further in value by virtue of its extraordinarily prescient 
acknowledgment of the startling efficiency with which capital capitalises 
(there is no more perfect word) on the new sexual phenomena that 
came into increasing visibility in a newly sexually permissive society. By 
the mid-1970s, it had already become abundantly clear to Mieli’s keen 
critical eye that this society ‘makes very good use of the “perversions”’ 
which, he affirms, are ‘sold both wholesale and retail’; are ‘studied, 
classified, valued, marketed, accepted, discussed’.18 
Knowingly, Mieli writes in the wake of both the naïve sexual 
liberationism of Norman O. Brown and the more politicised doctrine 
of repressive desublimation influentially advanced by Herbert 
Marcuse, whose work Homosexuality and Liberation quotes in some 
detail. The reference to Marcuse’s book makes abundantly clear that 
Mieli had already gained the famous insight that Michel Foucault 
would much more conspicuously develop in The History of Sexuality, 
the first volume of which was published the very same year as 
Homosexuality and Liberation. Be it by virtue of the material effects of 
capital or the amorphous forces of power, both texts posit the same 
result: the impulse behind sexual liberationism had been decisively 
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deformed and co-opted, and its effects of disalienation or subjective 
emancipation fully attenuated and renormalised. For both Mieli and 
Foucault, the rhetoric of sexuality’s liberation had, by the late 1970s, 
become a tired and toothless cliché.
Mieli’s deft handling of the classic Freudo-Marxist problem of the 
relation between, on the one hand, the demands of a civilisation that 
must organise production in order to survive and, on the other, the 
realities of a disruptive and impractical human sexuality, displays 
a remarkable subtlety. To be sure, Mieli’s approach puts paid to the 
hopeful notion that impactful social change can result from the 
expression of taboo sexualities. Nonetheless, Mieli consistently resists 
proceeding to the resigned conclusion that no form of sexual advocacy 
or practice will ever have any effect on the negotiation of sex roles and 
social relations. 
Central to Mieli’s take on the tricky Marx-Freud conundrum is the 
notion of labour which, to risk an understatement, has failed to figure 
prominently in academic queer discourse. In essence, Mieli cleverly 
adds to the doctrine of commodity fetishism famously developed by 
Marx in the first volume of Capital the idea that it’s not just labour 
which is alienated in the commodity, but sexuality as well. Or rather, 
it’s more accurate perhaps to say that Mieli, clearly under the influence 
of Freud here, implicitly reformulates Marx’s complex understanding 
of labour to foreground the agency of Eros in it. For Mieli, that is to say, 
the specifically human energy or life force that goes into any process of 
social production is the very same energy at work in sexuality. More 
concretely, the worker on that Fiat assembly line makes the same sort 
of expenditure of effort attaching a part to his car engine that he would 
make making love to his partner. And for Mieli at least (psychoanalysis 
isn’t so sure), it’s clear that this worker would much rather engage in 
the latter form of expenditure than the former. 
In Mieli’s view, the liberation of homosexual desire requires the 
emancipation of sexuality from both patriarchal sex roles and capital. 
This liberation depends first and foremost on our recognition of the 
fact that capitalism has already learned how to prey upon dissident 
desires, transforming them into what he calls ‘the squalid fetishes 
of sex marketed by the system’ (209). The enemy constituency here 
for Mieli includes all those reactionary souls who derive apparent 
satisfaction from the mediocre titillations such fetishes provide. It’s 
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quite clear from Mieli’s discussion that numerous gay men and other 
sexual dissidents figure prominently among them.
Mieli’s argument draws on Marx’s Grundrisse (1858, published 
1939) to make two main assertions. First, humanity will not be 
emancipated until human labour, and therefore sexuality for Mieli, 
ceases to be alienated in the production of falsely liberated perverse 
commodities. Second, technological advancements have created a 
historically unprecedented opportunity for emancipation. 
This last point is explained through reference to two phenomena. 
What Marx called the ‘surplus labour of the mass’ is no longer needed 
for general human well-being; and intellectual labour, heretofore 
restricted to the privileged classes, has made itself available to the 
worker, whose time is no longer monopolised by the exigencies 
of the (manual) working day. For Mieli, this means that the many 
revolutions in production that had taken place since Marx’s day 
only underscore how ‘it is even less necessary to channel all libidinal 
energies into reproduction’ (211) and, indeed, how ‘sexual repression 
is obsolete’ (212). 
For Marx, the dramatic reduction in socially necessary labour 
already discernible when he wrote – the time, that is, we collectively 
spend making what we need to survive – frees us up to pursue scientific 
and artistic endeavours, freely associating with one another to achieve 
our full collective creative potential. For Mieli, by contrast, these same 
improvements emancipate us from all sexual constraints: everything 
from reproduction to conventional gender roles; from patriarchy to the 
exhausting demands of the working day. 
All of this suggests an immensely preferable alternative to 
contemporary hegemonic queer theory. But as a product of its time, 
Mieli’s argument is marred by several significant limitations. In 
particular, Mieli’s fidelity to the classical Marxist line sees him fail to 
address certain key problems, which have only become more urgent 
in the decades since he wrote. The most obvious of these can be 
formulated as a question. Despite the emancipation from conventional 
industrial material production of a wide swathe of humanity across the 
global North and South, why do we remain basically as chained in our 
labour to our computers and wireless devices as any worker ever was 
to the production line? In many ways, the Blackberry-iPhone invasion 
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of non-labour time is as insidious as the pre-trade union extended 
work day. 
To give him due credit, Mieli provides an answer to this question, 
and here again he remains faithful to the Marxist view. For Mieli as 
for Marx, the alienation and exploitation of labour continue long 
after humanity has ceased being obliged to work all day to ensure its 
survival. This can be explained by capital’s dependence on the surplus 
value extracted from surplus labour, which is another way of saying 
that the relations of capital are based on human desires, not human 
needs. Hence Mieli’s focus on perverse commodity fetishism and the 
Marcusean critique of desublimation, but also his cutting invective 
against the ‘homocops’: all those reactionary queers ‘who are better 
adapted to the [capitalist] system’, and ‘who find ideological arguments 
to justify their position as contented slaves’ (194). Being faithful to 
Mieli’s line of argument requires us to align most of mainstream queer 
theory with these homocops.
These details highlight how Mieli’s discussion hinges on a 
crucial distinction he outlines between, first, those expressions of 
non-normative sexuality that remain complicit with capitalism’s 
colonisation of the perverse libido, and second, an alternative 
expression of homosexual desire, which would undo in a liberating 
way sexuality’s repressive sublimations in commodities. More simply, 
Mieli distinguishes between ‘the reified pages of Vogue’ (198) and what 
he calls the transsexual potential of human sexuality. In his invaluable 
introduction to an Italian-language edition of Homosexuality and 
Liberation, Christopher Lane helpfully summarises the salience of 
Mieli’s notion. His ‘transsexual aesthetic doesn’t enable men to pass 
unnoticed among women, leaving heterosexuality untouched’, Lane 
writes. Rather, ‘it defamiliarizes all social understanding of gender, 
destroying heterosexuality’s status, leaving us all to begin, as it were, 
from scratch’.19 
In this way, Mieli’s idiosyncratic understanding of transsexuality 
fully anticipates the ‘deconstruction’ of the gender binary and the 
critique of the ‘heterosexual matrix’ in queer theory. The crucial 
difference, however, is that Mieli traces a direct path from the work of 
deconstruction and critique to the subversion of not only patriarchy 
and heterosexism, but capitalism as well. In this sense, Mieli’s work 
could serve as a crucial missing link which, in today’s context, could 
Penney T02732 01 text   103 08/10/2013   08:16
after queer theory
104
potentially connect poststructuralist feminism and queer theory with 
the critique of capitalist social relations. As you may recall, this was 
precisely Floyd’s ambition, and one senses that Mieli would have 
proven more valuable than Lukács to his project. 
But how exactly does Mieli support his point concerning the 
properly material implications of a ‘queering’ of gender and sexuality, 
a trope which today has become entirely familiar? Shouldn’t poststruc-
turalist queer theory’s failure to engage with Marxian concerns inspire 
sharp scepticism about Mieli’s thesis? In my own view, these material 
implications are inadequately developed in Homosexuality and 
Liberation. What Mieli does indeed say, however, is that the liberation 
of non-normative sexuality can be complicit with capitalism because 
the sexuality concerned remains in a repressed and sublimated form, 
which reinforces the ethos of discipline and productivity upon which 
capital depends. But the discussion is based on vague understandings 
of repression and sublimation, and fails to delve into the complexities 
and ambiguities of these concepts as developed originally in Freud’s 
writing.20 Further, it’s not at all clear that the relations of capital today 
depend on a prohibition of enjoyment. On the contrary, the paradox of 
contemporary capitalism is the apparent symbiosis of a hypercompeti-
tive and individualistic work ethic with a hedonistic and consumerist 
injunction to ‘enjoy!’21 
Read with the benefit of hindsight, Mieli’s discussion leaves today’s 
readership with two options. First, we can congratulate Mieli, as well 
we should, for his awesomely prescient diagnosis of capitalism’s 
spectacular colonisation of the gains of feminism and the gay 
movements, all the while insisting that it still makes sense to claim that 
certain non-reified expressions of homosexual desire offer ‘a fertile 
potential for revolutionary subversion’ (212). Alternatively, we can 
take the contemporaneity of gay liberation and the queer phenomenon 
with the neoliberal era’s unprecedented unshackling of capital as 
evidence that, pace Mieli, the whole notion of a specifically sexual 
emancipation in all its possible forms is simply incompatible with anti-
capitalist politics, that is to say with politics properly speaking. 
Leaving aside for a moment the complicated question, pregnant 
with significance for theory, of how we understand the term in Freud’s 
wake, we might unabashedly and in a spirit of realism acknowledge 
that a certain degree of sexual repression is a precondition of radical 
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political organisation and action. If an ethos of hyperpermissiveness 
does indeed characterise contemporary capitalism, then a certain 
degree of old-fashioned inhibition or self-abnegation might in fact 
carry forward new initiatives for politics, including even those that fight 
against homophobia. Despite the weighty historical evidence to the 
contrary, we might add that there is nothing necessarily homophobic, 
patriarchal or even ‘sex-negative’ about the thematics of discipline and 
auto-critique in the tradition. In any case, if, as I argue in detail in the 
following chapter, Lacan’s Freud is right, and repression results from 
language rather than ‘civilisation’, no social transformation, no matter 
how radical or anti-capitalist, will ever succeed in undoing it. 
In the end, the most salient feature of Mieli’s work for the 
contemporary critique of queer theory is its conviction that being or 
identifying as homosexual doesn’t in itself pose any necessary challenge 
to the ideological status quo. By insisting on inserting class conflict 
among the queers, Mieli implicitly upholds the fundamental Marxian 
principle that the capitalist mode of production creates a diagonal 
social difference – one that cuts across all the other, less materially 
significant, differences of race, religion and ethnicity, for instance 
(with the exception of sexual difference which, for psychoanalysis at 
least, is a diagonal difference of a precisely analogous kind). Like the 
symptom which, according to Freud, takes advantage of pre-existing 
physical problems to express itself in its encoded way, class antagonism 
colonises other varieties of difference in a manner that obfuscates how 
religious and racial conflicts, for example, are often subtly displaced 
socioeconomic conflicts at the same time. 
What has changed significantly since Mieli’s historical moment is 
the fact that capitalism’s colonisation of homosexuality now extends 
well beyond the conformist, ‘straight-acting’ constituencies he 
identifies as the enemies of his transsexual aesthetic (although these of 
course continue, problematically to be sure, to exist). On the contrary, 
it would seem today that the most cutting-edge queers – those who 
refuse sexual identification and monogamy; those who dismiss 
‘vanilla’ sexual activity and marriage as hopelessly complicit – are 
the ones best adapted, with their transient lifestyles and antipathy for 
attachment, to capital in its current, hypermobile phase. Surely it has 
become impossible to pretend that unfettered capital and ‘traditional 
family values’ are mutually enforcing social forces, even if populist 
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conservative ideology functions to prevent this antagonism from 
manifesting itself politically – that is, as an explicit and self-conscious 
contestation of dominant social and economic models. The radical 
queer millionaire Internet pornographer who organises ‘sex-positive’ 
sex toy parties in his spare time (the new Tupperware?) has become 
one of the best emblems of contemporary capitalism. 
Capital Enjoyments
So, then, what are the consequences of all of this for the search for a 
Marxist alternative to queer theory? To get us started, we can return to 
Morton’s critique of Baudrillard, more specifically to his dismissal of 
postmodernism’s reinterpretation of exchange value as the hegemony 
of the signifier’s subversive play over the concrete meaning of the 
signified. I claimed that Baudrillard was correct, and in agreement 
with psychoanalysis, to deny the possibility that the human subject 
can content itself with the satisfaction of need. Need, like use value, is 
in this specific sense an illusory abstraction. What the postmodernist 
analysis lacks, however, is the fundamental psychoanalytic corollary 
that the impossible excess of desire, and by extension the sexy 
phantom of exchange value, is a mechanism of defence designed to 
shield the subject’s ego from the dangerous eruption of enjoyment. 
In other words, psychoanalysis adds to the classic Marxist analysis of 
the commodity form the key notion that exchange value is correlative 
to the defence against, the repression of, enjoyment. Where enjoyment 
is concerned, there is no surplus value, no Lacanian plus-de-jouir. And 
yet, by this last statement I would appear to contradict myself. After 
all, did I not claim just a few paragraphs back that Lacan articulates 
his criticism of utopian Marxism by denying that any manner of social 
transformation, no matter how radical, can succeed in extinguishing 
surplus enjoyment, in reconciling the human subject’s desire to the 
object of need?
For Lacan, we attribute surplus value to an object – we perceive in 
the object an ineffable ‘x’ that can potentially extinguish desire – as 
a result of our unwillingness, buttressed by our ego investments, to 
derive libidinal satisfaction from it. Although psychoanalysis argues 
that neurosis – the defence against jouissance – can never be eliminated 
in any final, once-and-for-all fashion, clinical practice is premised on 
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the notion, properly utopian in this precise sense, that by confronting 
our dissimulated enjoyment we can attenuate the seductive and 
inhibiting power of the ideals that prop up our self-image. In this way, 
it’s possible at least to begin to see through the false promise of the 
idealised, full satisfaction issued by the surplus value of exchange. 
This unlimited, perfect satisfaction, psychoanalysis teaches us, is one 
we desire to experience simultaneously with our self-apprehension; 
without the expropriation of selfhood, the subjective destitution, to 
use Lacan’s suggestive phrase, that inevitably accompanies authentic 
drive satisfaction. 
In this precise sense, then, the commodity form in Marx’s political 
economy is structurally correlative to the ideals (ideal ego and 
ego ideal) of which Freud speaks in the presentation of his concept 
of narcissism. The commodity’s seductions are premised on the 
idealisation, and therefore the repression, of the enjoyment against 
which they defend the ego’s investments. As Lacan argued relentlessly 
in his early teaching, these investments always adapt with supreme 
efficiency to the demands of the ‘American way of life’ and ‘the service 
of goods’ – the smooth functioning, to Marxianise Lacan’s idiom, 
of capitalist social relations. Despite the changes in emphasis that 
modulate his teaching over time, Lacan was unwavering in imparting 
the lesson, initially targeted at the ideology of ego psychology, that the 
aim of analysis must be to attenuate the lure of the ego so as to make 
manifest the enjoyment dissimulated by the symptom. If this is indeed 
the ultimate kernel of truth in the Freudian project writ large, then 
psychoanalysis should make a similar promise, however impossible or 
‘interminable’, as concerns the enticing lure that surplus value and the 
commodity form unfurl. 
On this assumption, Marx’s critique of surplus value does precisely 
the same work as Freud’s critique of the ego on the level of what 
we might call the structure of their respective speculative systems. 
Marx’s critique uncovers the obfuscating idealisation of exploitative 
production relations, which make up the disavowed truth of surplus 
value (i.e. reification: commodities in capitalism make nasty qualitative 
relations between persons appear as innocuous quantitative relations 
between sexified things). Analogously, Freudianism unearths the 
enjoyments that, dissimulated by identification, hold together our 
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alluring ego structure, the very same structure that provides the 
commodity with its enticing libidinal appeal. 
If the point of psychoanalysis is to teach us to wrest ourselves from 
the force of the inhibitory ideals through which we develop a sense 
of ourselves, then the goal of ideological critique is an uncannily 
similar one: to diminish our dependence on those social forms that 
dissimulate the bitter truth of unjust relations of production. Psychoan-
alytically put, Marxist critique decodes the unconscious satisfactions, 
the multiple forms of consumerist jouissance, that bind us to market 
ideology. These are the formidable forces that see us purchase that 
bottle of perfume or cologne despite the fact that we know better, 
that we’re not quite sure we even enjoy the scent. If the old project of 
so-called Freudo-Marxism ever had a point to make, it was perhaps 
that the two agendas, viewed on this level, are one and the same.
Taking the literary cue from Freud, Lacan tied the destiny of 
the desiring subject to the vicissitudes of the tragic genre, from the 
desire of the destitute Oedipus ‘never to have been born’, through 
Antigone’s uncompromising perseverance at the limits of atè, to Sygne 
de Coûfontaine’s pathetic and suicidal facial tic. This tic indexes a 
pure negativity, an absolute ‘no’, whose possibility is carved out by the 
signifier, according to Lacan, in Paul Claudel’s dramaturgical trilogy. 
But, as Alenka Zupančič insightfully argues, desire also belongs to the 
realm of comedy, here understood as the generic mode that exposes 
the difference between the lofty and otherworldly ambitions of desire 
and the inadequate objects that fail to satisfy it.22 This is the desire 
not to desire; the desire whose aim is to sabotage its own realisation, 
whose modus operandi is precisely to repress the knowledge of its own 
impossibility. 
This desire is to be distinguished from what Lacan called desire’s 
real – the drive, that is – which does in fact deliver satisfaction. But 
we can only experience this satisfaction at the ego’s expense, as a 
consequence of the ego’s fleeting collapse. This explains why we must 
distinguish the play of desire, its endless substitution of inadequate 
objects, from enjoyment or jouissance which, despite its impossibility, 
happens nonetheless, whether we care to know about it or not. 
Desire is to the play of signifying substitutions as jouissance is to a 
resolutely non-signifying, meaningless satisfaction. With unrelenting 
seriousness, this satisfaction remains in unconscious form as the 
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neurotic symptom, banished from conscious knowledge to allow for 
the ego’s construction. Similarly, the pleasure we derive from our ego 
structure is to be contrasted with the Freudian ‘beyond’ of pleasure, the 
traumatic satisfaction we derive, as it were, from the drive.
Lacan’s notion of enjoyment, as the beyond of the pleasure principle, 
also allows for a psychoanalytic reformulation of Marx’s old concept of 
use value. Earlier, I agreed with Baudrillard’s qualification of use value 
as an abstraction, as a Marxist illusion. But this agreement holds only 
to the extent that use value is held to be separable from its coupling 
with the ideal of exchange value; to the doubtless debatable extent, 
in other words, that the Marxist critique of the commodity form 
ultimately leads towards a sort of egalitarian utilitarianism, that it is 
held to insinuate that the utopian defeat of capitalism will reconcile 
humanity with the value of use as a realisable summum bonum or 
general social good. 
But what if we posit instead that it’s really Marx’s idea of use value 
that should be connected to Lacan’s concept of enjoyment – that 
self-expropriating experience of embodiment which dispenses, for 
a time at least, with the protective barrier the ego erects in defence 
against it? That is, should we not hold that when Lacan coined the 
term plus-de-jouir to connect psychoanalysis to Marx’s discourse on 
the commodity form, he really meant to say that it’s use value, not 
exchange value, that corresponds to the always imperfect and fleeting 
satisfactions the castrated subject of the unconscious is only able to 
access? This compromised satisfaction must then be distinguished 
from the phantom promise of ‘more! ’ enjoyment. This is the excessive 
enjoyment that both fascinates and repels us in the Other; the surplus 
jouissance we can never manage to experience for ourselves.
Psychoanalysis surely argues that there can be no definitive exorcism 
of exchange value, no once-and-for-all cure for our chronic collective 
overvaluation of the commodity-objects that capitalism displays to 
lure the insatiable appetites of desire. But psychoanalysis can also 
teach Marxism the lesson that the resistance-breaking assumption 
of our imperfect and shameful enjoyments, on the one had, and the 
desire-causing power of the commodity, on the other, are inversely 
proportional. The more we acknowledge our jouissance – the more 
bravely we come to terms with its ‘base’, and properly perverse, 
libidinal origins – the more independence we gain with respect to 
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the dictates of commodity relations. In short, tarrying with the drive 
and its inhuman insistence can insulate us from the temptations 
of sacrifice, postponement and compromise by which we tether our 
destinies to the imperatives of capital. Freud rigorously defined the 
analyst’s task as impossible, its practice interminable. Yet, he doggedly 
persisted in its performance, with obviously remarkable results. No 
doubt we must conclude that, in conformity with Lacanian ethics, 
the impossibility of the ultimate completion of the critique of the 
commodity form is the very reason for which its practice presents itself 
to us as an absolute duty. 
It’s probably no coincidence that in these last considerations of 
Lacan’s intervention in Marx’s labour theory of value, queer theory 
has seemingly disappeared from view. What does this mean? As I 
argue in detail in the next chapter, Freud’s definition of sexuality, or 
more precisely of the drive, paradoxically implies that sexuality is 
asexual. Indifferent to gender, it remains unmoved by every positive 
quality of the object. 
To the extent, then, that we identify queer theory with the thematics 
of endless discursive production concerning the construction and 
undoing of gender and sexual identities in and through the multiform 
and conflicting forces of power, this theory is simply irrelevant to the 
psychoanalytic critique of capital whose very general parameters I’ve 
just sketched out. What happens to queer theory, by contrast, when 
it confronts jouissance and its constitutive deadlock, the dogged 
persistence of Lacan’s plus-de-jouir? The critical project that targets and 
demystifies the lure of surplus value is indifferent to sexual categori-
sations, and in this sense carries a universal relevance and address. 
Everyone is queer, therefore no one is queer, let’s move on. 





Against Queer Theory, Avant La Lettre
In 1972, nearly two decades before the emergence of what we know today as queer theory, Guy Hocquenghem published his singular text Homosexual Desire. Despite its relatively marginal status 
within current debates on politics and sexuality, this book precociously 
broaches a number of central topics that anti-homophobic critics still 
raise today: the psychodynamics of homophobia; desire’s role in the 
exercise of power; and strategies for the facilitation, if I can put it this 
way, of the experience of homosexual desire. 
Hocquenghem’s book is an unacknowledged forerunner of 
contemporary queer theory. Indeed, although queer theory is barely 
aware of it, it helped set the stage for its most fundamental debates. 
Most importantly for my concerns, Homosexual Desire represents one 
of the most consequential attempts to think about homosexuality 
and homophobia in acknowledgment of both psychoanalytic and 
Marxist insights. 
Hocquenghem’s book was first translated into English in 1978, and 
then conspicuously reprinted by a major American university press in 
1993. So, why does it remain an obscure anomaly in English-language 
queer discourse? The answer might lie in part in the book’s French 
intellectual cultural origins during the immediate post-1968 period – a 
culture whose investments, both political and theoretical, now contrast 
sharply with those that animate contemporary gay and queer politics 
in the global North. We can account for the relative non-reception of 
Hocquenghem in Anglo-American sexuality theory today by citing the 
contrasting historical locations, theoretical assumption, and political 
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ideologies that separate Hocquenghem’s moment of writing from 
contemporary queer theory.1 
In this light, one of this chapter’s aims will be to engage in an 
exercise of translation between the various discourses concerned 
– Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari’s schizoanalysis, and Anglo-American poststructuralist queer 
theory2 – not in order to reconcile their conflicting contentions, but 
rather to force a productive encounter. My wager is that this encounter 
will help to identify the political and theoretical stakes of sexuality 
theory in general and, more specifically, to call into question the most 
basic tenets of contemporary queer theory. 
Homosexual Desire predates by four years Foucault’s monumentally 
influential engagement with the repressive hypothesis in his 
introduction to his book series The History of Sexuality. As we’ve 
considered in previous chapters, Foucault overturns in that text what 
was perhaps the most pervasive assumption about sexuality in the 
twentieth century: that it struggles for expression against oppressively 
normative social forces; that its force goes against the current of power. 
Foucault countered that power rather works in tandem with sexuality – 
indeed, that the discourse of sexuality is itself a subjectivity-producing 
mechanism of power. 
Reading Hocquenghem today, we recognise retrospectively the 
tremendous debt Foucault’s text owes to what is perhaps, in comparison 
with Homosexual Desire, the more consequential attempt to do battle 
with the ‘French Freud’, namely Anti-Oedipus, the first volume of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Hocquenghem’s 
book shows the influence of Anti-Oedipus on every page. Despite its 
tremendous impact on cultural theory in general, however, this text 
has had a comparatively minor, although latterly increasing, impact on 
hegemonic queer theory’s development. 
In his reading of Freud, Lacan unwaveringly insisted on the 
inseparability of desire from, indeed its causation by, an irreparable 
lack in both the subject and its sociosymbolic Other. Against this 
emphasis, Deleuze and Guattari offer an alternative account of desire 
as self-generating production. This production is immanent to a field 
of forces that thwarts the ‘territorialising’ ambitions of meaning and 
representation – the Oedipus complex, that is, which is the familial 
form these latter take in psychoanalytic theory, according to Deleuze 
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and Guattari. It’s easy to discern the imprint of the anti-oedipal concept 
of desire’s positivity on Foucault’s contention that social repression 
produces, rather than inhibits, desire. For his part, Hocquenghem 
directly lifts his vocabulary of desiring-machines and deterritoriali-
sation from the pages of Anti-Oedipus, whose publication the same 
fateful year as Homosexual Desire is perhaps merely the most contingent 
aspect of their consequential intertextual relations.
But surely there are other reasons, theoretical and political in nature, 
that explain why so much Anglo-American poststructuralist queer 
theory has failed to engage with Hocquenghem’s argument about 
homosexual desire. Three such reasons immediately come to mind. 
First, Hocquenghem subscribes to the Deleuzo-Guattarian thesis 
that Freud ‘discovered’ what Hocquenghem calls ‘the mechanisms of 
desire’, defining the latter term as an ‘abstract general force at work 
in sexual life’.3 In light of Hocquenghem’s attribution of this thesis to 
Anti-Oedipus, we can extrapolate from the qualification of desire as 
abstract that desire is something other than what it tends to be in queer 
poststructuralism, namely a determinate (and in this sense ‘concrete’) 
effect of particular conditions of discursive or historical possibility. 
More simply put, Hocquenghem could not subscribe to the Foucault-
derived queer assumption that one can only desire what discourse or 
history has already made it possible to desire. 
Hocquenghem’s consequential distinction between ‘homosexuality’ 
and what he alternatively calls ‘homosexual desire’ provides a salutary 
illustration. Homosexuality belongs to the ‘molar’ (another Deleuze 
and Guattari term) level of modern sexuality discourse. According 
to Hocquenghem, this discourse bestows a normative identity on the 
subject on the basis of its sexual behaviour, effectively circumscribing 
this subject within the parameters of a pathologising and guilt-inducing 
regime of knowledge. By contrast, homosexual desire corresponds 
to the disruptive ‘molecular’ level of desiring production. This level 
escapes the imperative of representation enforced by discourse. As a 
result, it has the capacity to thwart the power of sexual knowledges to 
define, and therefore normalise, the subjects about whom they seek 
to know. 
Hocquenghem sees the absurdity to which any attempt at defining 
his concept will lead. ‘“Homosexual desire” – the expression is 
meaningless’, he writes. ‘There is no subdivision of desire into 
Penney T02732 01 text   113 08/10/2013   08:16
after queer theory
114
homosexuality and heterosexuality’ (49). Impersonal, non-subjective 
and even non-human, for Hocquenghem desire designates a faculty 
of production, which need not pass through a signifying function to 
have its effects. Desire is therefore resistant to, and unexpressed by, 
historical discourses – that is, by the available knowledges that attempt 
to take account of it at any particular moment in time. 
I’ll have occasion shortly to look further into this notion of a desire 
liberated, as it were, from the constraints of history, or at least history 
conceived along Foucaultian lines as the set of conditions of possibility, 
embedded in thought and language, for knowledge. For the moment, 
however, it will prove helpful to retain that whereas homosexuality, 
for Hocquenghem as well as for Deleuze and Guattari, is part and 
parcel of a specific historical social formation, namely capitalism, 
desire as such is not a historical concept. Desire persists beneath the molar 
agencies of meaning, knowledge and power, and for this reason it can’t 
be described as conditioned by them. 
Although rarely acknowledged in the secondary sources, this 
separation of desire out from discourse is an act of thought that 
Deleuze and Guattari attribute explicitly to Freud. It’s also what 
Foucault effectively dismantles in his reformulation of the repressive 
hypothesis. This reformulation has proven decisive in both the insti-
tutionalisation of sexuality studies over the last decades, and the 
development of queer discourse. To sum up what I’ve argued thus far, 
the first reason for Hocquenghem’s minimal impact on queer theory 
relates to his endorsement of the ‘abstract’ (non-discursive and non-
historical), properly Freudian view of desire. Through its enlistment of 
Foucault’s historicist conception of sexuality as discourse-power, queer 
theory has shown itself bent on opposing this view. 
Not unrelated to the first, the next factor impeding the assimilation 
of Homosexual Desire into queer theory doxa is its resolutely 
universalising reach. With reference to the classificatory zeal of mid-
twentieth-century American researcher Alfred Kinsey’s sexual identity 
surveys, Hocquenghem asks rhetorically: ‘Was it really necessary 
to send out so many questionnaires and investigations in order to 
establish that everyone is more or less homosexual?’ (52). 
It’s crucial to note that the universal referent of Hocquenghem’s 
‘everyone’ isn’t the same, strictly speaking, as the one queer 
theory wants to acknowledge. Once more, we can take one of the 
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foundational texts of poststructuralist queer theory as an example. 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick famously identified two contradictions in 
modern sexuality discourse. One of these contradictions occurs 
between a ‘minoritizing’ and a ‘universalizing’ view of what she terms 
‘homo/heterosexual definition’.4 The former view proceeds from the 
assumption that the classificatory apparatus of sexual orientation is 
relevant only to a restricted group of people. Not everyone, that is, 
will feel that the question ‘am I gay or straight?’ applies to them. By 
contrast, the latter view assumes that it does indeed concern everyone; 
no one can avoid asking themselves whether their desire targets same- 
or other-sex objects, or perhaps both. The importance of Sedgwick’s 
presentation of the question lies in the fact that the object to which 
each view of sexuality refers is different from the one implied by what 
Hocquenghem calls homosexual desire. The content of the idea of 
sexuality featuring universal and minoritarian versions is equivalent 
to what Freud refers to as ‘object choice’ – the relation, that is, between 
our own biological sex and the sex of the persons to whom our desire 
is addressed. 
Hocquenghem would have had to dismiss Sedgwick’s outline of the 
means of formulating the possibilities for sexuality in late modernity, 
because it remains shaped by the molar categories of personhood and 
sex identity, the very sedimented, territorialised parameters against 
which he pitches his alternative concept of homosexual desire. An 
important consequence follows. In response to Sedgwick’s exhortation 
first to underline the ‘incoherence of definition’ inherent in the 
discourse on sexuality, and then to identify ‘discursive power’ as the 
‘rhetorical leverage’ required to ‘set’ its terms (11), Hocquenghem 
would likely reply that the entire definitional apparatus of sexuality 
simply fails to recognise the disruptive force, indeed the essence, of 
desire. In a thoroughly Freudian vein, Hocquenghem insists that desire 
cannot be defined because it resists, by its very nature, all efforts at 
identification and classification. Simply put, desire can’t be expressed 
in any of the codes – semiotic, discursive, social, political, historical, 
however you may wish to name them – with which one might consider 
it amenable to articulation. 
Sedgwick’s implicit understanding of universality expresses one of 
two possible ways of qualifying the purchase of sexual definition on 
the subjects this definition defines. By contrast, Hocquenghem offers 
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a stronger, less familiar and intuitive, formulation of the universal as 
the attribute of an anoedipal desire. This desire is not only logically 
prior to its reactive personalisation in sexuality discourse. Much more 
radically, it also undermines the very premise that desire is a function 
of a human individual. Desire’s impersonality throws a spanner in the 
works of the vocabularies of object choice and sexual orientation – that 
structure of sexuality discourse around which Sedgwick’s thinking, 
and most of queer theory’s, pivots. 
This remains the case not only when queer theory insists, as Sedgwick 
does, on the underlying incoherence of the object choice concept, but 
also when it aims to ‘deconstruct’ this concept’s presumptive identity 
foundations by asserting that sexuality subverts the sex and gender 
binaries on which the rhetoric depends. In Hocquenghem’s view, I can’t 
say for sure if I’m homosexual or heterosexual not because my desire is 
indifferent to sexual difference (although it is that too for Deleuze and 
Guattari), but rather because this desire isn’t ultimately directed at an 
individual person. Desire, for Hocquenghem, harbours an inhuman 
or mechanical quality, which effectively lifts sexuality above the 
psychological realm of human attributes and qualities. Further, that 
desire is transindividual and can’t be articulated isn’t merely a feature 
of a particular discourse – the modern, post-sexological discourse of 
sexuality, for example. Desire, as it were, always remains indifferent 
to history. 
Although I endorse both its universal purchase and the pressure it 
puts on contemporary ideas of object choice and sexual orientation, 
I’ll have occasion later on to question the understanding of desire 
Hocquenghem takes from Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Indeed, 
the very qualification of desire as unnameable already alerts us to 
language’s dependence on negation to evoke it, and therefore sits 
uncomfortably alongside what Deleuze and Guattari protest is desire’s 
inherently positive, or more precisely productive, work. For now, 
however, we can move on to the third and last prong of Hocquenghem’s 
queer theory-challenging argument. 
What I have in mind is his contention, also inspired by Anti-Oedipus, 
that the modern homosexual identity, unlike homosexual desire in 
Hocquenghem’s specific sense, is indeed a historical phenomenon. 
We’ve already seen how poststructuralist queer theory typically 
links the historicity of homosexuality to a ‘modernity’ figured as 
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merely discursive – in contrast, for instance, to more conventional 
Marxian materialist conceptions of history, viewed as the succession 
in time of the modes of production. Instead, Hocquenghem views 
modernity’s obsessive encoding of desire as a reaction against the 
radically transformative socioeconomic impact of capitalism. For 
Hocquenghem, the discourse of sexuality is therefore a reactive 
product of a particular historical mode of production. In queer theory, 
by contrast, the relation of modern sexuality to underlying economic 
structures remains essentially unexamined. 
No doubt, here again, political context sheds some light on these 
contrasting assumptions about how we should conceive of the 
forces shaping modern ideas of sexuality. As Bill Marshall notes, the 
Anglo-American post-Stonewall gay movement reflected a political 
field shaped by the ideologies of ‘liberal individualism and self-
invention’,5 which gave rise to social formations anchored in ethnic 
and other identities. With few exceptions, these identities’ agendas 
were restricted to an ambition of inclusion within the capitalist mode 
of production and the liberal-democratic state apparatus. 
Marshall goes on to argue that the French revolutionary republican 
tradition, with its hallmark stress on the virtues of abstract citizenship, 
has tended to discourage the emergence of identity-predicated interest 
groups. Confronting the abstractly defined republican citizen with the 
state structure without the mediating influence of a strong civil society 
(this tension was more evident 40 or 50 years ago than it is today), 
this system proved more conducive to the emergence of politically 
radical projects, which sought the overthrow of the entire bourgeois 
state structure. Evidently, this state of affairs has no close equivalent 
in the US. This brand of ‘hard left’ politics has had a comparatively 
marginal impact on not only the historical US-based gay and lesbian 
movements, but their more contemporary offshoots as well.
To be sure, the subject of the late 1960s revolutionary project was 
defined primarily not by cultural and sexual identities, but rather 
by socioeconomic class. It’s certainly true that the students in the 
soixante-huitard political alliance thought of their status along class 
lines. This would explain why, in the immediate post-1968 period, 
the various groups campaigning for the liberation of homosexuals, 
notably including the FHAR (Front homosexuel d’action révolution-
naire) with which Hocquenghem was at one time affiliated, tended to 
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emerge out of, and on occasion in association with, Trotskyist groups 
and parties of the far left. 
These groups reacted against widely recognised sexist and 
homophobic currents within the French Communist Party (PCF) which, 
in the 1950s and early 1960s, was still wilfully blinding itself to both 
the abhorrent crimes of Stalinism and the tenacious but disintegrating 
structures of French colonialism. Although the association of the 
French homosexual movements with left politics would deteriorate 
throughout the 1970s, in the late 1960s the problems of sexual 
regulation and homophobia were widely considered inseparable from 
the analysis of class formations and the logic of capital, in general 
accordance with the classic lines of Marxist thought. 
The sociopolitical context goes a long way towards explaining 
the relative tardiness and initial political radicalism of the emergent 
homosexual movement in France. Yet, it can’t on its own account 
for the properly theoretical argument developed by Hocquenghem 
after Deleuze and Guattari. Indeed, Hocquenghem asserts that the 
appearance of the familiar modern homosexual identity is a determinate 
consequence of, and also reaction against, the social deterritorialisa-
tions effected by capital with increasing intensity in late modernity. 
According to this thesis, mounting social upheaval, dislocation and 
fragmentation are the consequences of the commodification of wage 
labour and the expansion of markets. These social phenomena work 
to disperse the centripetal energies of the kinship group and scatter 
libidinal energy more widely across the social field. At the same time, 
however, reactive and proprietary forces of control attempt to contain 
capital’s explosive social energies. As Hocquenghem sums up in 
full-on ‘D and G mode’, ‘capitalism decodes the fluxes of desire and 
immediately circumscribes them within privatisation’ (142). 
But a fundamental ambiguity clouds Capitalism and Schizophrenia’s 
theoretical horizon. Forces linked to capital are held to account for 
both the crumbling of the social and symbolic structures that codify 
and normalise desire and the reactive, indeed reactionary, resignifica-
tion of desire in the bourgeois interpretative matrix of Freud’s Oedipus 
complex. To be sure, this ambiguity leaves its mark on Hocquenghem’s 
estimation of homosexual desire’s properly political implications. As 
I’ll explore further at the conclusion of this chapter, schizoanalysis’ 
belief in the availability of a non-signifying desiring production – a 
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mode of desire, that is, emancipated from the signifier, from the 
constraints of language – sees Hocquenghem wax rapturously on the 
topic of a sexual liberation modestly confined to the limits of capitalist 
modernity. Like its distant queer-theoretical cousins, Hocquenghem’s 
anti-oedipal desiring utopia turns out to have disappointing, and 
entirely questionable, political implications. 
The Redoubling of the World, and What to Do About it
Queer theory’s general embrace of the later Foucault’s psychoanalytic 
scepticism has caused the complex relation between Hocquenghem’s 
anti-oedipal influence and the wider French psychoanalytic field, 
particularly the Lacanian one, to go largely unexamined. Undoubtedly, 
the intertextual link that joins both Homosexual Desire and Anti-Oedipus 
to Lacan’s reading of Freud has an uncanny or spectral dimension, one 
which bespeaks a significant but buried influence belying the paucity 
of explicit references. Yet, just when Deleuze and Guattari’s revolt 
against Oedipus promises to rejoin the Lacanian concept of the drive 
on some elusive theoretical horizon, we’re reminded anew that the 
two discourses finally talk past one another, anchored as they are by 
irreconcilable assumptions about fundamental philosophical issues, 
such as being, knowledge and language. 
Anti-Oedipus does in fact get around to crediting Lacan for severing 
the link more decisively than Freud between the faculty of desire and 
its entanglement with signifying representations, and therefore, at 
least potentially, with meaning. Now, Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly 
condemn meaning as a wellspring of guilt, which destructively 
reflects the productive force of desire back upon itself. In Lacan, by 
contrast, meaning, or rather truth, has an ineradicable, however 
illusory, significance for the subject of the unconscious. For his part, 
Hocquenghem refers to Lacan only once in Homosexual Desire in a none 
too nuanced gloss on the mirror stage. Nonetheless, it’s clear enough 
that Hocquenghem takes on board Deleuze and Guattari’s rejection 
of Lacan’s major thesis about the subject, namely that this subject is 
subject to the signifier. This subjection carves out a primary ontological 
lack, which no representation will fully succeed in filling out. Because 
Hocquenghem’s reading of psychoanalysis is so clearly mediated by 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work, and because, despite the many buried 
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references, Anti-Oedipus in an important sense is a critical assessment 
of, and also polemical attack against, Lacanian psychoanalysis, it will 
be helpful to explore in more precise terms how the two theoretical 
lines ultimately deviate quite dramatically from one another.
Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Lacan in Anti-Oedipus is 
comparable in its fundamentals to the critique of Freud developed 
by Hocquenghem in Homosexual Desire. As we’ve already considered, 
Freud’s work for Hocquenghem manages to identify a disruptive, 
non-historical and uncontainable desiring function in the psyche, only 
to harness it, at moments of theoretical regression, to the meaning 
horizon of the bourgeois family. Not dissimilarly, Deleuze and Guattari 
first sing the praises of Lacan’s objet petit a – his term for the immaterial 
‘lost’ object that causes desire – as the concept that wrests the libido 
from its allegedly forced canalisation towards privileged and normative 
bodily organs. However, they then accuse Lacan of reintroducing 
through the back door a stifling signifying function in the form of what 
he calls the Other – that is, the ‘locus of speech’ that indexes desire’s 
dependence on language, on social discourses. According to Deleuze 
and Guattari, Lacan’s theory of the object liberates desire from ‘any idea 
of need and any idea of fantasy’.6 However idiosyncratically (for Lacan, 
the object is always and necessarily an object of unconscious fantasy), 
they find in Lacan’s teaching an anticipation of their qualification of 
desire as both immediately productive and unconditioned by lack or 
absence, even the kind of lack (of nourishment, for example) that 
triggers a biophysiological need like hunger.
For Deleuze and Guattari, no fantasy comes between desire and 
what they call ‘the conditions of objective existence’; no mediation 
between production, or the activity of desire, and what is produced, 
which they call ‘the real’ (27n). Production may indeed be bound by 
certain conditions, be they social, historical, political or psychical. But 
if these conditions are without limit, if they exclude no possibility, 
then production simply names the infinite faculty of desire as such. 
Desire is immanent to a network of forces and flows at once material 
and kinetic, natural and social. Thus, no obstacle opposes desire either 
within itself or without. More precisely, there is neither a something 
that concretely impedes the satisfaction of desire, nor a nothing – a 
self-difference in the object, as Lacan in fact argued – that effectively 
subverts satisfaction from within. 
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Lacan’s theory works to estrange desire from itself, to prevent desire 
from encountering itself in the object that causes it. For Deleuze 
and Guattari, by contrast, the Lacanian reference to fantasy and ‘the 
symbolic’ are reactive symptoms of a mechanism of repression to 
which the molar agencies of meaning and interpretation give rise. The 
repression of desire creates the illusion that desire depends on lack. 
Indeed, the main target of Deleuze and Guattari’s polemic against 
psychoanalysis is the premise that a lack sustains desire; that desire is 
set in motion by, and addresses itself to, a nothing. Lacan’s definition of 
desire posits instead an internal dialectic whereby desire sustains itself 
by sabotaging its own fulfilment. By contrast, Deleuze and Guattari 
attribute to desire a potentially unlimited creative function hindered 
only by an alien oedipal force of normalisation imposed by language, 
by the signifier, from without. 
The anti-oedipal argument against psychoanalysis in general, and 
Lacan in particular, can be quite straightforwardly articulated and 
has become relatively familiar, if rarely grasped on the level of its 
consequences. What interests me here, however, are the comparatively 
unexplored implications of the motivation, as it were, for Deleuze and 
Guattari’s antipathy for lack and negation. These implications have 
the tremendous benefit of acquainting us not only with the error that 
causes them to view lack as something from which desire requires 
emancipation, but also with the problematic, and concretely political, 
consequences of their alternative desiring production framework. This 
line of inquiry gains in significance for my argument in this chapter 
because it sheds valuable light on Hocquenghem’s view of the political 
importance of the modern homosexual social movements at the time 
he wrote Homosexual Desire. Along the way, I’ll also be interested in 
identifying – surprisingly, perhaps – the common ground that Lacan 
and his anti-oedipal critics share, namely a desire to place the subjective 
or productive function as decisively as possible in the sociopolitical 
here-and-now. 
A wide swathe of contemporary cultural theory has allowed the 
intuitive appeal of Deleuze and Guattari’s association of lack with 
guilt and repression, indeed with all that thwarts the productivity of 
desire, to prevent us from asking a seemingly naïve question. So let’s 
ask it here: what exactly is the problem with Lacan’s idea of a desire 
predicated on a lacking, in the sense of immaterial, object – an object 
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whose objective absence nevertheless fails to prevent it from causing 
the appearance of the subject who desires it? More simply, how does the 
anti-oedipal camp view lack, in its relation to the force of repression? 
One of the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari argue against 
the ontology of lack in psychoanalysis is by drawing an analogy, as 
I’ve already suggested, between desire and need. Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia insinuates a relation of dependence between the 
organism and something it apprehends as existing outside itself, 
and therefore as potentially antagonistic. The authors have in their 
crosshairs the psychoanalytic deduction of the concept of desire from 
biophysiological need. They argue that both functions introduce a 
dimension of negativity into an operation they prefer to conceptualise 
in exclusively positive terms. Just as need places the organism in an 
antagonistic relation with the surroundings from which it must draw 
its sustenance, so desire for psychoanalysis relegates the subject 
to the ‘passive syntheses’ (26) of external conditions. Similarly, 
these syntheses place the subject under the determinations of the 
environment by effectively cutting it off from them. The assumption, 
in other words, is that the object of desire, from the subject’s point of 
view, remains foreign or outside. 
None of this appears to be controversial at first glance. Yet, we can 
point out in response to Deleuze and Guattari that if they’re perturbed 
by the notion of a desire determined by need, then it’s emphatically 
not psychoanalysis that should worry them. Indeed, Lacan produced 
a helpful formula for the Freudian concept when he defined desire as 
the result of the subtraction of need from demand.7 If desire is what’s 
left over once you’ve eliminated need, in other words, then the latter 
may hardly be said to determine the former. Further, the subject in 
this psychoanalytic scenario becomes something other than an entity 
shaped by ambient forces, an actualisation of social or environmental 
norms. That subject is the misleading schizoanalytic caricature of the 
psychoanalytic subject of desire. 
Anti-Oedipus makes explicit the instructive political context of 
this unfortunate misinterpretation of desire in psychoanalysis in the 
following assessment, quoted from Clément Rosset’s book Logique du 
pire (1970). This key passage succinctly summarises the anti-oedipal 
view of the implications of the (Lacanian) notion of a desire caused by 
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an empirically or materially missing object. In psychoanalysis, so the 
allegation goes,
the world acquires as its double some other sort of world, in 
accordance with the following line of argument: there is an object 
that desire feels the lack of; hence the world does not contain each 
and every object that exists; there is at least one object missing, the 
one that desire feels the lack of; hence there exists some other place 
that contains the key to desire (missing in this world). (26) 
Deleuze and Guattari incorporate this misconstrual of the 
psychoanalytic argument to support their contention that the premise 
of a lacking object that causes desire is complicit with an ideologically 
suspect otherworldliness. In other words, Lacanian psychoanalysis 
gives rise to an obfuscating, almost religious, spiritualism, which 
diverts desire’s attention away from the everyday world and towards a 
mystical, unattainable beyond. 
We’ve already seen that the schizoanalytic alternative is to fill out, 
as it were, the empty space of desire by locating both its conditions 
and the products of its action on the same level of materially available 
immanence. Simply put, both the cause and the effect of desire occupy 
the same ‘lackless’ space. Clearly, Deleuze and Guattari interpret 
the empty psychoanalytic object of desire as a break, conceptually 
speaking, with the Marxist tradition’s injunction to focus attention 
on material reality and the here-and-now. Yet, despite his suspicions 
about political Marxism, Freud himself viewed the analytic cure as 
a rigorously analogous project to shift libidinal energy away from its 
neurotic entanglement with fantasy’s possible worlds and towards 
an investment in what Freud also called reality. In Freud’s view, this 
reality happily includes the ‘normal’ – that is, imperfect – pleasures 
and satisfactions that everyday engagement with the immediate 
environment is prone to yield.
To present schizoanalysis as a politically desirable alternative to 
Freudianism, Capitalism and Schizophrenia needs to give a misleading 
account of the very nature of the psychoanalytic project. If the subject of 
the unconscious is indeed marked by its dependence on an impossible 
object, then the aim of analysis must be to train this subject to access as 
directly as possible the satisfactions made available through the objects 
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of ordinary experience. Freud’s text abounds with statements that 
frame the analytic process as one aiming to enable the neurotic to carve 
out simpler, more direct routes to satisfaction. Indeed, this is what 
neurosis is for Freud: a barrier against a disruptively intense enjoyment 
in which our ego would prefer not to take part. The problem, of course, 
is that over a century of clinical experience bears compelling witness to 
the difficulty of overcoming this barrier. 
In this light, the anti-oedipal critique of psychoanalysis mistakenly 
takes its non-political thesis – derived from clinical observation 
of a neurotic subject who resists satisfaction – for an ideological 
endorsement of this subject’s symptom. Deleuze and Guattari’s 
argument can’t take account of the fact that, for psychoanalysis, 
the dreamy redoubling of the world that results from a neurotic 
relation to desire is effectively a sort of ideological misrecognition, 
the dismantling of which is the very aim of the analytic process. The 
objective of analysis is precisely to minimise the effects on the subject 
of the symptom as well as its underlying fantasy support. 
There’s a complication, however. This positive clinical outcome 
is possible only to the extent that we acknowledge the impossibility 
of the symptom’s complete and once-and-for-all eradication. For 
psychoanalysis, there’s no possibility of a direct apprehension of the 
material here-and-now. Indeed, with Lacan’s radicalisation of Freud, 
we come to the idea that the best way of attenuating the symptom’s 
neurotic power is paradoxically to identify with it, to claim it as the 
truth or essence of our being. The symptom becomes the fragile cordon 
that separates us from the otherwise all-consuming force of jouissance. 
Contrary to the anti-oedipalists’ contentions, then, a reference 
to reality (or more properly, for Lacan, to the real), along with an 
associated demystification of the seductions of an illusory beyond of 
this paltry and disappointing world, are the two features that Freudian 
psychoanalysis shares with its revisionist schizoanalytic critics. 
The incompatibility between psychoanalysis and anti-oedipal 
discourse is therefore ontological rather than ideological in nature. 
Indeed, we should resist succumbing to the misleading emphasis 
Anti-Oedipus places on the allegedly stifling consequences of the 
psychoanalytic description of a subject shaped by fantasy and an 
unconscious signifying function. Instead, both Lacan, and Deleuze 
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and Guattari, belong to the same tradition – inaugurated by Marx and 
Freud – that attempts to theorise what I would call the critical sovereignty 
of desire. This tradition aims to think possibilities for subjective 
or productive agency that defy their own conditions of historical 
possibility. In other words, desire is what calls into question the very 
limits of what can be entertained in thought in a given discourse at a 
given time. 
The fundamental antagonism between the two systems therefore 
relates to their respective conceptions of desire. Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia qualifies the subject’s involvement in the signifying 
function as an obstacle, which must be overcome in order to found a 
new political order of desiring production. By contrast, psychoanalysis 
qualifies this implication as an objective, indeed transcendental, 
condition unamenable to historical alteration. This condition, however, 
always fails to normalise the subject’s desire. Occasionally, new things 
can emerge in the order of the signifier, as Lacan himself admitted in 
his early teaching. Nonetheless, the condition of our subjection to this 
order isn’t amenable to historical remediation.
The schizoanalytic argument errs where it decides to read the 
transcendental conditionality of desire – that is, that there is no desire 
without fantasy and the lack that causes it – as political in itself. In other 
words, Deleuze and Guattari mistakenly situate politics on the level of 
desire’s supposed significations, and then theorise as compensation an 
alternative world of desire liberated, as it were, from their normalising 
agency. Rarely, if ever, put forth in appraisals of their work is the 
psychoanalytic rejoinder to this intuitively very attractive alternative 
scenario. Indeed, I now want to argue that psychoanalysis forces us 
to qualify Deleuze and Guattari’s recourse to an alternative faculty of 
desiring production as a symptom of the very worrisome redoubling 
of the world with which they reproach Freud and Lacan. And talking 
of production, the most productive way of exploring this unfortunate 
feature of the anti-oedipal argument is to examine the form it takes 
in Hocquenghem’s appraisal of Freud’s vexatious notions of paranoia 
and narcissism. More specifically, we’ll focus in on how these notions 
help to shape Freud’s controversial, and somewhat confused, theory of 
male homosexuality. 




Earlier, I considered how Hocquenghem wants to wrest homosexual 
desire from repression, an agency he associates with an oppressive 
force of psychosocial normalisation. Hocquenghem is noticeably upset 
by the link Freud makes, notoriously, between sexuality’s homosexual 
element and the so-called social instincts, which range in Freud’s 
writing from the benign fraternal altruism of humanitarian feeling 
(esprit de corps), to the severe hallucinations of persecutory anxiety, 
or even psychosis. For example, Hocquenghem draws out how Freud 
describes the delusions of Senatspräsident Schreber, that paradigmatic 
psychotic of psychoanalysis, as sublimations that draw on improperly 
repressed homoerotic libidinal investments. 
Understandably, Homosexual Desire worries about what, to all 
appearances, is Freud’s condemnation of the homosexual libido 
to the twin abject destinies of repression and sublimation. In the 
repression scenario, homosexuality is shoved down into the murky 
depths of the unconscious, where it foments obsessive guilt feelings 
and straitjackets creative initiative when it doesn’t conjure up 
wrenching psychotic delusions. In the hardly more attractive case 
of sublimation, homosexuality is rebranded as the identificatory 
ideals of masculine narcissism – army general or sports hero, for 
example. In Hocquenghem’s reading of Freud’s text, these ideals 
acquire creepy Foucaultian powers of inescapable discipline and 
all-seeing surveillance.
Four years prior to the publication of The History of Sexuality’s first 
volume, Hocquenghem shows a remarkable degree of prescience with 
regard to what would become one of queer theory’s central tenets: 
The homosexuality which [society] represses and sublimates keeps 
springing from every pore of the social body. It delves all the more 
violently into the private lives of individuals, although it knows that 
what goes on there exposes society itself and slips out of reach of the 
law-courts. (61) 
In Hocquenghem’s view, Freud’s territorialisation of homosexual 
desire fuels the energies of social regulation, including most notably 
the pernicious power of homophobia. By refusing to recognise itself, 
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homosexuality exacerbates the masochistic severity of its self-moni-
toring. This has the devastating effect of sanctioning a hypocritical 
complicity between official prohibitions on sexual enjoyment and the 
pursuit of forbidden pleasures. In this way, the repressive sublimations 
of homosexuality simultaneously produce and normalise a murky, 
subterranean world of paradoxically transgressive ecstasies, which 
only gain in intensity from the intuitions of guilt with which they 
come, as it were, pre-packaged.
It’s easy to see, in this inauspicious light, why Hocquenghem decides 
to attack Freud’s insight that secondary narcissism – that is, the subject’s 
attachment to its ego ideal – feeds off of a deflected homosexual libido. 
The psyche’s investment in the father, which would otherwise take on 
a directly sexual tenor, is transformed into the energy that sustains the 
precarious structure of identification. In no uncertain terms, Freud 
qualifies the psychosocial function by which the normative male or 
masculine subject appears worthy to itself as an object of properly, 
if unconsciously, homoerotic interest. It’s readily apparent why this 
premise brings Hocquenghem to the conclusion that the way to escape 
from homosexuality’s complicity in repressive idealisation and guilty 
self-surveillance is through desublimation – the conversion, that is, of 
disguised homoerotic investments into conscious homosexual desires 
and actions. 
With this move, Hocquenghem shows that he has equated Freud’s 
idea of sublimation with repression, the latter understood in rather 
vague energetic terms as the transformation of sexual libido into a 
nonsexual identification with the father figure. The consequence for 
Hocquenghem is not only that the homosocial instincts of fraternal 
feeling inevitably exacerbate the superego’s lacerating accusations. 
Also, any ‘work’ performed on the homosexual libido that deflects it 
away from direct satisfaction is going to lead down the same masochistic 
path. On this level, Hocquenghem’s argument reveals a close affinity 
with the writing of post-Freudian anti-psychiatric sexual liberationists 
such as Wilhelm Reich and R. D. Laing. As Hocquenghem was surely 
aware, these figures, hardly coincidentally, had a decisive impact on 
the theories and experimental clinical practice of Félix Guattari.8 In 
its response to this sort of neo-Freudian revisionism, the Frankfurt 
School, looking for a way to theorise the libidinal appeal of fascism, 
qualified desublimation not as antagonistic to, but rather as complicit 
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with, the force of repression. Summarily put, the argument here is that 
the desublimation of sexual interest short-circuits the critical faculty 
of consciousness, thereby increasing our vulnerability to ideology by 
making enjoyment support the forces of social control.9 
For his part, Hocquenghem uses the loaded term ‘desublimation’ to 
refer specifically to a withdrawal of sexuality’s investment in the social 
ideals that funnel desire through the psyche’s oedipal representations. 
In this view, desublimation is a condition of possibility for the liberated, 
deterritorialised and non-signifying desire for which Hocquenghem 
wishes to advocate. Because it inhibits the expression of same-sex 
desire, the oedipal structures sublimate the libidinal forces that buttress 
not only the cohesiveness and internal discipline of the nuclear family, 
but also the reactive privatisation of desiring production in capitalism. 
‘Narcissism and homosexuality’, Hocquenghem concludes, ‘supply 
the field of sublimation with its preferential object, to the point where 
we can truthfully say that sublimation is simply homosexuality in 
its historical family truth’ (81). Sublimation, for Hocquenghem, is 
the agency that converts the free expression of same-sex eroticism 
into the inward accusations of the superego and the delusions of 
psychotic paranoia. In this light, it would seem logical to conclude that 
desublimation is indeed the royal road to desire’s anti-normative and 
productive emancipation. 
It’s certainly true that Freud, in numerous places, qualifies the 
sexuality inherent in our relation to the oedipal ego ideal as homosexual 
in nature. In this sense, Hocquenghem is certainly correct to complain 
that psychoanalysis can only envision actual homosexual sex – sex 
acts between men, I mean – as resulting from the dismantling of this 
narcissistic relation as well as the sublimation on which it’s viewed to 
depend. Evidently, this is the line of thought that sees Hocquenghem 
link the activity of sublimation as such to the whole Freudian apparatus 
of the Oedipus complex. As we recall, Hocquenghem understands 
this last complex to refer to a normative sociosymbolic order which, 
for Deleuze and Guattari as well, imposes a guilty regime of desire on 
those on whom it exercises its disciplinary force. 
From this point of view, psychoanalysis simply denies the 
possibility of a form of libidinal expression that would escape from 
the oppressively familialist triangle composed of ‘daddy, mommy 
and me’, as Deleuze and Guattari sarcastically write. Psychoanalysis 
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is perceived to offer no recourse to the self-identified and sexually 
active homosexual, whose existence could only be accounted for by 
an alternative theory that shrugs off the weight of the oedipal system, 
with its rigid regime of sexual difference and retrograde obsession 
with lack. For Hocquenghem, homosexual desire as he wishes to 
think of it is simply inconceivable within the bounds of the framework 
of signification upheld, in this view, by Oedipus. Indeed, in this 
landscape, homosexual desire can only move towards an unhappy – 
paranoid, guilty, masochistic, psychotic – end. 
It seems from all this that Freud’s theory of homosexuality is ill 
equipped to think through the expression of homosexual desire in the 
contemporary and ordinary sense of the phrase. Freud’s contention that 
a specifically homosexual libido maintains the social ideals anchoring 
masculine identity holds forth little promise for the consideration of 
homosexual sex. You could even go so far as to say that there’s no sex in 
Freudian homosexuality: on the level of theory, male homosexuality 
can only figure as the repressed and disavowed foundation of the social 
world, or rather, more specifically, the social world of men. 
Yet, as unpromising as Freudian discourse might seem, we shouldn’t 
fail to notice how Hocquenghem’s intuitively compelling discussion 
sidesteps two key questions. First, what precisely is homosexual in the 
libido at work in Freud’s description of narcissism’s ego ideal? As the 
question hints, is it possible that ‘homosexuality’ in Freud, at least 
in the contexts I’ve considered here, bears only the most tenuous 
of connections to the historical constant of (male) same-sex sexual 
behaviour? Second, even more crucially as regards my purposes in this 
chapter, what are we to make of Freud’s sketchy attempt to distinguish 
sublimation from both idealisation and repression? How, more 
precisely, might this distinction critically inform Hocquenghem’s 
recourse to a problematic anti-psychiatric and liberationist paradigm 
for desublimation?
As far as the first question is concerned, it’s important to note that 
Freud’s manifestly sex-neutral discussion of his ego ideal concept has a 
latent masculine specificity. The homosexuality in narcissism describes 
the phallic or paternal identification of a ‘normal’ (read: heterosexual) 
male subject with a masculine and superegoic sociosymbolic ideal. 
This is the subject whose castration is underwritten, if I can put it this 
way, by the father. Freud’s treatment of masculine narcissism contrasts 
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starkly with his efforts at evoking the comparatively impenetrable, 
seemingly self-satisfied narcissism of women, in whom Freud 
famously failed to find the masochistic permutations of conscience he 
connects to the masculine ego ideal. It would perhaps only bring to the 
surface a buried coherence in Freud to propose that the homosexual 
libido idealised in masculine narcissism – on both its repressed-but-
socialised and liberated-but-paranoid poles – bears no relation to the 
psychic life of the contemporary self-identified gay man. 
Indeed, as I argue in detail in the next chapter, the theory of male 
homosexuality in psychoanalysis is condemned to repeat phobic and 
nonsensical clichés to the extent that it turns a blind eye to what I call 
cross-sexuation. This phenomenon remains unthinkable under the 
assumption, explicitly contradicted by Freud, that all biological males 
undergo the castration associated with the person Freud called ‘the 
boy’. This latter, masculine form of castration can lead to the sort of 
oedipal identification that places the male subject under a power of 
self-surveillance, which threatens to strengthen to paranoid extremes. 
Despite these dangers, Freud considers this form of identification, 
at least on the manifest level of his discussion, the ideal outcome of 
the oedipal conflict’s male version. By contrast, Lacan associates this 
outcome with sexual inhibition and neurosis, choosing instead to 
underline the clinical value of castration itself. 
What’s significant about my conjecture concerning cross-sexuation 
is that it indexes a structure of male homosexuality aligned with the 
castration of the Freudian girl who, unlike the boy, doesn’t identify 
with the phallus at the end of the phallic stage, and therefore doesn’t 
require the prohibition whose precariousness exacerbates the dynamic 
of idealisation and paranoia looming ominously over masculine psy-
chosexuality in Freud’s account. In other words, I’m suggesting that 
the putatively homosexual quality of the libido at work in Freud’s 
discussion of masculine narcissism may, in fact, refer only to the 
repression of same-sex eroticism necessary to achieve the ‘normal’, 
more or less heterosexual, masculine subject. 
In this context, Freudian homosexuality is simply the unconscious 
homosexuality of the straight man; a homosexuality that manifests 
itself symptomally – in hazing rituals and homophobic violence, for 
instance – as the male concerned struggles to assume his castration. 
Under this alternative hypothesis, Hocquenghem’s legitimate worries 
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cease to be concerning. Why? Because the portentous homosexual 
libido of Freudian narcissism proves to be unrelated to homosexual 
desire properly speaking – neither in Hocquenghem’s schizoanalytic, 
nor in the psychoanalytic sense of an ‘assumed’ object choice: that is, of 
a roughly determinate, if neurotic, libidinal tendency. 
Now, the issues raised by my second question focus in on the set 
of assumptions Hocquenghem brings to his reading of homosexual 
desire’s unpromising development in Freud’s work. Here it will be 
helpful to inquire after the pressure psychoanalysis can exert back on 
Hocquenghem’s very concept of homosexual desire. More specifically, 
what happens to this concept when we take seriously Freud’s 
insistence that the idealisation of an instinct is not the same thing as 
its sublimation? And what about the corollary that sublimation is to 
be distinguished from repression or, perhaps more rigorously, that 
sublimation provides an alternative to neurosis? In other words, are 
there moments in Freud’s text that allow us to rescue the concept of 
sublimation from its tragic implication in social repression? My answer 
to this last question will be ‘yes’. Indeed, it’s possible to tease out of 
Freud’s writing a version of his concept of sublimation that’s not only 
fully compatible with what we might call actually existing homosexual 
sex, but also, and by definition, anti-normative in a way that responds 
to Hocquenghem’s entirely legitimate concerns. 
It’s important to acknowledge at this juncture that the discussion 
may have reached unpalatable, and seemingly apolitical, levels of 
theoretical abstraction. In this light, it will be wise to stress that what’s 
at stake is the very need for an alternative to psychoanalysis to theorise 
a non-oppressive and properly political concept of desiring production. 
I’m in the process of arguing that Freud’s text already signposts an 
idea of sublimation that conforms not only to the aspirations of 
Hocquenghem, and Deleuze and Guattari. Additionally, this idea 
has the merit of avoiding what I’ll describe in the final section of this 
chapter as the latently isolationist and politically problematic anti-
representationalism of these writers; that is, their revolt against the 
logic of the signifier as Lacan systematically developed it in his teaching.
Freud’s clear but undeveloped contention about sublimation is that 
it’s an alternative to repression’s neurotic effects. To develop Freud’s 
claim, we’ll need more clearly to distinguish sublimation’s action from 
the compulsive admonishments of the ego ideal or superego. Since the 
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sublimation question has proven to be one of the most controversial 
and tortured aspects of Freud’s legacy, we should begin by posing some 
very basic questions. Of what precisely does the force of repression 
consist, according to Freud? And crucially, how are we to conceive of 
the object on which this force acts? 
I’ve already considered how Hocquenghem views repression in 
Freud as a force of symbolic meaning attribution, which operates 
directly and normatively on desire’s production. If we look carefully 
at his text, however, we see that Freud makes a different contention. 
Repression operates instead on what he calls ‘ideational representa-
tives’ (Vorstellungsrepräsentanzen) – ideas, that is, which represent the 
drive’s libidinal pressure to the psyche. Freud argues that repression’s 
force exerts itself on representations, not on the libido itself, however 
we might choose to conceive of it. Freud’s definition of repression’s 
object is crystal clear: ‘an idea [Vorstellung] or group of ideas which is 
cathected with a definite quota of energy (libido or interest) coming 
from an instinct’.10 The idea of a repressed instinct or libido, therefore, 
isn’t authentically Freudian (or Lacanian, for that matter). Homosexual 
desire in Hocquenghem’s specific sense of the term can’t be an object 
of repression. Only representations – signifiers, in Lacan’s vocabulary – 
can be repressed.
Moreover, we should note that, as is the case with many of Freud’s 
concepts, repression comes in two varieties. There is first of all primal 
repression, ‘which consists in the psychical (ideational) representative 
of the instinct being denied entrance into the conscious’ (148). 
Secondary repression, or what Freud also calls ‘repression proper’, 
refers to the process whereby ‘mental derivatives of the repressed 
representative’, in other words derivatives of the object of primal 
repression, are similarly pushed into the unconscious on account of 
their ‘associative connection’ with this repressed representative (148). 
Freud underlines that this latter, primally repressed representative is 
subject to fixation: it stays irretrievably caught in the unconscious, 
where it persists ‘unaltered’; and the instinct, Freud continues, remains 
forever ‘attached’ to it (148). In this primary sense, then, the libido 
is always-already repressed; always-already deformed or denatured 
by its attachment to an unreachable unconscious representation, a 
‘representative of representation’ (représentant de la représentation), as 
Lacan will say in his teaching. 
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The subtraction of this key signifier from consciousness is a 
necessary condition of the unconscious for Freud, and therefore of 
consciousness as psychoanalysis conceives of it in its imperfect, split 
form. The secondary form of repression is the agency responsible 
for our neurotic symptoms. Aspects of our everyday sociosymbolic 
world succumb to this primally repressed representative’s forces 
of attraction if they become associated with it through the classic 
Freudian mechanisms of condensation and displacement, as originally 
described in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900). We are far, in Freud’s 
semiology of the unconscious, from the vulgar post-Freudian world of 
repressed libidinal energies thwarted by moralistic social conventions 
that foment dreams of transgressive liberation.
The schizoanalysts’ sociologising misreading of Freud is all the 
more unfortunate, if not inexcusable, given that Freud himself 
provides valuable insights into the means by which repression works 
in tandem with idealisation. Indeed, Freud goes so far as to describe 
the mechanism of primal repression as fetishistic in nature. When a 
signifier (or idea – Vorstellung – if you prefer Freud’s term) is repressed 
from consciousness in the very process of this latter’s constitution, 
part of this signifier splits off, so it appears, and then undergoes 
idealisation to form the ego ideal. The irretrievably repressed signifier 
in the unconscious has a counterpart in consciousness, Freud holds. 
This counterpart is the point of symbolic identification from which the 
subject can look upon himself with narcissistic satisfaction. However, 
it’s also from the point of view of the ego ideal that the subject will 
berate himself for his inevitable inadequacies. ‘In this connection’, 
Freud adds, 
we can understand how it is that the objects to which men give most 
preference, their ideals, proceed from the same perceptions and 
experiences as the objects which they most abhor, and that they 
were originally only distinguished from one another through slight 
modifications. (150)
These modifications are the signifying distortions performed by the 
unconscious as a means of breaking through the barriers of censorship 
and repression. Repression is therefore the flipside of idealisation. 
Only a thinly disguised instance of condensation or displacement 
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– a jokey pun or play on words – mask from us the truth that these 
two apparently conflicting agencies derive from the same abject and 
obscene unconscious object. 
Having described this dissimulated connection between repression 
and idealisation, we’re now in a position to shed more light on the 
question I posed earlier about what Freud really means to say when he 
qualifies narcissism’s libido as homosexual. The acquisition of ‘normal’ 
masculinity requires the idealisation of a representation whose 
counterpart is the signifier of a repressed homosexual attachment. 
Simply put, to acquire a masculine identity, according to Freud, you 
have to repress the homosexual libido on which this identity depends. 
I would only add that Freud doesn’t intend to imply that all men are 
‘really’ homosexual, even if his analysis does indeed posit a secret 
homosexual essence to normative masculinity. The point is subtler 
and more radical: originally bisexual, we’re nonetheless forced by the 
signifier to aspire to a sexual identity. 
But the deep logic of Freud’s writing on sexual difference also 
implies that this identity can never be secured; that it will forever 
be undermined by the symptomatic emergence of incompatible 
and inappropriate desires, regardless of how we choose to define 
our sexual orientation. This entirely orthodox reading of Freud is 
infinitely more subversive and weighty with implication than either 
queer theory’s deconstruction of a putative heterosexual matrix, or the 
sci-fi schizoanalytic utopia of an infinite quantity of sexes and genders. 
Freud’s revelation of masculinity’s dependence on the simultaneous 
repression and idealisation of the libido’s homosexual tendency also 
goes a long way towards explaining the frustrating intractability of 
homophobia, not to mention the actual but disavowed homosexual 
relations, often of a clearly abusive nature, that seem to run rampant 
in male homosocial institutions. The seeming timelessness of these 
phenomena already signals how unsatisfactory are the competing 
historicist accounts that cite specific discourses of sexuality. 
Psychoanalysis suggests a more convincing, consequential and 
indeed more troubling explanation: the exclusion of explicit and 
acknowledged homoeroticism (of course, it’s everywhere present 
in barely disguised form) is the very condition of male sociality, 
of the capacity of (heterosexual) men to function normally within 
predominantly male social institutions. Indeed, we can look to the 
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contemporary Hollywood buddy-flick comedy to discern how this 
reality can be managed through humour. Homophobic violence 
between men can be avoided by the non-repressive sublimation 
(discussed below) of the straight man’s homosexual latencies, on the 
condition that they’re openly acknowledged, however ironically, or in 
however politically incorrect a fashion. 
To his tremendous credit, Hocquenghem readily sees how 
psychoanalysis theorises – somewhat against itself, to be sure – the 
link between the normative male subject’s fragile castration and the 
dynamics of homophobia. Indeed, he recognises the implicit anti-
homophobic ramifications of Freud’s narcissism theory, and even 
castigates post-psychoanalytic psychiatry for transforming this theory 
into a crude pathology, which links homosexuality in an essential way 
to paranoia and psychosis. 
In my view, Hocquenghem’s misreading of psychoanalysis lies 
elsewhere – namely, where he equates Freud’s concept of sublimation 
with narcissism’s tendency to fuel the accusatory fires of the superego. 
If sublimation, as Hocquenghem contends, can only mean our 
normative, masochistic identification with the ideals of social morality, 
then we can hardly blame him for casting psychoanalysis aside to find 
alternative means of thinking about human creative potential. Yet, it 
can’t be denied that Freud’s pithy, properly theoretical definition of the 
sublimation concept belies the notoriously repressive conservatism of 
his decidedly bourgeois examples. In the last analysis, Freud defines 
sublimation as an alternative to idealisation, one that clears a path 
for libidinal satisfaction by averting the usual pitfalls of repression 
and neurosis. 
A detailed consideration of Freud’s contentions about sublimation 
is therefore in order. We’ve already observed that the ego ideal emerges 
when we select from the representations in our psychical environment 
an object from whose perspective we can look upon ourselves in 
a pleasing light. Idealisation is the process whereby the apparent 
libidinal value of this object is inflated. In order for this to occur, the 
aspect of this same object that produces a disturbing and excessive 
libidinal excitation has to be repressed. By contrast, sublimation 
‘concerns object-libido’, as Freud puts it. Sublimation therefore acts 
not on the object per se, but rather on what Freud calls the Trieb, 
the drive. Sublimation directs the drive towards an aim ‘other than, 
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and remote from, sexual satisfaction’, as Freud famously contends.11 
This last qualification is the one that has so puzzled commentators 
wishing to lend some precision to Freud’s sublimation concept. If 
sublimation is to be distinguished from secondary narcissism because 
it doesn’t idealise the object, and therefore fails to produce a neurotic 
symptom, one would tend to think that sublimation does indeed 
produce satisfaction, and that this satisfaction would have to be sexual 
in nature. 
Indeed, the relation between a properly sexual satisfaction and the 
activity of sublimation remains muddled in Freud’s formulations. 
Emerging with greater clarity, however, is the contention that 
sublimation successfully lessens the intensity of the narcissistic 
identification that supports repression. ‘The formation of an ideal’, 
Freud asserts, ‘heightens the demands of the ego and is the most 
powerful factor favouring repression; sublimation is a way out, a way 
by which those demands can be met without involving repression’ (95, 
my emphasis). The exclusion of sexuality from sublimation becomes 
quite baffling in this light.
Freud’s somewhat clumsy attempt to distinguish sublimation from 
idealisation hinges on the proposition that satisfaction is absent of the 
quality he calls ‘sexual’. However, given the kinship of Freud’s more 
concrete descriptions of sublimation with his earlier qualification of 
the drive in the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality as generically 
perverse, there is evidence to suggest that ‘sexual’ is here to be 
understood alongside Freud’s evocations of happy love, fully achieved 
genital maturity, or the synthesised instincts – those normative ideals 
that correspond, according to Freud’s deeper logic, to precisely nothing 
in human experience.12 
Consequently, ‘sexual’ in this sense would refer to a mythically direct 
brand of satisfaction, a pure experience of the libido entirely cleansed 
of its implication in the ego, as well as the signifying or symbolic rep-
resentations on which it depends. In this precise sense, the sexual in 
Freud is a prototype for the utopianism characteristic of both Deleuze 
and Guattari’s notion of desiring production, and Hocquenghem’s 
idea of homosexual desire. In this view, the term refers precisely to the 
merely logical possibility of an experience of sexuality emancipated 
from what Lacan calls the defiles of the signifier. 
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The confusing details finally fail to cloud the clarity of Freud’s basic 
point about sublimation, namely that it’s an alternative to the kind of 
repression that creates symptoms; a more direct route to satisfaction 
than the one that passes through the endless detours of neurosis. Less 
straightforward, of course, is Freud’s choice not to restrict sublimation 
to the libido itself. On the one hand, Freud claims that sublimation 
acts on the drive properly speaking rather than its object. On the other, 
however, he claims that sublimation is involved in the construction 
and buttressing of the ego ideal – that is to say, the structure of 
narcissism that functions to impede sexual satisfaction. This tension, or 
outright contradiction, is so deeply embedded in Freud’s fragmentary 
comments on sublimation that it’s impossible simply to iron it out. 
The most helpful approach to this difficulty is the one I’ve just 
outlined. As speaking subjects, we’re barred from the experience of a 
‘pure’ sexuality, of a full and uncompromised enjoyment. In Lacanian 
terms, a part of jouissance is forever unattainable, forbiddingly 
sequestered in the alien place of the Other. We lose this unattainable 
plus-de-jouir in consequence of our subjection to language. In 
consequence, every possible experience of sexuality, no matter how 
uninhibited or ‘raw’, is minimally sublimated. This is to say that the 
experience is made possible by a significant, but temporary and partial, 
lessening of the ego’s repressive hold. In sum, sublimation refers to 
the human capacity to access satisfaction, to experience enjoyment, 
without entirely obliterating the fragile fantasy structure that sustains 
desire. The fantasy accomplishes this by standing between us and 
the annihilating force of an unbridled and unlimited, and therefore 
impossible, jouissance.
We can further illuminate the distinction between idealisation and 
sublimation in Freud’s theory with reference to Lacan’s analogous 
distinction between desire and drive. The reference is instructive only 
if we keep in mind that each concept, for Lacan, refers to one of the 
two sides of a Möbius strip, which counterintuitively blend into one 
another. Desire and drive, in other words, are never met in their pure 
form. Or, perhaps more accurately, ‘pure desire’ – a phrase Lacan uses 
in the context of his analysis of Antigone, for example – corresponds 
to an experience of the drive, and vice versa. 
Idealisation describes the process through which the object of 
identification is split into competing representations, one of which 
Penney T02732 01 text   137 08/10/2013   08:16
after queer theory
138
is invested with narcissistic libido and the other thrust down into 
the unconscious. The result of idealisation is a self-alienated and 
self-thwarting desire: we don’t really want what we think we want; 
satisfaction can only be experienced as its opposite – the symptom’s 
inconvenient or painful excitations. By contrast, the drive takes 
the form of a perverse, meaningless, autoerotic loop: it achieves 
satisfaction by circling around an object from which libido has in 
fact been withdrawn. The drive becomes its own object, such that 
the qualities of that around which it circulates become indifferent, as 
Freud in fact suggests at the end of his sexuality essays. 
The element of Lacan that Hocquenghem, via Deleuze and 
Guattari, finds most attractive is the psychoanalyst’s reformulation 
of Freud’s Trieb as pulsion. As a result, when Deleuze and Guattari 
write about a specifically desiring production, and Hocquenghem then 
introduces his derivative notion of homosexual desire, in Lacanian 
terms they’re describing the acephalous libidinal force of the drive – 
impersonal or transpersonal, anoedipal, satisfying, devoid of a proper 
or even qualifiable object because it is deflected in its essence from 
any normative or reproductive aim. Further, and crucially, the drive 
is unmarked by the phallic signifier’s failed attempt to represent the 
difference between the sexes. 
From the Lacanian perspective, however, Hocquenghem follows 
Deleuze and Guattari as they effect what can only be called a 
reidealisation of the drive. The gesture inevitably participates in the 
retrograde liberationist fantasy of escape from a repressive world of 
civilised morality, in fact the very same fantasy against which Foucault 
railed when he subjected the repressive hypothesis to brilliant scrutiny 
in The History of Sexuality. 
The relation between sublimation and the pleasure yielded from 
sexual practice is fundamentally indeterminate. If a properly ‘sexual’ 
relation is impossible, as my interpretation of Freud’s theory suggests, 
then sexual practice is, always-already as it were, sublimated. There’s 
no general qualitative or quantitative distinction to be drawn between 
the satisfaction derived from sexual activity properly speaking (let’s 
assume momentarily the ordinary meaning of the phrase) and the 
activity of sublimation, which ranges from Freud’s too respectable 
example of men’s club membership to Lacan’s more terre-à-terre 
example of matchbox collection. This is surely the sense in which we 
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should understand psychoanalytic ‘pansexualism’ – that notorious 
Jungian substantive intended as a discrediting criticism of Freud. 
Lacan couldn’t be accused of circumlocution when, presenting 
the drive concept in his seminar, he said: ‘For the moment, I am 
not fucking, I am talking to you. Well! I can have exactly the same 
satisfaction as if I were fucking’.13 The casually provocative tone of 
Lacan’s pronouncement shouldn’t detract from its serious theoretical 
implications. First, any properly conceptual distinction between sexual 
and non-sexual drive satisfaction is untenable. Second, there is no 
satisfaction available to us other than the earthy, idiotic, non-cognitive 
or paracognitive satisfaction of the drive. Further, we can only fail to 
integrate this satisfaction into our self-concept. For this reason, we 
always experience this satisfaction as incomplete or compromised; as 
less satisfying than the fascinating jouissance we locate in the body of 
the Other. 
In short, the ideals that mediate our identificatory relation to the 
symbolic order and the dislocating intensities of drive satisfaction 
are incommensurable. All promises of a fuller, less problematic 
satisfaction, be they hygienic, revolutionary, bourgeois, intellectual, 
nationalist, utopian or otherworldly, bear witness to the obfuscating 
idealisations of neurotic fantasy, and will therefore remain forever 
unfulfilled. There’s no externally imposed, social or political, obstacle 
to enjoyment from which we require liberation. The only effective 
impediments to all possible satisfactions are the neurotic ideals we 
insist on imposing upon ourselves.
And yet these ideals, these Freudian Vorstellungen, prove resistant to 
eradication. Indeed, they make up the tenuous and unreliable barrier 
that shields us from psychosis, preventing us from succumbing to 
the trauma aroused in us by fantasies of the Other’s jouissance. The 
promise of Freudian analysis has never been utopian, in the precise 
sense that it has never claimed the possibility of completely wiping 
out neurosis once and for all. At the deepest, most troubling level, 
the symptom is ineradicable. This is the sense in which analysis is 
interminable, which doesn’t mean, however, that the patient forever 
remains on the couch. What it does mean is that there’s a horizon in 
analytic experience where the seductive pull of fantasy fails, although 
the fantasy structure as such remains intact and psychically operative. 
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Here, the clinical aspect of the Lacanian rejoinder to schizoanalysis 
emerges. Full-on, ‘triggered’ psychosis or ‘schizophrenia’ is 
experientially intolerable, unsustainable. Psychotics like the 
paradigmatic Schreber manage to construct a workable psychic life 
for themselves by producing neurotic symptoms – in other words, 
by telling an Other (in this instance embodied by an anonymous 
readership) about their ‘nervous illness’. In this important sense, 
neurosis is an escape from psychosis. The relation psychoanalysis 
theorises between the neurotic world of desire – with its unending 
object substitutions and eternally deferred satisfactions – and the 
non-repressive experience of the drive – with its satisfying, but also 
traumatic and non-cognitive, enjoyment – is therefore properly 
dialectical. This means that it’s conflicted, foundational and resistant 
to any final synthesis or pseudo-Hegelian Aufhebung (‘sublation’). 
Sublimation is the psychoanalytic name for the human capacity 
creatively to manage this tension, to (fail to) work out a compromise. 
It’s not coincidental that Deleuze’s entire philosophical system is, 
in an important sense, an attack against dialectical thought from 
Plato to Hegel, from Marx to Lacan. Neither is it by chance that 
Deleuze and Guattari premise their idea of desiring production on 
a properly non-dialectical ontology, on the purely positive virtuality 
of an infinite vista of becoming. The ideology of becoming contrasts 
sharply with the psychoanalytic insistence on repetition – that is, on 
the insurmountable, but also potentially creative, way in which we 
fail, over and over again, to encounter our own being; to integrate our 
being, that is, with our social identity. 
Within the Lacanian framework, then, the subject seeks relief 
from desire’s unceasing frustrations in drive satisfaction. But equally, 
we retreat to neurotic fantasy to find shelter or distance from 
jouissance when it becomes, as it inevitably will, excessive: invasive, 
claustrophobic, smothering. In this light, we can define sublimation 
not as the experience of drive satisfaction as such, but rather as the 
‘impossible’ eruption of the drive within consciousness, within the 
order of social relations. When satisfaction breaks out in our everyday 
sociosymbolic world, this world’s proper functioning – its coherence, 
its very ‘impression of reality’, as the old film theorists used to say 
– momentarily breaks down, revealing in the process its essential 
contingency and lack of foundational meaning. 
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In order to avoid Deleuze and Guattari’s retrograde idealisation of 
the drive as desiring production, we must specify that sublimation is 
the experience of drive satisfaction from within the imperfect order 
of the signifying function. Sublimation exposes the limits of this 
function, confronting us in the process with the inconsistency and 
inadequacy of the world, but also with its perplexing and potentially 
exciting openness, its ambiguous susceptibility to change. 
Beyond the Revolutionary Libido
Alongside all those pragmatic queer critics who draw their concepts 
willy-nilly from multiple theoretical discourses, you might wonder why 
such a seemingly arcane effort to distinguish between psychoanalysis 
and the anti-oedipus discourse even matters. To help spell this out, 
we can return to Hocquenghem by way of conclusion to consider the 
concrete political endorsements he outlines in Homosexual Desire. 
Despite his political education among dissident Trotskyist groups 
objecting to the Stalinist ossification of the French Communist Party, 
Hocquenghem took membership in the libertarian, anti-author-
itarian element of the 1968 generation. For Hocquenghem, the 
historical significance of the then-emergent gay movement consisted 
in its membership of the emblematic new social movements, 
including feminism and environmentalism, of the time. According 
to Hocquenghem, these movements distinguished themselves by 
premising their political project not on any determinate concept or 
theory, such as human rights or the class struggle for example, but 
rather on what he calls ‘a particular desiring situation’ (142): ‘particular’ 
as opposed to Marxism’s universalising narrative of the proletariat’s 
glorious historical destiny; ‘situation’, in its existential or sociological 
concreteness, as opposed to the concepts of political theories, including 
Marxism, which insist on the possibility of abstracting subjectivity 
from its grounding in determinate social identities.
Writing in the early 1970s, Hocquenghem attributes tremendous 
significance to the widespread popular struggle against US involvement 
in Vietnam. In his view, this struggle saw a novel association of 
progressive forces, which successfully rallied ‘against sexism, the cult 
of masculinity and the American version of war as a kind of “manly 
game”’ (142). With Hocquenghem, it becomes clear, we’re very 
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much in the New Left ‘rainbow coalition’ ethos of the time. This time 
corresponds to the period of socialism’s ‘return of the repressed’, when 
all those constituencies who felt marginalised by (pseudo-)orthodox 
Marxist economism began to make their voices loudly heard.
These informative contextual details notwithstanding, it’s rather 
Hocquenghem’s theoretical take on the new social movements that 
concerns me here. The historical gay movement puts into operation 
what Hocquenghem calls ‘a crude sexualisation of the social field’ 
(144). That is, this movement effects a direct libidinal investment, 
which sidesteps the normative-repressive representationalism of 
democratic political processes as conceived, presumably, by both 
communist party vanguardism and the liberal parliamentary tradition. 
As Hocquenghem describes, ‘the political system operates on the 
relation between signifier and signified, on the pyramidal relation 
between representative and masses’ (145). 
Decentred, amorphous and anarchic, this new libidinal politics 
dispenses not only with the need for centralised planning, strategy and 
organisation, but also with the entire ‘phallic’ (147) hierarchy that’s 
supposed to be required to implement them. Indeed, Hocquenghem 
dismisses outright the entire framework of representation as ‘the reign 
of the political’ (146) when he qualifies anyone who claims to speak 
on behalf of the masses as both necessarily complicit in a repressive 
regime of signification, and supportive of a system that menacingly 
dwarfs the persons of which it is comprised. Here again, Hocquenghem 
supports his argument with a reference to Anti-Oedipus, more precisely 
to Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between a subjected and a 
subject group:
A revolutionary group remains, as far as the pre-conscious is 
concerned, a subjected group, even when winning power and for as 
long as that power itself reflects a form of mastery which continues 
to enslave and crush desiring production ... A subject group, on the 
contrary, is one whose libidinal investments are in themselves 
revolutionary; it introduces desire into the social field. (147) 
This passage demonstrates how, in emblematic anarcho-libertarian 
fashion, Hocquenghem’s brand of anti-representationalist politics 
provides an alibi to the would-be revolutionary subject. This alibi 
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threatens to rationalise quietism: it suffices that one’s libidinal 
investments be revolutionary (whatever that means), and the rest, 
so it would appear, will take care of itself. Distressingly, this political 
cop-out devolves from a classic banality of vulgar postmodernism, 
which advances the doctrine of a relativism of political narratives and 
theories which are, Hocquenghem concurs, ‘all equally true whatever 
the bearer’ (142). The assumption is this: since everyone can weave a 
post-Marxist yarn in which his or her identity – ethnic, sexual, religious, 
whatever – can play a starring role, the entire project of theory to think 
through the practical means of effecting thoroughgoing social change 
becomes simply superfluous.
Far from offering an alternative to an insipid politics of identity, as 
many who have chosen to follow in this tradition now claim, the politics 
of desiring production, at least in the mode offered by Hocquenghem, 
exhibits the traits of a dubious humanistic voluntarism. In the unceasing 
flux of desire, I can access ‘n’ genders, ‘n’ sexes, ‘n’ identities. Such a 
politics simply reconfigures the conceptual apparatus of identitarian 
humanism by multiplying it. Liberal multiculturalism paints a rainbow 
of ethnic identities premised on an unmarked (white and ‘Western’, 
of course) exception, from whose point of view cultural diversity is 
offered for display. In an analogous way, the anti-oedipal discourse sets 
up an unwitting hierarchical structure in which the unfixed desiring 
nomads can look down upon all those other benighted subjects still 
reactively sutured to their markers of sociological and sexual identity. 
By refreshing contrast, psychoanalysis suggests a different political 
configuration, in which identity is marked as both necessary and 
necessarily failed. The subject of politics, also by definition a subject 
of the unconscious, ‘is represented, undoubtedly, but also it is not 
represented’,14 to quote Lacan. This can be taken to mean in the 
present context that the unconscious subject is socially indeterminate, 
ultimately empty. A compatible Marxism adds to Lacan’s contention 
that the subject is also subject to the real of socioeconomic antagonism, 
the rift that cross-cuts the entire social field, diagonally bisecting all 
possible configurations of social identity. Instead, Hocquenghem’s 
practical politics offers little more than an apolitical narcissism of 
becoming in which the political meaning of my libidinal investments 
appears transparently, undistorted by the jouissance of an unconscious 
knowledge from which I remain irremediably separated. In classic 
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‘bad utopian’ fashion, Hocquenghem’s argument further sidesteps the 
problem of the symbolic order, of the big Other and its mediation of 
political organisation. Planning, structure, reasoning, decision-making 
processes remain necessities that refuse to disappear in the aftermath 
of the overthrow of a bourgeois parliamentary regime.
In sum, the Deleuzo-Guattarian anti-oedipalism in which 
Hocquenghem’s politics takes shape is in the end a heroic, but hopelessly 
idealised, libertarian and ultraliberal anarcho-capitalist utopianism. 
This discourse associates the agency of reaction to emancipatory social 
change not with the violent and concretely dispossessing deterritori-
alisations of a capitalist system seeking profit through the exploitative 
extraction of profit from labour, but rather with the resistance to such 
deterritorialisations – that is, with the very effort to limit or eliminate 
capital’s addictive cult of economic growth, as well as the sociopolitical 
schizophrenia it instils as a result.
‘The sexualization of the world heralded by the gay movement’, 
Hocquenghem writes, ‘pushes capitalist decoding to the limit and 
corresponds to the dissolution of the human’ (145). But what if 
the exact opposite is true? What if the gay movement idealised by 
Hocquenghem fully participated in capital’s repressive eroticisation 
of commodity relations, effectively turning us away from what 
Freud began to describe as the paradoxically asexual and world-
shattering satisfaction of the drive? Rereading Hocquenghem today 
should remind us of the importance of formulating an alternative 
post-humanism, which both reidentifies the self-thwarting limit of 
capital, and reasserts the importance of a politics recognising both the 
necessity and necessary failure of representation. 
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The Sameness of  
Sexual Difference
This chapter’s basic assumption is that, in addition to its strictly clinical value, psychoanalytic case literature can be read as an argument against the direct politicisation of sexuality. 
The terrain here is tricky, however, since this doesn’t mean that the 
literature is immune from bias or ideology, particularly as concerns 
the interpretative framing of desires that appear to deviate from what 
is understood as heterosexuality. Indeed, in the consideration of 
Lacanian clinical discourse I undertake below, I identify precisely this 
kind of failure. 
Although they often throw the baby out with the bathwater, queer 
and pre-queer critics have admirably expended significant energy 
undoing the heterosexist assumptions that have marred too much 
clinical literature since Freud. Yet the unconscious as such resists overt 
politicisation. This remains true whether one views the unconscious as 
content or form. While the former assumes a murky reservoir of erotic 
fantasies or impulses barred from consciousness, the latter foregrounds 
the Freudian tradition’s more rigorous concept of a properly semiotic 
logic. This is the logic by means of which unconscious thoughts are 
distorted in order to evade censorship imposed by the ego. From 
this perspective, the political appears as the refusal to analyse, as the 
resistance to the exercise of will required to unbundle the symptom’s 
dissimulated enjoyment, whether this enjoyment takes the form 
of an addiction to bourgeois real estate websites, or the phobic 
and misogynist violence of the various and proliferating religious 
fundamentalisms. 
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Lacan’s famous claim that Marx invented the symptom explicitly 
links the psychoanalytic project to the properly materialist demy-
thologisation of surplus value. For Lacan, the dissimulation, the 
reification of exploitative relations of production in the commodity’s 
sexy phantasmagoria, is the particular historical form taken by the 
symptom in the capitalist social formation. In this way, Lacan’s 
thesis explicitly sexualises the commodity relation, reminding us 
that the most ‘scientific’ iteration of political economy ultimately 
rests on the identification, and attempted dismantling, of an illusion 
or misrecognition buttressed by the ego’s libidinal resistance to 
the unconscious. 
In short, our denial of the unconscious tethers us all the more 
tightly to the exalted and abstract world of capitalist valuation. We are 
returned thereby to the imperative to sexualise the political; to link 
our resistance to a politics of emancipation to our refusal to tarry with 
the scandal of a sexuality that refuses to conform to any norm. But 
a detailed consideration of the assumptions that frame the clinical 
approach to sexuality and sexual difference will be required to show 
not only how psychoanalysis evades the trap of a more vulgar kind of 
politicisation, but also sometimes fails to live up to its own rigorous 
ethical imperative.
Psychoanalysis and Queer Theory: Same Difference?
Among the numerous efforts of Anglo-American queer theorists to 
grapple psychoanalytically with the phenomenon of homosexuality, 
an antinomy has arisen in connection with ideas of sameness and 
difference. Influential queer theorists, such as Judith Butler, have 
argued against the psychoanalytic concept of sexual difference. For its 
part, Lacanian theory reasserts Freud’s original pronouncement that for 
psychoanalysis, sexual difference is of an order other than the cultural 
and the biological. For Lacan, sexual difference is neither symbolic 
nor imaginary, but rather real. In opposition to this view, queer 
theory considers the psychoanalytic emphasis on sexual difference 
an imposture that circumscribes sexuality’s diverse manifestations 
within a normative (read: phallocentric, patriarchal and heterosexist) 
sociosymbolic framework.1 Implicit in such discourses is the notion 
that if a difference qualified as sexual invariably pathologises 
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homosexuality, then it’s by reclaiming an idea of sameness – ‘same-sex 
desire’ – that sexuality theory is to consider homosexuality.
Two observations can be made at this early juncture. First, the post-
structuralist current of cultural theory affiliated with queer discourse 
characteristically holds that the proliferation of sexual differences 
beyond the conventional male–female binary is in itself of political 
value. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s idea of a deterritorialised 
multiplicity of ‘n’ sexes is emblematic of this view. Against this 
backdrop, the recourse to an idea of a sameness in desire claimed as a 
difference presents as logically awkward. That the difference against 
which the sameness of sex desire is contrasted is itself formulated as 
a concept of difference, namely sexual difference, only adds a further 
layer of fog to an already misty theoretical landscape. 
Second, the queer-theoretical protest against sexual difference takes 
aim at the psychoanalytic assumption that sexual difference stubbornly 
remains the same, in the precise sense that it doesn’t vary in accordance 
with the vicissitudes of cultural and historical discourses. Moreover, 
queer theory has proven hostile to the psychoanalytic premise that this 
same sexual difference remains psychically operative for all subjects, 
regardless of what Freud called their small differences (‘race’ and 
language group, for instance), and is therefore a difference which is, as 
it were, different from the other varieties of difference. 
There’s a manifest difficulty at work in the discourse on sexuality 
that calls out for ‘deconstruction’. The queer-theoretical notion of a 
sameness in sex desire depends on the assumption of its difference 
from a sexual difference which, so it holds, can only produce hetero-
sexuality. And, the sexual difference on which psychoanalysis insists 
rests on the idea of a sameness resistant to historical change and 
indifferent to the various predicative differences we commonly use to 
distinguish individual persons from one another. 
My aim in this chapter is to argue that we can resolve this difficulty 
by invoking the fundamental psychoanalytic distinction between a 
psychical and a biological sex. But, this requires that we make a further 
distinction between psychical sex, as psychoanalysis formulates it, 
and the idea of gender endemic to Anglo-American, and increasingly 
other varieties of, feminist and sexuality theories. In terms of its 
relation to this book’s wider context, this chapter explores one 
dimension of the limitations of the politicisation of sexuality. It does 
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this by demonstrating how the politicisation of sexual difference 
as psychoanalysis conceives it is not only clinically and theoretically 
disastrous, but politically distracting as well. 
Considered from the broadest multilingual and cross-disciplinary 
perspective, there’s tremendous confusion in gender and sexuality 
theories concerning what precisely its fundamental categories are 
meant to designate. It’s far from clear, for instance, that the various 
figures engaged in the debate understand the same thing by the terms 
‘sex’ and ‘sexuality’. As far as these terms are concerned, we know 
where to look to discover what Freud, for example, meant by them. 
The case with gender is altogether different, however. Like French 
and many other Romance and Germanic languages, Freud’s German 
had no vocabulary with which to distinguish between what English 
designates by sex and gender. Until ‘Anglo-Saxon’ gender theory 
finally made its presence felt in a begrudging French intellectual field 
in the 1990s, the term genre held only contrasting grammatical and 
cultural meanings, referring to the masculine indefinite article or the 
Western in literature and cinema, for instance. However, it’s also true 
that this hasn’t stopped French, or potentially any other language 
deprived of an indigenous term for ‘gender’, from distinguishing, as 
has much French work in feminist theory since Simone de Beauvoir, 
between a sexe biologique and a sexe social or culturel. By contrast, there’s 
no rigorous concept of gender in psychoanalysis, neither in the original 
Freudian texts, nor in the broad post-Freudian field in the French-lan-
guage tradition. 
Of course, numerous English-language analysts and therapists, 
many with links to the feminist movement, have more or less uncon-
troversially imported gender into psychoanalysis. I want to argue that 
this importation has had a devastating effect on our capacity to theorise 
correctly what psychoanalysis, with greater fidelity to Freud, refers to 
as sexual difference. During the past half-century, feminist theory has 
spent significant amounts of time distinguishing between sex, deemed 
biological or anatomical, and gender, variously construed as historical, 
cultural, social, linguistic, discursive or ideological. Most recently, post-
structuralist feminists have attacked this distinction, proclaiming that 
biological sex is a sort of Kantian thing-in-itself, which can never be 
apprehended or perceived from outside the discursive frame of gender. 
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My own argument moves in a different direction, however. The 
‘gendered subject’ of contemporary Anglo-American theory is 
fully expressed by social codes and scripts, however heterogeneous, 
contradictory, or incomplete we might consider these to be. Even 
Judith Butler’s notion of gender as an unrealisable normative ideal, 
which condemns us to endlessly inadequate attempts at performative 
conformity, assumes that this ideal is nevertheless socially intelligible 
– that is, inscribed in what Lacan called the symbolic order. In contrast, 
the sexed subject of psychoanalysis is an unconscious subject, a subject 
defined precisely by its non-appearance within the forms of recognised 
social life. For psychoanalysis, gender – understood as ‘masculine’ or 
‘feminine’ social identity – can only ever be a vexing question for a 
subject of uncertain or ambiguous sex. 
In Lacanian terms, the power to bestow a firm sexual identity 
is always alienated in the Other. Butler’s gendered subject fails to 
incarnate manifest and communicable ideals of gender. By contrast, 
the psychoanalytic subject is forced to wonder about the content of 
these ideals, and also whether or not he or she conforms to them. 
In other words, as subjects of the unconscious we engage in a futile 
attempt at deciphering the impossible meaning of sexual difference 
from the Other’s enigmatic and contradictory discourse, which can 
range from the ideas about sexuality uttered by parental figures or the 
media, to a prospective partner’s expectations about the qualities of an 
ideal mate. In short, the social meaning of masculinity and femininity, 
for psychoanalysis, is forever barred from knowledge. Gender identity 
can only take the form of a question, which the subject poses of an 
Other who is incapable of responding in any fully satisfying way.
This being said, there are good reasons for which gender theory has 
argued against the discourse of sexual difference in psychoanalysis 
with the claim that it perpetuates a bias against homosexuality. Indeed, 
much of the discourse on homosexuality in Lacan’s work, and among 
many Lacanian theorists and clinicians, has done little to dispel the 
suspicion. For example, Renata Salecl’s otherwise excellent edited 
volume Sexuation, which features the work of prominent Parisian 
Lacanian clinicians, assumes by omission that sexuation always occurs 
in conformity with the subject’s biological sex, an assumption Lacan 
himself eventually and squarely denied. Clinical work by such figures 
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as Joël Dor and Jean Clavreul subsumes all forms of homosexuality 
under what both authors refer to as the ‘perverse structure’.2 
By contrast, in his path-breaking book Beyond Sexuality, Tim 
Dean draws attention to Lacan’s thesis that the human sexual drive 
is caused by a real object of enjoyment, which is sexually undifferen-
tiated, indeed finally asexual. As Freud himself put it, the ‘instinct’ 
is ultimately indifferent to the object’s sexual characteristics. Dean’s 
emphasis on what he calls the libidinal object’s impersonality further 
exonerates the psychoanalytic theory of sexuality from familiar charges 
of heterosexism. The link between this object and what Lacan calls 
sexuation (a psychical or unconscious sex), however, remains unclear 
in his work. If psychoanalysis posits that the drive in itself, as it were, 
remains indifferent to sexual difference, then how can it take account 
of what today we refer to as sexual preference? 
Even if we assume that the final lesson of psychoanalysis on 
sexuality is that the notion of sexual orientation is ultimately neurotic 
or ideological, the onus remains on psychoanalysis to explain 
why many people, or most, insist that they have one. Despite its 
tremendous theoretical value, Dean’s work sheds no new light on this 
perennial problem. More precisely, it fails to distinguish between the 
real object that causes desire – what Lacan famously called objet petit 
a – and the other, ideal object to which the subject will address itself 
in the inescapable dynamic of transference. This latter object, to which 
Lacan gave the symbol I, is the phallus in its symbolic dimension, 
and it acquires crucial significance in the clinical writing on male 
same-sex desire. 
It will be helpful to examine Dean’s argument in more detail 
by specifying the role each of Lacan’s three registers plays in its 
development. Put in the most basic of terms, Dean advances that faecal 
matter functions psychically as a sort of prototype for the phallus, which 
is ‘less a figure for the penis than, more fundamentally, a figure for the 
turd’.3 This is no doubt the case on the level of the drive. However, 
Dean’s discussion fails to take account of Lacan’s insistence that the 
phallus is (also) a signifier. In the mother’s or mother figure’s speech, 
this signifier will come to represent for the subject’s unconscious what 
Lacan called the name of the father (le nom du père). This name refers 
to another entity, an object, which traumatically wrenches the subject 
from its position at the centre of the maternal world. In short, Dean 
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privileges the function of the real phallus at the expense of its symbolic 
role as the emblem of castration. ‘The logic of the concept of object 
a’, he writes, ‘demotes or relativizes the phallus: whereas the phallus 
implies a univocal model of desire (insofar as all desiring positions 
are mapped in relation to a singular term), object a implies multiple, 
heterogeneous possibilities for desire, especially since object a bears 
no discernible relation to gender’ (250). 
Dean expresses reservations about Deleuze and Guattari’s 
anti-oedipal idea that there exists a limitless number of sex-gender 
positions. In light of these reservations, it remains unclear how Dean’s 
own non-dialectical model of queer sexuality beyond sexual difference 
differs in its fundamentals from the one he opposes. Although 
he ultimately reproaches Deleuze and Guattari for promulgating 
a voluntarist utopianism in the liberationist current, which was 
thoroughly quashed in Foucault’s The History of Sexuality, Dean 
nonetheless supports their enterprise to the extent that they ‘aim to 
depersonify desire’. Further, ‘apart from the vocabulary of desiring-
machines’, continues Dean, ‘their contentions seem wholly compatible 
with Lacan’s theory of desire as unconscious and originating in the 
object a, which is itself both irreducible and prior to anything that may 
be made to conform to the Oedipal figure’ (242). 
This last comment draws attention to a weak spot in Dean’s book. 
According to Lacan, desire is also an effect of the subject’s mediation 
through the Other – that is, its imperfect inclusion in the field of 
language. For this reason, the thesis about the real’s power to eclipse 
the (necessarily failed) representation of sexual difference remains 
difficult to distinguish from Deleuze and Guattari’s attack against the 
symbolic order as such. It’s more theoretically consistent to argue that 
the so-called beyond of Oedipus – to be perfectly precise, the beyond 
of language’s necessary but failed mediation of sexual difference – is 
internal to language itself, internal to the very process of oedipalisation. 
In this sense, sexuality is indeed caused by objet petit a. However, we 
fail to understand Lacan’s concept if we imagine the latter as some 
tangible object on the other side of language or representation. Rather, 
the partial object is a by-product of the impossibility of uttering the 
sexual relation; a sort of remainder of language, which wouldn’t exist 
without language’s failure to signify it. 
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Further, we should recall that the anatomical reference of ‘the penis’ 
in the original Freudian passages on the phallic stage was to both 
the penis and the clitoris. This suggests that a degree of ambivalence 
with respect to biological sex was embedded from the very beginning 
in Freud’s own discussion of what he misleadingly called the penis. 
In this light, the conclusion supporting the tired queer-theoretical 
cliché according to which psychoanalysis upholds a sexist view of the 
relation between the phallus and biological men, can only be qualified 
as overhasty. Lacan eliminated any lingering ambiguity in Freud when 
he claimed that ‘clinical facts’ demonstrate that there exists ‘a relation 
between the subject and the phallus that forms without regard to the 
anatomical distinction between the sexes’.4 
In this sense, Lacan’s Freudian position on the phallus is more 
radical than Dean’s. Dean argues that the (symbolic) phallus helps 
legislate a social order that tends towards heterosexist normativity. 
In consequence, Dean must move to the level of the drive in order to 
find this normativity’s subversion. By contrast, Lacan insists that the 
symbolic distribution of the phallus already remains undetermined by 
sex, anatomically defined. The very symbolic mechanism that attempts 
(and fails) to impart sexual identity can fail even to ‘match’ its attribution 
with a subject’s bodily sex. As Lacan, with disarming directness, put 
it in Encore, ‘everyone knows there are phallic women, and that the 
phallic function doesn’t stop men from being homosexuals’.5 Lacan’s 
utterance problematises Dean’s assumption that the elimination of 
the agency of the phallus in sexuation is a necessary condition for a 
genuinely anti-homophobic psychoanalytic account of sexuality. 
In my own view, the properly psychoanalytic position is that despite 
the asexual quality of objet petit a, the homosexual subject, male or 
female, isn’t immune to the effects of the fantasmatic comedy of 
being and having the phallus. With reference to Lacan’s later work, 
the logic of sexuation, which upholds that there are only two possible 
ways in which the symbolic order can fail to signify the (hetero)sexual 
relation, also plays a role for the subject who will call him or herself 
homosexual. To state, as one should, that all nonpsychotic forms of 
subjectivity must submit to what Lacan called the phallic function is 
not tantamount to the imposition of what Dean calls a univocal model 
of desire. For psychoanalysis, castration’s universality obtains in two 
different ways: the feminine way, which is based on an immediate 
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judgment that one does not have the phallus, coupled with an 
affirmation of non-phallic jouissance; and the masculine way, which 
bases castration’s lack of exception on the authority of a paternal 
prohibition paradoxically exempt from castration. In short, there’s no 
escape from the requirement that the psyche, in both its masculine 
and feminine guises, imbue a particular signifier with the unconscious 
power to signify what one necessarily lacks. 
While this requirement of psychic life ensures that the phallus will 
play a determinative role in human sexuality, it doesn’t succeed in 
legislating a regime of sexual orientation – hetero, homo or otherwise. 
Yes, the drive by its nature is indifferent to the sexually differentiated 
attributes of the object, as Dean and Deleuze/Guattari maintain, 
not to mention both Freud and Lacan. But it’s also true that we 
never experience sexuality purely on the level of the drive. Cultural 
discourses – language – will forever try, and forever fail, to effect, to 
actualise the sexual relation. Evidence for this is far from lacking. 
Everything from the vulgar Jungian ‘men are from Mars’ discourse, to 
the various forms of male and female genital circumcision, attest to 
our species’ unceasing effort to put sexual difference on firmer cultural 
and anatomical ground. 
The causal power of Lacan’s objet petit a with respect to desire doesn’t 
prevent the subject from connecting its separation from jouissance to 
a phallic third party. The signifier our unconscious selects for this third 
party then serves to represent the impossibility of definitive, once-
and-for-all libidinal satisfaction. In short, the phallus stands in for 
our irremediable sense of lack. It is crucial to underline with respect 
to the concerns of queer theory, or more generally in the context of 
today’s complex social realities, that the paternal function is precisely a 
function for Lacan. This function can and will be linked with represen-
tations that may or may not bear any relation to the biological father, 
or even with the person who performs the paternal role in the infant’s 
family unit. If, as Lacan argued, the unconscious picks out the paternal 
metaphor from the mother’s speech, then it’s hardly even necessary 
that the father be alive, let alone ‘emotionally available’, as an ambient 
and highly normative psychologism might suggest. 
For this reason, the familiar diagnostic social commentaries that wax 
apocalyptic about the disastrous social implications of non-traditional 
families or the so-called decline of paternity should be questioned from 
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the point of view of psychoanalysis itself, even and especially when 
these diagnoses emerge from psychoanalytic contexts, as they often 
do. Further, it’s likely no great secret that the discourse of the male 
homosexual – and it’s predominantly the male form of homosexuality 
that will preoccupy me in what follows – is deeply marked by the phallus 
and whomever, for a given subject, is deemed to bear it. This issue of 
the relation between male homosexual desire and the problem of the 
phallus is precisely what Dean’s analysis glosses over and Lacanian 
clinical discourse most often fails adequately to address. 
These are the reasons why I’ve chosen to examine in what follows 
the complex mutual implication of sameness and difference in 
sexuality theory through the lens of the Lacanian clinical discourse on 
male homosexuality. More specifically, I’ll engage with the work of the 
late Belgian analyst Serge André, in my view the most consequential 
to have appeared thus far as concerns the analysis of male same-sex 
desire in the Lacanian field. In the process, we’ll have occasion to 
revisit a number of classic problems that have marked the history of 
psychoanalytic thinking about homosexuality, including the relation 
of the perverse structure, sometimes deemed synonymous with 
fetishism, to male homosexual object choice, as well as the vexed and, 
in the broader context of queer theory, outright suppressed problem of 
the psychogenesis of homosexual desire.6 
I pose two basic questions. First: what distinguishes the male 
homosexual from the male, predominantly heterosexual, fetishist? 
Second: if male homosexuals aren’t ordinarily perverts, in the struc-
tural-clinical sense of the term, then what distinguishes the one from 
the other? Nearly a century of analytic discourse has prevaricated, 
often in a quite phobic way, on these two questions. My argument 
will be that both questions can be answered with a single contention. 
The only theoretically consistent way to distinguish the neurotic male 
homosexual from the fetishist is to assume that the former, unlike the 
latter, agrees to assume what Lacan calls feminine sexuation. As we 
follow the logic of this argument, we’ll encounter not only something 
of the insistence of a sameness that distinguishes sexual difference from 
other kinds of difference (ethnic, racial, economic and so on), but also 
a perhaps surprising indication of a distinctly sexual difference at work 
in what we call same-sex desire. 
Penney T02732 01 text   154 08/10/2013   08:16
the sameness  of sexual difference
155
Dany, or the Paradox of Hetero-Transsexuality
Dany is a young male patient who, for some years, has anxiously asked 
himself if he’s a transsexual. Although the prospect of a sex-change 
operation horrifies him, he bears witness to having felt more like a girl 
than a boy for most of his life. At the time of his entry into analysis at 
age 20, Dany has been taking female hormonal supplements, which 
provide him with what André calls ‘a few curves’.7 A low-level white 
collar worker, Dany marries a female colleague at age 19 but, even 
after the wedding and up to the time of his analysis, he continues to 
spend on average one night a week at his father’s house, a widower 
whose wife died when Dany was 16 years old. 
Dany describes to his analyst some key details of the unusual 
domestic relationship he has with his father. The day after his mother’s 
death, Dany’s father invites his son to sleep with him in his bed every 
night, rationalising this invitation by saying that he wants to convert 
Dany’s room into a memorial space for his wife. According to André’s 
reproduction of his patient’s discourse, the father subsequently adopts 
the role of ‘housewife’, insisting on dressing his 16-year-old son every 
morning before leaving for work. 
Dany takes advantage of his mother’s death to increase the 
frequency of the cross-dressing practice he had been engaging in since 
age 6. Before her demise, Dany’s mother silently tolerated her son’s 
transvestism. Dany explains that his mother had passionately wished 
for a daughter while pregnant with him. After the delivery, she refused 
to touch her new baby for two days. Although she eventually, on the 
surface at least, accepts her newborn’s male sex, Dany’s mother insists 
on dressing him in girls’ clothing and buying him toys associated 
with girls. Not without consequence, according to André, the mother 
gives her son the diminutive form of the name she had picked out for 
a daughter. As André informs his reader, the name ‘Dany’ (not the 
patient’s real name) is used for both boys and girls, men and women, 
in the patient’s cultural context. Later, at age 12, Dany reluctantly 
agrees to undergo surgery to lower his testicles which, as he says, had 
‘remained inside’ his body (34).
Those are the basic facts of the case history as André presents them. 
Central to my concerns in this chapter, however, will be to examine not 
only how André interprets these facts, but also how his interpretation 
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is informed by particular theoretical premises surrounding the relation 
between the notion of the perverse psychic structure in Lacanian 
theory and what we call male homosexuality. With these aims in mind, 
certain key details of the case gain special significance. For instance, we 
learn that his mother would allow the young Dany to put on a pair of 
her tights after school before his father’s return from work. This detail 
leads André to observe that ‘a complicity, never explicitly formulated, 
was established between Dany and his mother’, and that the father, 
although ‘not invisible [pas inexistant]’, was ‘systematically deceived, 
cuckolded by the couple formed by the mother and her son’. In rather 
too flippant a tone, André concludes that not only did the mother ‘wear 
the pants’ in the household, but she would also, when the father’s 
attention was turned elsewhere, ‘share them with her son’ (35).
Those familiar with the main tropes of the history of psychoanalytic 
clinical writing on male homosexuality will immediately recognise 
this classic aetiological scenario: a retiring, absent or feminised father 
symbolically castrated by the mother; the latter a permissive, almost 
obscene figure who lends herself with gusto to clandestine incestuous 
enjoyments with her son. These enjoyments are held to undermine the 
father’s presumed duty to signify or effect castration. André’s analysis 
assumes that the mother’s desire for a female child virtually guarantees 
that Dany’s future symbolic identifications will be feminine, in other 
words that he’ll position himself as a member of the maternal line. 
Although it hits all the familiar notes in the melody of dominant 
analytic thinking about male homosexuality, Dany’s case, according to 
André himself, has little in the end to do with homosexuality properly 
speaking. First, Dany never claims to be homosexual, never speaks 
of desiring another man, and marries, when all is said and done, a 
woman. Second, Dany’s primary concern appears to lie not with the 
sex attributes of his object, but rather with his own sexual identity, 
with what André calls ‘the enigma of his sex’ (34). The question Dany 
formulates in response to the Other’s enigmatic desire is not ‘am I 
homo or heterosexual?’ but rather ‘am I a man or a woman?’
In addition to worrying about his sexual identity, Dany gives 
evidence of sadomasochistic fantasies in his unconscious life. For 
instance, he tells his analyst that he customarily hires female prostitutes 
with whom he stages a particular fantasy scenario. Its mise-en-scène 
sees Dany dress in tight-fitting women’s clothing, pretending to do 
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housework while his paid female partner aggressively insults him. The 
scene reaches its climax when the prostitute ties Dany up and flogs 
him to orgasm. Gradually, Dany introduces his wife to his masochistic 
fantasy world. Although compliant with some of his requests, she 
refuses to engage in any activity that threatens to cause her husband 
direct physical harm. Central to Dany’s fantasy is the requirement 
that his partner enjoy her involvement in its enactment. Only in this 
way, André suggests, can Dany offer up his ecstasy to the Other as the 
fulfilment of its desire. 
Here we encounter an example of what Lacan describes as the 
perverse structure: the subject offers up his services as the catalyst, 
the vehicle, of the Other’s jouissance. This requires not only that 
the subject actively manipulate his partner in order ‘passively’ to 
experience masochistic enjoyment. Further, he must also receive a sort 
of proof from the Other that it isn’t simply pretending to be a sadist, 
but actually derives obscene satisfaction from causing pain. 
In his commentary, André leaves unexamined the fact, crucial 
for my own purposes, that Dany’s perverse self-instrumentalisation 
vis-à-vis the Other’s enjoyment occurs in tandem with the physical 
manipulation of his own body. This manipulation through hormonal 
supplements is designed to attenuate the evidence of his male 
biological sexual identity. Not only does Dany’s fantasy phallicise 
his female partner by having her give voice to a superegoic command 
that must be obeyed. The fantasy also functions to calm his anxiety 
about his own sexual identity, by in effect ‘performing’ the non-coin-
cidence between bodily sexual difference and its representation in 
conventional gendered domestic roles. The sadomasochistic sequence 
attenuates the traumatic question of Dany’s uncertain sexual identity 
by making it difficult or impossible to answer one way or the other. 
Or, perhaps, the fantasy works pre-emptively to answer the question 
of sexual difference before it can even be asked: if Dany, a man, can 
adopt a ‘passive’ feminine role, and if his female partner can give 
voice to a severe paternal superego, then sexual difference ceases to 
be a function of subjectivity proper – of the always failed attempt to 
find a symbolic home in the Other – and becomes instead a matter of 
self-instrumentalisation, of solving the enigma of sexual difference by 
impeding its castrating emergence as a question. The neurotic tends 
to worry about the sex of his object, anxiously subjecting himself to 
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the multiple-choice question of sexual orientation. By contrast, the 
pervert offers himself up in fantasy as the object that tries to resolve the 
difference between the sexes by blocking, quite literally, the emergence 
of the problem of its impossible symbolic representation.
André is certainly correct in his assessment that Dany isn’t a 
‘repressed’ homosexual, but rather a heterosexual pervert. Insightfully, 
he underscores how Dany’s perverse structure functions psychically as 
a defence against homosexuality. In short, Dany becomes a pervert in 
order to avoid becoming homosexual. In so doing, Dany saves himself 
from the difficulty of acknowledging the possibility that a biologically 
male subject is capable of desiring ‘like a woman’, of adopting what 
Freud referred to as a passive aim for the drive. According to André, 
the ‘complicity’ between Dany and his mother allows Dany to feign 
submission to the symbolic law of paternal authority. But, when 
his mother dies and the father adopts his feminine position in the 
diminished family structure, Dany is directly placed for the first time 
in a position of passivity in relation to the father. This prospect is so 
traumatically seductive for Dany, André contends, that his patient 
must construct, in defence, a masochistic fantasy with a phallic mother 
dominatrix in the starring role.
Dany resists the form of symbolic castration that can engender a 
homosexually tending desire in at least two ways. First, the masochistic 
fantasy scenario supports Dany’s perverse desire to fuse with his 
partner into a unified or self-sufficient phallic object – to embody, in 
other words, the phallus the mother lacks on the level of her anatomical 
body. Second, as if to compensate for the difficulty of finding an 
authentically sadistic partner willing to play the required role, Dany 
hormonally feminises his own body, effectively protesting to the Other 
that in any case his desire can’t possibly be homosexual because he isn’t 
even really a man. Indeed, the psychodynamic significance of Dany’s 
fantasy constructions finds clear expression in his response of absolute 
conformity with his mother’s desire for a female child. 
Despite the mother’s apparent acceptance of her son’s biological 
sex, André contends that the young Dany was traumatised by an 
unconscious wish, communicated by the mother between the lines, 
for a child of the opposite sex. Dany’s unconscious life is structured at 
the most fundamental level around a libidinal dynamic of self-instru-
mentalisation, which functions simultaneously as a defence against, 
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and perverse enactment of, this desire for a girl he hears articulated 
in his mother’s speech. Compliance with this desire requires an 
acknowledgment of sexual difference by way of acceptance of (phallic) 
lack and what goes along with it – the intolerably traumatic prospect 
of sexual passivity. By effectively positioning himself in fantasy as 
the asexual object that fills the lack in the Other, Dany’s unconscious 
tries to stop all evidence of sexual difference from even emerging as 
a problem. In this way, Dany secures for himself a precarious, ersatz 
form of perverse castration, which is exempt from sexuation’s forced 
choice between the libido’s active and passive expressions.
Dany’s analysis lasts for only a year and a half, culminating in what 
André calls an affirmation of the patient’s masochism. According to 
André, the abbreviated analysis causes Dany to fail to withstand the 
subjective destitution that would have allowed him to traverse his 
perverse fantasy and attenuate its symptomatic agency. Nonetheless, 
Dany manages to undertake a sublimating writing practice, which 
grants him a modicum of satisfaction outside the challenges and 
dangers posed by his sexual practices. For André, writing allows Dany 
to engage in a form of labour that provides the psychical reassurance 
that comes with enabling the Other’s enjoyment without having to act 
out his masochistic fantasy, and thereby experiencing the suffering 
it engenders. 
The significance of the Dany case history for my concerns in this 
chapter lies in how it presents a concrete instance of the implication 
of the fetish structure in the psyche’s defence against homosexuality. 
Without spelling it out in detail, Freud intuited this implication in 
his own work on perversion. ‘The fetish’, Freud asserts, ‘saves the 
fetishist from becoming homosexual, by endowing women with the 
characteristic which makes them tolerable as sexual objects’.8 But if the 
‘successful’ male, more or less heterosexual, pervert is in some sense, 
according to Freud, a ‘failed’ passive homosexual (at least on the level 
of the passive fantasy vis-à-vis the father), then what does the clinical 
picture of what we might call, however improperly, the ‘successful’ 
male homosexual look like? 
Indeed, a certain kind of male homosexual desire may in fact be 
unrelated to the perverse phallicisation of the mother we find in Dany’s 
case. Such a male homosexuality would also be unrelated to a ‘denial 
of sexual difference’, which is the hallmark of the widest swathe of 
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psychoanalytic writing on perversion. Rather, this male homosexuality 
would be situated in a ‘feminine’ position of passivity with respect 
to the phallus or father. What does this imply with respect to this 
presumably neurotic, as opposed to perverse, subject’s castration? In 
short, what is the structure of (neurotic) male homosexual desire? 
Although it’s not certain that André’s nonetheless invaluable book 
provides a convincing and unambiguous answer to this question, it will 
still be worth our while to examine another example from his casework 
in order to further the inquiry. This second case history will lay the 
groundwork for the presentation of my own views concerning both the 
relation of perversion to male homosexuality, and the implication of 
sexual difference in what we call male same-sex desire. 
Philippe, or the ‘Imaginarisation’ of Castration
In André’s historicised psychoanalytic account, male homosexuality 
is organised around what he calls an initiation to virility, by which 
access to a sexualised masculinity is non-normatively aligned with the 
maternal genealogical line. In André’s view, such a psychic structure 
bears witness to a ‘difficulty with respect to castration’, and this 
difficulty plays a role in the formation of the male erotic subcultures he 
describes as ‘more or less codified and cloistered’ (159). 
I’ll leave it up to the reader to decide whether this description 
accurately identifies a key feature of male homosexual life, or rather 
bespeaks a fantasy, hardly unheard of among male heterosexual 
analysts, of male homosexual enjoyment as exotic and impenetrable, 
not to mention threatening to a masculine sexual identity deemed 
unstable or unattainable by Lacanian theory itself. For my own part, 
I’d merely suggest that the alternatives are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Doubtless, however, it will prove more productive to focus 
on the details of André’s theory of male homosexuality as well as the 
facts of the case that serves to exemplify it.
Despite its occasionally phobic limitations, André’s clinical 
discussion of male homosexuality has the merit of reinscribing 
the vectors of male homosexual desire within a phallic orbit, 
emphasising in the process the agency of a symbolic phallus in the 
male homosexual’s discourse. In this way, André’s approach rectifies 
the tendency in queer-inflected Lacanian criticism such as Dean’s to 
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theorise homosexuality strictly in relation to the real object-cause of 
enjoyment, abstracted from its dependence on the symbolic order, 
which remains, however, inconsistent and incomplete. In short, male 
homosexuals are neither more nor less subjected to language’s opacity 
than any other category of subject. Moreover, they’re equally obliged 
to separate from the gravitational field of the mother’s all-consuming 
jouissance with the help of a phallic signifier, the signifier of lack. With 
this allusion to the phallus as the sign of castration, we can already 
see how André’s considerations move us away from the paradigm 
of perversion characteristic of the previous case. The pervert’s 
raison-d’être is to forestall the emergence of the mother’s lack, by 
posing as the object that fills it. Here, by contrast, the subject is forced 
to tarry with this lack by finding a signifier to represent it. 
In this way, André’s account admirably highlights how the male 
homosexual psychic structure, or at least a particular version of it, 
features a determinate link to what Lacan calls the paternal metaphor, 
and more specifically to its interrogation. In brief, the paternal 
metaphor serves to signify for the unconscious the other thing, 
separate from the subject, that the mother desires. This object – the 
phallic object – is necessarily elsewhere, outside, in the place of the 
Other. This is what turns the male homosexual to the interrogation 
of the phallus in all its forms, not only the excremental partial object 
of which Dean importantly speaks, but also the idealised symbolic 
and imaginary forms of the phallus, which hold up the lure of virile 
identity. As I developed in my criticism of Dean’s work, we can see 
how the universal queerness of sexuality – by which I mean sexuality’s 
excess over sexual difference; the fact that the drive’s object is 
ultimately asexual – fails to do away with the need for a (necessarily 
failed) process of oedipalisation, to use the old-fashioned Freudian 
vocabulary; or, more helpfully perhaps, for a pass through what Lacan 
calls the phallic function. 
Indeed, Lacan’s famous (or notorious) formulas of sexuation can 
be read as the formalisation of precisely this antinomy or disjunction 
between the mode through which the subject is inscribed in the 
symbolic order, and the queer residue of the real that deuniversalises 
or detotalises the phallic function. This residue can take either the 
masculine form of the obscene exception (Freud’s ‘primal father’), or 
the feminine form of the pas-toute (the law of castration is not-all). 
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André’s concern for the male homosexual’s virility boils down to 
the problem of how to frame the question of what we might loosely 
call the location of the symbolic phallus in the structure of male 
homosexuality. How does the male homosexual orient himself with 
respect to the phallus – the signifier that represents the interdiction, 
the impossibility, of a full and uncompromised jouissance? In short, 
how are we to theorise the male homosexual’s sexuation? 
In André’s view, the elaboration of oedipal identifications, and the 
installation in the unconscious of the phallic signifier, are susceptible 
to two modes of failure he associates with male homosexuality. While 
one mode causes the formation of the perverse clinical structure, 
the other creates a more ‘normal’ form of neurotic subjectivity. As 
became apparent in the Dany case history, perverse ‘homosexuality’ 
for André bespeaks ‘a failure to realise castration [un ratage par défaut 
de réalisation de la castration]’. By contrast, neurotic homosexuality 
is based on a second kind of failure marked by what André calls an 
‘excessive imaginarisation of castration’. Tellingly, however, Marc, 
whose case history André uses to illustrate the neurotic variation, bears 
consistent witness during his analysis to a ‘nostalgia, which grows in 
intensity over the years, for a real relationship with a woman’ (171). 
With the pseudo-homosexual case of Dany still in mind, we couldn’t 
be blamed for wondering if André is looking for male homosexuality 
in all the wrong places. 
Here it will be helpful, parenthetically, to bring to the fore some 
key details of Marc’s case history. This case serves to illustrate in 
André’s discussion the neurotic homosexual psychic structure from 
which Philippe’s perverse structure, discussed in detail below, is 
distinguished. The importance of Marc’s case increases by virtue of 
the fact that I’ll want to suggest that André’s diagnoses of the two 
analysands makes more sense put the other way round. 
Describing his erotic orientation as bisexual, Marc desires 
nonetheless to marry a woman and have children. Despite a number of 
homosexual liaisons during his university years, liaisons characterised 
most consequentially by oral–penile contact, mutual masturbation 
and an atmosphere of affective warmth, Marc ‘has no desire to 
become a homosexual’, André writes (174). Instead, Marc seeks out 
psychoanalysis in order to overcome his impotence with women, a 
condition André associates with his patient’s sense of horror at female 
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genitals. Although he shows tenderness towards his son during his 
childhood, Marc’s father adopts a more severe attitude towards him 
in his adolescent years. According to André, this change in the father’s 
attitude causes Marc to seek shelter in the orbit of his mother, with 
whom he develops the signature ‘complicit intimacy’ (174). 
André describes Marc’s oedipal conflict as classic. Although 
the father’s early, caring relation with his son prevents Marc from 
identifying symbolically with his mother, Marc’s virility, according to 
André, is marred by his fear of the father’s later, more intimidating 
persona. Although I agree with André that the form of Marc’s castration 
is of the phallic or masculine variety in the sense that it’s overseen by 
the father, in my view André goes wrong where he characterises this 
castration as ‘overly successful’ (177). With his difficulty assuming 
the consequences of masculine sexuation, the resulting phobia of the 
female sex organs and the associated fear of becoming homosexual, 
Marc’s psychic structure appears to fit more comfortably under the 
rubric of perversion. 
Indeed, the only case material presented in André’s book featuring 
a patient who speaks of being penetrated by another man is Philippe, 
who not only serves to represent within André’s typology the perverse 
version of the two possible homosexually inclined psychic structures, 
but also dies after only five sessions with his analyst in a car accident 
featuring a likely suicidal intent, conscious or unconscious. This is 
the gist of the background behind my suggestion that André gets his 
diagnoses mixed up. With his sexual ambivalence but overarching 
heterosexual orientation, Marc is the one who shows signs of the 
perverse structure. It’s Philippe, rather, who best exemplifies the 
neurotic profile. 
As mentioned, Philippe’s analysis is cut short by his tragic death: 
he crashes his car into a median at the fork of a motorway, one route 
leading to one of his male sexual partners, and the other to his 
girlfriend. Pace André, it’s entirely possible that Philippe’s suicide has 
more to do with his failure to extricate himself from his capture by a 
phobic ideology that caustically abjects male sexual receptivity, than 
it does with the effects of a perverse or fetishistic psychic structure. 
In any case, according to the mainstream of analytic literature, the 
pervert, unlike the neurotic, rarely has problems achieving libidinal 
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satisfaction, isn’t ordinarily depressive, and for these reasons seldom 
comes knocking on the psychoanalyst’s door. 
No doubt my hypothesis requires a closer look at André’s 
presentation of Philippe’s case. My aim will be to show that cases like 
Philippe’s can be mistaken for instances of perversion because of an 
ambient phobia of male anal eroticism, from which analytic literature 
often fails to extricate itself. Another factor is a hardly uncommon 
resistance within the Lacanian clinical field itself to the entirely 
orthodox Freudian thesis according to which many subjects of both 
biological sexes are cross-sexuated. This is to say that these subjects 
confront the impasse of jouissance in language in a manner associated 
with the other sex. 
Philippe is a young, university-educated man who interrupts 
his post-secondary studies to become a fashion model for industry 
magazines and couture houses in Milan and elsewhere. Although 
he enjoys tremendous professional success, a condition of paralysing 
anxiety brings him to analysis and causes him to ask himself the 
question: ‘am I or am I not homosexual, and must I live in this 
manner?’ (180). Although left without comment by André, Philippe’s 
formulation of the question concerning the nature of his desire 
betrays the considerable extent of his internalisation of phobic value 
judgments about what we call sexual orientation. Nevertheless, during 
his analysis Philippe speaks of frequenting what André calls hard 
homosexual establishments, and engaging in oral sex with a number 
of his male acquaintances in the fashion world. Although he considers 
acts of fellatio and mutual masturbation with male friends a normal 
feature of life in his professional environment, Philippe suffers painful 
intuitions of guilt in response to his desires with respect to other men.
Further, Philippe’s discourse suggests that his sexual life is 
characterised by a significant degree of compulsiveness. As André 
relates, throughout this period of homosexual activity, Philippe 
maintains a ‘more or less stable’ (180) relationship with a woman. 
Successful sexual relations with his female partner often require, 
however, the conjuring of a fantasy of a man in briefs. A crisis of anxiety 
and confusion strikes Philippe when a male acquaintance invites him 
for an evening of sexual activity featuring fist-fucking. Fascinated and 
repulsed in equal measure, Philippe responds non-committally. He 
proceeds to wander through the streets of Milan in a state of acute 
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disorientation, impulsively giving away the contents of his wallet to a 
woman who asks him for money. Managing to direct his ambulation to 
Milan’s famous Duomo, Philippe experiences a full-on attack of panic 
while gazing upwards at a statue in the dome of the cathedral depicting 
the Lord God placing a crown on Jesus’s head.
André’s interpretation of this key sequence of events provides 
crucial evidence of the clinical points of reference at work in his 
understanding of the perverse structure in its questionable relation 
to male homosexuality. As I’ve already suggested, this interpretation 
also bears witness to a common theoretical regression in the Lacanian 
clinical field. This regression detracts from the analyst’s ability to come 
to terms with the sexuation of some neurotic subjects who think they 
might be, or explicitly identify as, homosexual. Had he accepted the 
acquaintance’s sexual invitation, André explains, Philippe in his own 
mind would have placed himself definitively ‘among the homosexuals’. 
More precisely, the prospect of anal penetration for Philippe carries 
with it what André describes as ‘an acceptance of castration, here 
understood on the most real level’ (182). We should note that André 
doesn’t specify at this juncture which form of castration, masculine or 
feminine, such an acceptance would imply. Concerning the compulsive 
monetary offer Philippe makes to the woman on the street, André 
avers that his patient here ‘behaves as a man’ in the sense that he ‘gives 
a gift of what he has (the phallus) to the one who lacks it’ (182). 
As for the final climactic event of Philippe’s narrative, namely his 
panicked viewing of the coronation statue, André suggests that it calls 
into question for a second time Philippe’s masculine identification. 
On one level, God’s crowning of his son allegorises the generational 
transmission of the phallic signifier, and this transmission occurs in 
tandem with the bodily sacrifice at the centre of the scriptural Passion. 
This means, for André, that the episode represents on another level both 
a refusal of the paternal phallic gift, and the assumption of a passive 
position with respect to the father. Significantly, after the cathedral 
episode, Philippe experiences recurring attacks of panic, engages in 
compulsive and anonymous sexual encounters, and bears witness to 
fantasies of anal penetration, which incite violently guilty self-accusa-
tions. For André, the emphasis Philippe places on sensations of anal 
excitation during his attacks suggests ‘an identification with the hole, 
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on the model of the female genitalia (or a cloaque [an animal’s anal or 
urinary orifice])’ (186). 
Like Dany, during his childhood Philippe entertained a relation with 
his mother that André qualifies as complicitous. Going further, the 
analyst considers his patient’s choice of profession to be an unconscious 
response to the lavish attention the mother accorded to her son’s 
boyhood body. Insisting on bathing him well into his adolescence, 
she took care, André underlines, not to call attention to his penis with 
her soapy touch. In this way, according to André, Philippe’s mother 
positions her son as an imaginary phallus – a self-enclosed, asexual 
unity designed to keep jouissance at bay. Further marginalising the 
agency of the father in the familial symbolic environment, Philippe’s 
mother confesses to her son that her marriage was a forced and 
desperate attempt at self-preservation in the face of a difficult material 
situation stemming from her own mother’s death. 
At this crucial point of his case history, André begins to explore 
the dynamic of what he calls Philippe’s fetishism, insisting that 
the patient’s homosexuality is tied structurally to a denial of ‘the 
anatomical difference between the sexes’ as well as the ‘castration 
that revealed to him the female sex organs’ (186). Yet, Philippe tells 
his analyst that he experienced his first orgasm while masturbating 
and inhaling the odour of a pair of briefs his father had left on the 
bathroom floor. In a searching, if not desperate, tone, André then 
writes that a few moments earlier Philippe had been viewing rep-
resentations of the female sex organs in a book of sexual education 
given to him by his parents. André qualifies Philippe’s first orgasm 
as the instigating moment of a ‘central perverse fantasy’ involving an 
acute ‘desire to see men in briefs’. The perverse nature of the fantasy is 
rationalised through the notion that men’s briefs, ‘more surely than a 
woman’s bikini’, reassure Philippe that there is ‘something behind the 
veil’ (186), even if this something remains hidden from sight.
To be sure, it’s a central tenet in Lacan’s teaching that the phallus 
functions ‘only when veiled’. This implies that the penis, if it’s to have 
any chance at all of standing in for the phallic signifier of absolute 
and impossible jouissance, has to remain hidden from view. On my 
reading of the case history, however, it’s not in fact clear why André 
chooses to qualify Philippe’s enthusiasm for images of men in briefs 
as perverse in the strong clinical sense – that is, as a denial of sexual 
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difference and the form of castration based on its acknowledgment in 
the unconscious. As we recall, André describes Philippe’s anxious and 
directionless wandering through the streets of Milan as a consequence 
of what he calls a literal castration, which the prospect of being 
fist-fucked presents. Clearly, Philippe’s marked discomfort at the 
moment he receives the invitation evokes a deeply traumatic fantasy 
of anal receptivity which, in André’s own interpretation of events, 
presupposes a dramatic and radical experience of castration. 
Set against André’s account of the father’s domestic marginalisation 
and the clinical narrative of the briefs fantasy, Philippe’s case appears 
to deviate from the dynamic that characterises the Freudian boy’s 
predicament. This is to say, in Lacanian terms, Philippe’s castration 
seems at odds with the logic of masculine sexuation. We can ask at this 
juncture why André doesn’t choose to link Philippe’s psychic structure 
with feminine sexuation – that is, with the castration of the Freudian 
girl. In this alternative scenario, the phallic fantasy object veiled by the 
briefs is recharacterised, changing from a perverse manifestation of 
the maternal phallus (what Lacan calls the hommelle) to the symbolic 
paternal phallus, which inspires desire for the one who has it. The 
briefs, after all, belong to the father, and no evidence is given to support 
the premise of any unconscious maternal significance. 
I should stress here that my main intention isn’t simply to assert 
that André misdiagnoses his patients. Rather, the point is to underline 
how the logic of the analyst’s interpretation fails to acknowledge the 
possibility that Philippe has undergone feminine castration, in other 
words unconsciously registers phallic lack without the intervention of 
the father. Even more consequentially, André’s clinical logic effectively 
renders unthinkable the existence of what I would call an actually 
existing form of neurotic (as opposed to perverse), and male (as 
opposed to masculine), homosexuality. 
I’ve already pointed out that the patient whom André describes as a 
homosexual neurotic, namely Marc, not only never has sexual relations 
of any kind with another man during the period of his analysis, but 
also never gives evidence of a consistent desire to do so. In fact, Marc 
frames his erotic ambitions, as if to dispel all doubt, around an explicitly 
heterosexual aim. In the case of Philippe, André characterises a male 
subject’s adoption, as his object of fantasy, of a veiled image of the 
male member as, by definition, a fetishistic phallicisation linked to a 
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denial of sexual difference, here construed in anatomical, as opposed 
to psychical, terms. Indeed, at the crucial moment when he describes 
Philippe’s structure as perverse, André conveniently forgets the 
fundamental Freudo-Lacanian thesis about sexual difference – namely 
that it’s not of the order of anatomy and biology. 
The classic post-Freudian qualification of perversion as a denial of 
sexual difference, too often left in a fog of vagueness, must be qualified 
in such a way as to take account of what I’ve called cross-sexuation. 
If sexual difference, psychoanalytically conceived, is indeed not 
the same as anatomical sexual difference – a point which André, as 
a self-described Lacanian, would surely be forced to concede – then 
we can no longer assume that any male subject’s libidinal investment 
in images and representations of masculinity or virility is a displaced 
manifestation of the perverse denial of the mother’s castration. 
Under the hypothesis of cross-sexuation, the neurotic form of male 
homosexuality would then indeed be marked by sexual difference 
insofar as, psychically, the male homosexual experiences, or can 
experience, a specifically feminine castration. In this precise sense, 
what the homosexual seeks in his partner is in fact the other sex. 
Surprisingly, perhaps, this critical assessment of André’s 
interpretation of the case of Philippe can actually lend support to his 
view of male homosexual subcultures as cults of virility. It was Lacan 
himself, after all, who said that the display of virility is a properly 
feminine phenomenon.9 Further, it’s not clear why gay cultures 
would be so concerned with the acquisition of the accoutrements of 
an idealised masculine embodiment if masculinity were not precisely 
an object of desire, rather than something simply achieved, however 
problematically, through sexuation itself. 
Moreover, the intense investment in embodiment characteristic of 
male homosexual subcultures gains further in analytic significance 
when we consider that, in imaginary terms, the idealised object of 
desire and the ego of narcissism aren’t sexually differentiated for gay 
men as they would be for their straight counterparts. This might mean 
that the pursuit of virility acquires a plastic, mobile quality, which 
distributes its aims between the body of the desired object and the 
subject’s own body-image. On the level of the imaginary, in other 
words, the sexy body the male homosexual desires ‘out there’ (at the 
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disco) and the one he wants ‘for himself ’ (by working out at the gym) 
are one and the same.
From I to a: the Beyond of Sexual Identification
These last comments evoke what can only be described as the neurotic 
elements of the male homosexual economy. Before exploring what 
might lie beyond gay neurosis, however, it will be wise to anticipate, 
with the dominant assumptions of contemporary queer and feminist 
theories in mind, a couple of the more obvious objections to what 
I’ve put forward concerning the involvement of (one type of ) male 
homosexuality in feminine sexuation. 
First, my hypothesis in no way equates male homosexuality with 
transsexualism. The male homosexual, although clearly vexed in 
childhood and adolescence by intuitions of difference with respect 
to other subjects who share his bodily sexual traits, doesn’t generally 
question his biological sex; doesn’t bear witness to being ‘trapped’ 
inside the wrong-sexed body. 
Unlike Dany, for instance, Philippe doesn’t ask if he’s a man or 
a woman; his question of the Other is framed, rather, within the 
terms of today’s post-sexological discourse of sexual orientation. 
Secondly, and of equal importance, the idea of cross-sexuation I wish 
to propose in this chapter is indifferent to gender. By this I mean that 
being cross-sexuated in the manner I’ve described carries no necessary 
consequences for how this subject appears in the social world with 
respect to dominant ideologies of masculinity and femininity. The 
difference of the cross-sexuated subject is therefore to be located on the 
level of his or her speech, more specifically with respect to the way this 
speech stumbles upon the real of sex – the bedrock of sexual difference, 
as it were – and not in terms of the positive qualities (attributes or 
predicates) of this subject. 
Provided we divest the notion of inversion – which Marcel Proust, 
for one, deemed a more appropriate moniker than homosexuality – 
of its personalising reference to a soulful essence, and also take the 
reference to woman not as evidence that every gay man is a closet drag 
performer, but rather as a signifier for the mode in which (some) male 
homosexuals desire, we can agree with Leo Bersani when he writes 
about that prolific and hypochondriacal French novelist that:
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‘homosexuality’ can’t describe the attraction of one male to another 
male if, according to the popular notion that Proust appears to accept, 
such men have a woman’s soul. As others have noted, this rules out 
the same-sex desire it claims to account for. Homosexuality is just 
an illusion; what looks like a man desiring another man is actually a 
woman longing for sex with a man.10 
To be sure, Proust’s literary discourse on femininity in male 
homosexuality is burdened by the psychological rhetoric of inversion, 
which the modernist sexual ideologies inherited from mid-nineteenth- 
to late nineteenth-century sexology. Indeed, the idea of a female soul 
in a male body to which the term inversion gives expression, is linked 
more closely in conceptual terms with the classic feminist distinction 
between (biological) sex and (sociocultural or psychological) gender 
than it is with the properly psychoanalytic notion of sexual difference. 
In short, the inversion idea takes for granted socially determined 
meanings for masculinity and femininity, and then defines the male 
invert along rather crude behavioural lines as the subject who gives 
expression to a feminine soul.
By contrast, Lacan’s Freudian concept of sexuation situates itself 
on another level, at the impossible intersection of speech and the real. 
By definition, this intersection remains inexpressible within the terms 
of the sociosymbolic contract. Whereas the discourse of inversion 
implicitly defines desire in accordance with how positive qualities of 
the personality accord or conflict with hegemonic gender ideologies, 
psychoanalysis claims instead that sex is what remains after all such 
expressions of the subject have been exhausted. Psychoanalytically, 
sex refers to the mode – ‘male’ or ‘female’ – by which such expressions 
always fail to express the subject’s sexual essence or identity. 
This being said, Bersani’s commentary on Proust’s interpretation 
of inversion makes tangible an illuminating paradox. Although, 
indeed, the male homosexual loves ‘the other as the same’ (128), and 
in this sense bears witness to a desire inscribed in what Bersani calls 
homo-ness, this desire is subject to the real of sexual difference if one 
considers that what’s inverted is the subject’s sexuation, and not his 
soul, personality, identity or other such metaphysical construct. If 
we suppose that the trajectory of the male subject who will come to 
experience homosexual desire is, or at any rate can be, marked by 
Penney T02732 01 text   170 08/10/2013   08:16
the sameness  of sexual difference
171
the immediate and actualised (unconscious) experience of castration 
that Freud discusses in relation to the girl – ‘she accepts castration as 
an accomplished fact’,11 he writes – then in speaking of the gay man, 
André must qualify his castration as imaginary only because he makes 
the following very specific and unwarranted assumption: since the 
male subject bears a penis, he must necessarily become a speaking 
subject in a fashion that positions him as having, or rather as supposed 
to have, the phallus. 
Under the hypothesis that some male subjects experience a 
symbolic castration of the feminine kind, what will be imaginarised, 
to use André’s term, is not the maternal phallus, but rather a phallus 
positioned on decidedly paternal, that is to say masculine, terrain. In 
this precise sense, male homosexual desire features no relation to the 
logic of fetishism, which is centred on the fantasy of the phallic mother. 
On the level of his neurosis, then, this male subject would tend to 
locate the impossible, absolute jouissance that his castration forbids 
him within a male body, one which can then serve as a prototype not 
only for his erotic object, but for his ‘own’ alienated, imaginary one as 
well. Insofar as there can be such an imaginary convergence between 
the gay man’s fantasised object and the body he wants to incarnate or 
become, he seeks himself in his partner – that is, one could say, the 
same in the other. 
However, the hyperphallic body that captures his desire emerges 
from the feminine space of lack. This ensures that the gay male subject 
can only fail to ‘find himself ’, as it were, in his Other. That there can be no 
relation between the gay man and his partner becomes especially clear 
when we consider that this non-coincidence of desire and object occurs 
not only on the level of the subject himself, but also ‘in’ his partner, 
such that the non-relation of homosexuality might be figured as the 
coexistence of two instances of the same non-complementarity. This 
formula distinguishes somewhat the impasse of homosexuality from 
the one that occurs in the heterosexual non-relation. Where heterosex-
uality reaches an impasse by virtue of the mutually exclusive terrains 
of the different masculine and feminine fantasies, homosexuality hits 
the rock of the real in consequence of the paradoxical incompatibil-
ity of two subjects harbouring the same fantasy structure. The basic 
psychoanalytic point to be made here is that any attempt to theorise 
a homosexual relation that would compensate for, indeed redeem, 
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the failure of heterosexuality is to be avoided at all costs. Any such 
attempt must be dismissed as necessarily ideological, and therefore 
‘homonormative’, to put a somewhat different spin on the term Jasbir 
Puar’s work introduces into queer theory.12
Now, this premise of a homosexual non-relation has the benefit of 
enabling an illuminating appraisal of various aspects of what we might 
call the male homosexual unconscious. Neurosis, for gay men as for 
anyone else, has the function of disguising the uncomfortable truth 
that there is no sexual relation, as Lacan famously said, to which we 
can now add of any kind. We can understand in this light not only the 
persistence within gay fantasmatics of the inaccessible and effortlessly 
masculine straight partner who never, of course, returns the gay 
subject’s desire, but also the related mystique of the authentic ‘top’ who 
would derive satisfaction from penetrating only male partners. 
Is it possible that the pathological coupling of the hysteric and 
the pervert in the heterosexual world finds a rough equivalent in 
the culture of male homosexuality in the form of the (active) male 
fetishist and the (passive) gay man? To what extent does the fetishist’s 
inability unconsciously to acknowledge female lack cause him to seek 
substitutive satisfactions with a passive male partner? Would this 
in turn imply that the neurotic male homosexual carries a certain 
vulnerability vis-à-vis other male subjects who experience difficulties 
with masculine castration? And finally, to the extent that they elaborate 
their fetish according to the classic Freudian paradigm of fetishism – 
as a means of resisting homosexuality – do these latter subjects tend 
towards a phobic form of acting out, either as a means of buttressing 
their own resistance to (passive) homosexuality, or else repressing their 
sexual attraction to other men? 
It will be comparatively uncontroversial, I would imagine, to claim 
that the more politically radical, or at any rate avowedly socialist, wings 
of the various gay and lesbian movements have faded into relative 
obscurity during the past three decades or so, largely because of broader 
global political trends lacking any manifest relation to sexuality. These 
trends resulted from the reactionary attacks, beginning in the 1970s, 
against the achievements of the post-war welfare state, as well as the 
devastating ideological consequences of the collapse of the Eastern 
bloc and the end of the Cold War. 
Penney T02732 01 text   172 08/10/2013   08:16
the sameness  of sexual difference
173
From the psychoanalytic perspective, however, it’s possible to say 
that gay men, during the period just evoked, may have succumbed, in 
response to increased social recognition and acceptance, to a confusion 
of the two psychic agencies Lacan called I and a. These agencies refer, 
respectively, to the idealised symbolic point of identification (what 
Freud called the ego ideal), and the traumatic, real object-cause of 
desire: the object located on the level of the drive. 
Lacan distinguishes between these two agencies of psychic life in 
the context of a gloss on Freud’s schema presented in Group Psychology 
and the Analysis of the Ego. ‘There is an essential difference’, Lacan says, 
‘between the object defined as narcissistic, the i(a), and the function 
of the a’. He adds that ‘the fundamental mainspring [ressort] of the 
analytic operation is the maintenance of the distance’ between the I – 
identification – and the a.13 The mechanism of separation that Lacan 
considers integral to the analytic process implies the extrication of the 
real object of enjoyment from both forms of the ego, imaginary and 
symbolic. This implies that psychoanalysis puts into effect a reversal 
of the dynamic Freud describes as characteristic of hypnosis. In other 
words, analysis forces the patient to experience the analyst as a stupid, 
inert, ‘hypnotised’ automaton devoid of concrete knowledge of its 
desire. Crucially, the knowledge the patient finds lacking in the analyst 
includes the knowledge that could relate the patient’s enigmatic desire 
to the classificatory framework of sexual orientation. 
I’ve speculated that one of the particularities of male homosexuality 
is the relative ease with which the idealised object can be integrated into 
the circuit of narcissism due to the shared sexual biomorphology of 
subject and partner. If this is indeed the case, then it might be possible 
that gay men, more readily than their heterosexual counterparts, try 
to elevate the libidinal object of the drive through idealisation as a 
means of circumventing its disruptive emergence. This would only 
underline the crucial importance for homosexually inclined men 
to work towards the separation to which Lacan refers. The goal is to 
separate the object of jouissance from the idealised, erotically invested 
narcissistic object. The object of jouissance is the one that effectively 
interrupts the subject’s self-relation, and spoils its ambition to feel ‘at 
home’ in its own subjectivity. 
The separation I’m attempting to evoke requires us to acknowledge 
that the object causing the desire that can be qualified as homosexual 
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is not the beautiful, seemingly self-contained, gym-trained, 
hypermasculine body of, say, Tom of Finland’s men, but rather an 
altogether different object – partial, decorporealised, unsettling, 
formless, uncanny – more akin to Tim Dean’s invaluable trope 
of the turd. Such an acknowledgment might have the benefit not 
only of knocking the postmodern queer subject off the treadmill of 
consumerism, integration, conformity, productivity and compulsive 
sexual activity that continues to fuel mainstream homosexual 
subcultures in what is called the West. Also, it might train his eye to 
see those invisible subjects in the gay world who, for reasons of ‘race’, 
socioeconomic position and – here the word fits the context – gender, 
will never make it into the pages of Genre, The Advocate, Têtu or Out. 
These are the turds of the gay social world, turds whose staunch 
persistence under the collective radar of the sublime gay lifestyle’s 
enthusiasts betrays the illusory and deeply ideological truth of the 
post-Stonewall construct of the brotherhood of men – white, elite-
educated, upper-middle-class, freshly gentrified gay village-residing 
– that my imagination conjures up when I hear the phrase ‘gay 
community’. 
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From the Antisocial  
to the Immortal
The investigation of male homosexuality in the previous chapter is intended in part as an intervention in the psychoanalytic clinical discourse on this topic. To some readers, it may have 
seemed out of place. However, I view this intervention as central to 
the concerns of the book as a whole, because it helps to demonstrate 
the irreconcilability of psychoanalytic ethics with the ‘sexual politics’ 
with which several decades of feminist and homosexual theory and 
activism have acquainted us. Although it has often betrayed itself on 
this point, Freudian psychoanalysis since its inception has featured, 
and this is no exaggeration, a strongly anti-homophobic message. 
After all, it was Freud himself who announced that he had never failed 
to find a significant ‘current of homosexuality’ in the unconscious of 
every patient he had ever treated.1 And famously, Freud’s tenuous 
belief in an ideal libidinal normalisation belied by the rest of his theory 
only faintly tarnished his otherwise laudable and radically before-
its-time response to the letter of a young homosexual’s concerned 
American mother.2 
Yet, psychoanalysis also teaches us that, in an important sense, 
sexuality as such is beyond politicisation. This is so to the extent that 
who we are, as subjects of the unconscious, is ultimately unknowable, 
unfathomable – a hypothesis, as Lacan rigorously argued. This 
hypothesis has both logical and ethical aspects. The analysis of 
symptoms reveals a signifying logic. This logic indexes, however 
unverifiably, a traumatic cause that effectively is the subject. Also, 
the speculative reconstruction of this subject, the ethical mission 
that Lacan sutures to the proper name ‘Freud’, can only be an end in 
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itself, one which is categorically distinct from any ‘good’ with which 
some might wish, disastrously, to wed the psychoanalytic project. It 
was perhaps Lacan’s most lasting contribution to psychoanalysis that 
he defended with such unwavering ferocity this unconscious subject’s 
absolute sovereignty. For Lacan, the attribution of any normative 
political meaning whatsoever to the unconscious subject is tantamount 
to a gross ethical betrayal of Freud’s analytic desire. 
However inauspicious the premise at first will seem, I want to 
argue nonetheless that it’s precisely the apolitical essence of the 
psychoanalytic subject – that is, this subject’s coincidence with the 
monstrously inhuman kernel of humanity that subverts the very form 
of the political good – that allows us to link the psychoanalytic project to 
the tradition of revolutionary political universalism. By revolutionary 
I mean to describe a politics based on two primary assumptions: first, 
that thoroughgoing social change is not only possible, but that its 
possibility is signalled by the very conservative doctrine that insists on 
its impossibility; and second, that the possibility of this change isn’t 
discernible from within the logic of the social situation in which this 
change is speculatively, counterintuitively, imagined. 
My argument rests on a distinction between what, above, I termed 
political meaning and politics proper. Politics proper identifies the 
political with a rupture in established political meaning. Simply 
put, politics is what emerges when something happens that can’t be 
articulated by, is dismissed as ‘impossible’ within, existing political 
and social knowledges. What psychoanalysis most consequentially 
shares with such a politics is its insistence on the legitimacy of a truth 
of subjectivity located on another scene: a scene distinct from, and 
inassimilable to, the sociosubjective world upheld and defended by 
what Freud called ego libido. 
As we’ve seen, the psychoanalytic subject can’t be directly known; 
it can only be retroactively pieced together through the analysis 
of its signifying dysfunction. For its part, political subjectivity, as 
conceived by Alain Badiou, bears a problematic relation to an event, 
which necessarily fails to register in the terms of available social 
knowledges – ‘opinion’, as Badiou prefers, disparagingly, to say. From 
the perspective of politics proper, then, we can assert that the subject 
of the unconscious is caused by a rupture in the field of existing 
Penney T02732 01 text   176 08/10/2013   08:16
from the antisocial to the immortal
177
political knowledge. The consequence of this is that the elaboration 
of this subjectivity will necessarily reform this political knowledge in 
previously inconceivable ways. 
In his seminar L’acte psychanalytique (1967–1968), Lacan began 
to develop the idea that the necessarily failed attempt in the clinic to 
signify the subject can nonetheless radically transform the dynamic 
of this subject’s relation to its sociosymbolic world. In an imperfectly 
analogous way, Badiou in his writing conceives of political work as the 
tracing of the consequences of a disruptive event, a ‘truth procedure’ 
which has the potential literally to transform what it’s possible to 
think in a given political situation. The psychoanalytic subject and 
the political subject share the key feature that they remain irreducible 
to, unexpressed by, the ambient discourses that work to perpetuate 
their indiscernibility. Given the disjunction between the subject and 
knowledge – in other words, the fact that no proof can establish a 
relation between them – a curious and deeply illiberal short-circuit 
is established between what is falsely understood by the distinction 
between the subject as person and its social beyond. This short-circuit 
finally puts paid to the ideology of the individual by substituting for it 
the truth of a strangely intimate, but properly transpersonal, subjectivity. 
In Lacanian psychoanalytic practice, only the patient can bear 
final witness to the event of subjectivity encountered in the clinic. 
It’s up to the patient, not the analyst, to decide when he has gone far 
enough to take account of, and responsibility for, his own subjective 
structure. This structure is then rendered as an impersonal formula 
that connects what we consider most particular about subjectivity to 
generic and transindividual psychical paradigms (neurosis, subdivided 
into hysteria and obsessional neurosis; psychosis; perversion). This is 
what Lacan meant when he said that the analyst ne s’autorise que de 
lui-même.3 She can only legitimate her practice, and the knowledge on 
which it rests, herself through what effectively amounts to a traversal 
of personhood. 
Further, in revolutionary politics the subject encounters the event in 
a way that significantly shifts the terms of his world. But this ‘personal’ 
witnessing, this attitude of fidelity towards that which transforms 
us, violently takes us out of ourselves, all the while connecting in a 
properly uncanny way our most apparently intimate experience to a 
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register of impersonality characterised by an indifference to difference. 
Subjectivated by the political event, we subtract ourselves from the field 
of substantive markers of identity – heterosexual or homosexual; Jew, 
Muslim, Hindu, Christian; black, white, yellow, brown – to ‘refind’ 
ourselves ‘outside’, as it were, in a movement of generic subjectivity. 
Transported by this modality of indifference, what distinguishes 
me from others, including in particular my sexuality, ceases to bear 
significant consequences for thought. 
‘It is certainly not by renouncing the concrete universality of truths 
in order to affirm the rights of ‘minorities’, be they racial, religious, 
national, or sexual’, writes Badiou, ‘that the devastation [of financial 
globalisation] will be slowed down’. Indeed, there most certainly exists 
what Badiou calls a ‘despicable complicity between the globalized 
logic of capital and French identitarian fanaticism’.4 For my purposes, 
Badiou’s reference to the xenophobic and crypto-fascist policies of 
Jean-Marie (and now Marine) Le Pen’s Front national can be taken to 
refer more generally to identitarian passion as such – in other words, 
our passionate attachment to those signifiers of belonging that serve 
to differentiate my individual, and our collective, interests from the 
interests of the shapeless people in their generic and threateningly 
anonymous multiplicity. 
In fact, I would go even further than Badiou does. As we know, 
queer theory since its inception has been invested in the dismantling 
of categories of identity related to gender and sexuality, viewed as 
normative categories of social knowledge. As I’ve argued in a variety 
of contexts throughout this book, however, it’s not at all clear that the 
‘subversion of identity’ doesn’t in fact reassert identity’s centrality by 
the very means of its putative, and typically ambivalent, negation. 
It’s time to substitute the left-deconstructionist motif of subversion 
with the contrasting, properly neutral, attitude of indifference. 
Although everyone can’t help but perceive ‘socially constructed’ 
differences of gender and sexuality on the level of appearances, these 
differences are devoid of consequences for political thought. I would 
only add to this thesis the proviso that for psychoanalysis, sexual 
difference is not a phenomenal difference of this kind. In this sense, 
the ethical indifference to difference must remain in tension with the 
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non-heterosexist iteration of the psychoanalytic position, which I fully 
endorse, that there are only two (psychical) sexes.5 
Deathly Queer
One of the most radically negative and potentially universalising 
formulations of queerness can be found in the work of Lee Edelman, 
whose provocative No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive has 
been adopted, alongside Leo Bersani’s writing,6 as a linchpin of the 
so-called antisocial turn in queer theory writ large. 
Although, officially, it aims to outline a negative political logic that 
moves beyond a merely oppositional stance, Edelman’s version of 
queerness defines itself nonetheless against what he calls ‘reproductive 
futurism’.7 This phrase refers to an all-encompassing ideological 
framework which, in his view, draws for its libidinal support on a 
fantasy centred around the image of the child. For Edelman, the 
seductively conservative power of this image enforces the ‘absolute 
privilege of heteronormativity’, a privilege he views as the ‘organizing 
principle of communal relations’ (2). In other words, the child is the 
very horizon of meaning for social life as such. 
Edelman’s work as a whole mounts a ferocious attack against the 
‘family values’ fetishisation of a certain construction of childhood as 
a time of pre-sexual innocence that paradoxically grounds the very 
possibility of the future. As monotheism does for the hereafter, this 
ideal of childhood installs the future as society’s very raison d’être. 
Defining queerness as a kind of immanent resistance to the terms of a 
social life turned to the future in this sense, Edelman enjoins his queer-
identified reader to resist the calls for positive alternatives that purely 
negative critical enterprises such as his own routinely come up against. 
Significantly, Edelman develops an interpretation of Freud’s idea of the 
death drive to oppose any and all mobilisations of the category of ‘the 
Good’. That is, Edelman bravely denies the basic premise that a politics 
must advocate for any positive social value or order whatsoever. 
In my view, Edelman’s development of the significance of the 
death drive is sound to the extent that the death drive and the terms 
that define the social world’s intelligibility make up the terms of an 
antinomy. In other words, the unresolvable tension between the two 
terms exposes an underlying disjunction between the psychic and the 
Penney T02732 01 text   179 08/10/2013   08:16
after queer theory
180
social that can never be rejoined. Although the text demonstrates no 
awareness of the link, Edelman’s insistence on society’s inconsistency, 
on the constitutive inability of any social order to effect a gesture of 
absolute inclusion, covers the same theoretical ground on which Slavoj 
Žižek treads when he writes about what he calls political ontology’s 
‘absent centre’.8 Žižek develops this thematic in dialogue with the 
work of French post-Althusserians Alain Badiou, Étienne Balibar and 
Jacques Rancière. 
Importantly, Edelman claims that queerness signals not merely 
the abjected outside of social arrangements – that is, those persons 
or groups who cannot be represented or remain unintelligible within 
an existing hegemonic field. This premise assumes that with a 
programme of expansive reform, for instance, queers could potentially 
be integrated with the existing social logic. Rather, Edelman claims for 
queerness a more radical negativity that exposes the inconsistency of 
the social as such. This negativity throws the very terms of the social 
into incoherence or disarray. 
Now, any reader with even a cursory knowledge will have already 
remarked that Edelman’s position runs against the tenets of the most 
fundamental assumptions of the socialist tradition in political thought. 
Indeed, the admirable doctrinal discipline with which Edelman 
restricts his argument’s articulation to a purely negative mode seems 
designed to provoke or invite accusations of nihilism. Edelman’s 
enlistment of psychoanalysis, and more specifically the work of 
Lacan, therefore poses an urgent question concerning the problematic 
relationship that inheres both historically and theoretically between 
the Freudian tradition and revolutionary socialist politics. In short, 
No Future implies that psychoanalytic theory is incompatible with any 
politics based on a sense of hope for a better future. In the rest of this 
section I will try to develop why I think this argument is wrong. 
As Edelman uncompromisingly develops the concept, the death 
drive discredits by implication all political thought, to the extent that 
this thought remains wedded to an idea of the future attributed with 
teleological, narrative, redemptive or progressive qualities. To be sure 
– Edelman’s training is literary, not philosophical – this thematic of 
futurism encompasses a broad cross-section of ideas of time that haven’t 
always been associated with one another in the philosophical tradition. 
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Nonetheless, the concept is designed, none too subtly, to sweep 
away in a single gesture all thinking about time based on any of these 
four basic assumptions: (a) that time has a predetermined end; in other 
words, that the future will come to fruition at some definitive moment; 
(b) that time tells a story with, as they say, a beginning, a middle and an 
end; (c) that the future contains a transcendental horizon, which will 
bestow retrospective significance on past failures, on past suffering; and 
(d) that things can or will get better as time goes by. In sum, Edelman’s 
discourse aims to ‘refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation’. In 
his view, this insistence ‘is always affirmation of an order whose refusal 
will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane’ (4). 
The problem with Edelman’s position at the most fundamental 
level relates to its undialectical notion of a radically pure brand of 
negativity. Arguably, this version of the negative sees Edelman shirk 
responsibility for the content of his own argument. For example, 
Edelman denies the ‘imperative to immure [his stance or argument] in 
some stable and positive form’ (4). Now, Edelman understands Lacan’s 
concept of ‘the Symbolic’ to mean that ‘nothing, and certainly not what 
we call the “good”, can ever have any assurance at all’ (4). The difficulty 
lies not in the statement itself, but rather in Edelman’s assumption 
that it isn’t a position – in other words, an argument that’s as much 
obliged to offer support for itself as any other. Edelman’s radical 
negativity unhelpfully ignores the enunciative paradox that makes of 
the denial of the legitimacy of any statement as much of a statement as 
any positive assertion. Further, the argument makes the unnecessary 
assumption that any construct of ‘the good’ must be amenable to 
symbolic accommodation; that the normativity it prescribes must 
conservatively uphold a positive value, which could be articulated in 
the terms that constitute ambient social knowledge. 
Like so much of the significantly American poststructuralist political 
hyperscepticism with which it shares its main features, Edelman’s 
nihilistic attack makes the associated and fatal mistake of placing all 
allusions to the future in thought under the banner of what Lacan calls 
the imaginary. In other words, Edelman’s discussion assumes that a 
retrograde belief in a time to come when all social antagonism, all 
conflict and dissatisfaction, all psychopathology has been eradicated, 
inheres analytically, as Kant would say, in the very concept of futurity. 
Edelman proceeds as if there’s no other way to think about the future; 
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all this imaginary baggage comes unalterably pre-packaged whenever 
we attempt to think through what comes next. 
By contrast, Lacan himself had a different and subtler way of 
conceiving of the subject’s desiring relation to time’s unfolding. In his 
Rome Discourse, for instance, Lacan emphasised the importance to 
psychoanalysis of the future perfect (futur antérieur), the verbal tense 
that looks back at the past from a hypothetical moment to come.9 
Clinically, the analysand looks forward to a time when its impenetrable 
symptom will have acquired an explanatory meaning, which in turn 
has an impact of the symptom’s significance in the present. The future 
perfect also illuminates Freud’s idea that the threat of castration has 
a period of latency: castration anxiety will only set in after the boy’s 
perception of female lack has retrospectively provided the threat with 
a concrete, redoubtable consequence. In short, the present becomes 
what it is only from the retrospective point of view of a future moment, 
at which point, of course, it has itself become part of the past. 
Lacan also developed in his teaching a related idea of logical time, 
premised on the notion that any act or utterance must be based on what 
he calls anticipated certitude. Somewhat analogously, this concept 
implies the projection into the future of a hypothetical certainty, which 
provides a fictitious rationale for one’s intervention in the present.10 
In other words, we can only justify a present action on the assumption 
that some missing piece of knowledge will become available in the 
future to support our decision in the here-and-now. 
For Lacan, psychoanalytic temporality’s dependence on an 
irreducible reference, however projective, to the future is a consequence 
of time’s mediation by language, by the signifier. Thus, Edelman’s 
speculations about a queer present made possible by the radical 
negation of the future abstracts undesirably from the subject’s circum-
scription by language – the very same ‘symbolic’, in other words, on 
which the rest of his argument fundamentally depends. 
We can make the same point with reference to the psychoanalytic 
concept of the transference. From this perspective, Edelman’s 
argument discounts the irreducibility of our transferential investment 
in the Other. As Lacan argued with his axiom les non-dupes errent 
(those who are not duped err), it’s never a wise move to think that 
our knowledge and actions don’t assume an unconscious belief in 
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the Other’s future consistency – the very same consistency that our 
intellectual arguments and rationalisations will insistently deny. 
Simply put, Edelman’s argument fails to take account of desire 
in time. Therefore, the absolute present he wishes to associate with 
queerness simply isn’t possible. Pace Edelman, the future can be 
conceived with perfect legitimacy. But this is so only if our idea of the 
future takes the form of the past of a projected later moment. There is 
no guarantee that, at this later moment, things won’t be significantly 
different than they are now; that a horizon-changing event might by 
that time have taken place. 
Crucially for my own argument, psychoanalytic temporality is thus 
a temporality of discontinuity. This temporality features moments 
of disorienting and unthinkable, and therefore radical, change. Not 
only can this change be assessed only retroactively, but future events 
are likely to change that retroactive assessment in such a way that 
the meaning or significance of the past, even the most recent past, is 
constantly subject to change in light of later anticipated retroactive 
assessments. At any point in time, in other words, something can 
happen which, from the perspective of a later moment, will have 
literally changed the past. 
Edelman’s framework offers an ahistorical and metaphysical 
binary between the present insistence of the negative and the future 
aspiration for meaning. Alternatively, Lacan’s logic of time formulates 
a dialectic between the symbolic order’s contingent closure and this 
closure’s inevitable failure. The fact that knowledge can only fail to 
think through the process of radical change – a thesis, by the way, with 
which Badiou takes issue – doesn’t mean that change never happens. 
On the contrary, it implies the ‘impossible’ possibility that what, in a 
given situation, could never happen can indeed take place at any time. 
In this sense, Edelman’s argument expresses a paradoxical idealism 
of the death drive. It mistakenly assumes that human life can be lived 
‘purely’ on this level; that language can be perfectly reduced to the 
nonsense of what Lacan called lalangue; that social life can be lived 
without the effects of an Other that imposes on human interaction 
not only a horizon of meaning, however contingent, imperfect, 
incomplete or anticipated, but also an ineradicable and unconscious 
transferential dimension of belief. As Žižek endlessly but instructively 
develops Lacan’s thesis, the Other’s powers of determination increase 
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in direct proportion with the denial of our own complicity in its 
effective functioning. 
But there’s a further, even more central, difficulty in Edelman’s 
discussion. This one is not only especially germane to the concerns 
of this book, but also typical of queer theory’s characteristically 
ambivalent flirtation with, and ultimate dismissal of, the category 
of the universal. On one level, the link Edelman posits between the 
death drive and the antisocial aspect of queerness makes tangible 
a horizon of exceptionlessness: no matter what one’s professed 
‘orientation’, sexuality as such grossly oversteps the species function 
of reproduction. This thesis was already fully elaborated by Freud 
in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1922), for example, and further 
developed through what Lacan calls plus-de-jouir (surplus enjoyment). 
On another level, however, Edelman’s discussion is pitched against the 
conceptual couplet of heteronormativity and reproductive futurism. 
In consequence, his celebration of the apolitical value – or anti-value 
– of queerness only gains significance against the backdrop of the 
assumption of the effectiveness of a universe of normative heterosexu-
ality or reproductive sexuality. This assumption is then drawn upon to 
attribute by specious opposition a minoritarian or vanguard edge to 
the queer. 
Although it points in the direction of a place where everyone’s 
sexuality can be defined as queer, Edelman’s notion of queerness, 
like so many others, is ultimately reserved for an elite constituency 
whose members have violated, as he conceives them, the temporal 
terms of reproductive futurism. More concretely, we can presume that 
those homosexuals who have (or have adopted) children will not be 
issued membership cards, despite the fact that their sexualities, just 
as much as the Edelmanian queer’s, overstep the bounds of what is 
required for species survival. In the end, Edelman’s argument winds 
up embracing the ultimate poststructuralist fetish-values of difference 
and particularity. Edelman’s ‘no future’ queerness fails the test of 
universality because its address retains an element of differential 
selectivity by pitting the breeders (and the other types of parent, even 
the ‘queer’ ones) against all the rest. 
Juliet Mitchell argued over 40 years ago that the classical Marxist 
‘dissolution of the family’ thesis à la Friedrich Engels – very 
different from Edelman’s, of course – was both vague and unrealistic. 
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According to Engels, the emancipation of women is dependent on 
the absolute destruction of the family form. Mitchell argued instead 
for a politicisation of the historical forms of the family, recognising, 
in anticipation of her psychoanalytic vocation, that the passionate 
investment of many women in maternity and early childhood would 
never permit the creation of a feminist consensus in favour of a radically 
socialised post-family utopia.11 Indeed, there’s a strange underground 
complicity between the radical humanist anti-familialism of classical 
Marxism and the radically anti- or post-humanist anti-familialist 
nihilism of death drive queer theory. 
By assuming the possibility of a zero-degree social life devoid of any 
form of the family whatsoever, these discourses lie vulnerable to the 
charge of idealism. By contrast, there’s every reason to think that the 
proper socialist goal in this context should be to continue to broaden 
contemporary understandings of the family, and to provide women 
(and men) with the freedom to choose to take up early childhood 
parental responsibilities themselves, or else share them with regulated, 
adequately funded and collectively organised state institutions.12 
Although it’s certainly a useful tool to wield against the ideologues 
of family values, Edelman’s polemic against ‘the Child’ contributes 
precisely nothing to the accomplishment of this socialist goal. 
Last but not least, it must also be said that the elitist minoritarianism 
of Edelman’s discussion is based on a reductive misreading of Lacan’s 
understanding of the universal. A consideration of this misreading will 
help to refine my criticism of Edelman’s provocative and influential 
argument. It will also suggest an alternative interpretation of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, which calls into question Edelman’s attribution to it 
of apolitical and nihilistic consequences. And finally, my alternative 
consideration will present a more orthodox Lacanian idea of the 
unconscious, which lends itself to productive comparison with the 
genericity that characterises Badiou’s idea of political subjectivity. 
In other words, this political subject is indifferent to (phenomenal) 
differences, including those that contemporary discourse links to 
the problematic of sexuality. In the final analysis, psychoanalysis is 
incompatible with the poststructuralist differentialism that informs 
Edelman’s interpretation of it. 
As we’ve already seen, Edelman’s argument insists on the 
particularity of the subject of the unconscious. To support this view, 
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he incorporates into his discussion an extended quote from Lacan’s 
relatively well-known seminar on ethics. As he does elsewhere in 
his teaching, in this seminar Lacan links his concept of the subject to 
an idea of truth. In the passage Edelman extracts, Lacan associates 
this truth with the term Wunsch, which Freud uses to describe the 
unconscious wish that dreams, for instance, serve at once to express 
and to disguise. 
Lacan’s general point in the passage is that this wish is immune to the 
moral judgments imposed by the socially mediated ego, which upholds 
the ‘civilised sexual morality’ that the subject will interiorise by means 
of its specific social identifications. This is why Lacan qualifies the wish 
as ‘irreducible’, obeying not a ‘universal’, but rather ‘the most particular 
of laws’.13 Edelman takes Lacan’s pronouncement to imply that this 
‘stubborn particularity’ in the subject – there’s no question that Lacan 
on one level emphasises the Wunsch’s ‘abnormal’ idiosyncrasy – ‘voids 
every notion of a general good’, in fact qualifying any reference to a 
‘positive social value’ (6) as unjustified and unjustifiable. 
Unfortunately, however, Edelman leaves the rest of the quoted 
passage from Lacan’s seminar without comment. Although the 
Wunsch, Lacan continues, follows a particular law reflecting the ego of 
an individual subject, he insists that it is ‘universal’ nonetheless. Why? 
For the straightforward reason that ‘this particularity is to be found in 
every human being’ (6). 
The logical flaw in Edelman’s discussion lies in his undialectical 
assumption that an assertion of particularity automatically negates 
the validity of all constructions of universality. In other words, the 
category of the universal for Edelman must convey a positive predicate 
that applies to all the objects to which this category aspires to refer. By 
contrast, the quotation from Lacan reveals that the psychoanalyst has 
put into operation a different, properly negative, concept of universality, 
one which grounds, so to speak, the concept of the subject with the 
premise that all particular subjects share the same estrangement from 
themselves – an opacity with respect to their own desires. What is 
universal in subjectivity is that all subjects have in common the fact 
that they have mistakenly taken themselves to correspond with the 
markers of social identity with which they have chosen to affiliate. 
There’s a precise correspondence here with Badiou’s concept of the 
subject as it relates to politics. In error, we map our subjectivities in 
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accordance with the reference points of the hegemonic social values in 
circulation in a given situation of discourse. At any moment, however, 
an event can happen that will address itself to us not as individuals 
– individuals with this or that ‘sexuality’, for example – but rather as 
particular incarnations of a generic humanity. This event calls us to 
rerecognise ourselves, as it were, or perhaps to derecognise ourselves, 
as participants in the elaboration of the consequences of an evanescent 
truth. If we allow it, if we overcome our resistance to it, this truth – the 
truth of Lacan’s unconscious Wunsch, the truth of Badiou’s political 
event – will radically transform they way we perceive our relation to 
the social world. 
What Comes After Queer Theory? Generic Immortality
The temporal dialectic that emerges out of psychoanalysis, and which 
we can now relate to Badiou’s doctrine of the idea, contrasts sharply 
with the distinction we find in Edelman’s work between an investment 
in the future and its nihilistic negation. The psychoanalytic position, 
initially developed by Freud, distinguishes rather between the finitude 
of ontogenetic or individual life – in other words, the ‘natural’ cycle of 
life and death – and the phylogenetic or infinite immortality of what I 
earlier called humanity’s inhuman essence. 
In simpler language, I refer here to the deathly persistence of life 
beyond the limits of (biological) life itself. Significantly, this irreducible 
dimension of human life beyond the Freudian pleasure principle is also 
presented by psychoanalysis as a generic attribute, one which straddles 
the otherwise unbridgeable chasm of sexual difference. Subjects on 
both sides of the sexuation divide are equally in excess of a merely 
animal self-preservative ‘instinct’, which fails to stop the living being 
from being capable of existing not for an ideal, but rather for an idea. 
I’d like to argue in this final section that in its most valuable and 
provocative moments, queer theory discourse has tried to suggest 
an understanding of queerness that closely resembles this psycho-
analytic-Badiouian thesis about a generic and immanent human 
immortality. Edelman’s work represents one significant attempt to 
link what psychoanalysis understands by the death drive to the queer 
problematic. The problem, however, is that far from suggesting what 
Edelman elaborates under the ‘no future’ banner, the death drive 
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introduces a realm we can describe in precisely opposite terms. Beyond 
Freud’s pleasure principle, in other words, there lies not the nihilistic 
negation of any future for humanity whatsoever, but rather the 
emancipatory affirmation of humanity’s excess over itself, an excess 
that is properly eternal in nature. If there’s no future, in other words, 
it’s because this future is not merely already (potentially) here, but also 
always has been, and always will be. 
Now, the relatively recent and seemingly improbable ascendancy of 
interest in Badiou’s work in Anglophone academic circles – secondary 
works and especially translations have now appeared in unprecedented 
number and with accelerating speed – is surely not unrelated to the 
remarkable clarity and single mindedness with which he mercilessly 
denounces the traitorous compromises and shameful rationalisa-
tions of so much contemporary thought. Badiou accomplishes this 
amazing feat by developing an ambitious and breathtakingly original 
alternative to the endlessly recycled poststructuralist theoretical 
commonplaces of the past three or four decades, which seem to 
become all the more familiar and predictable the more emphatically 
a ‘post’ to poststructuralism is proclaimed. Because of hegemonic 
queer theory’s impeccable poststructuralist credentials, the possibility 
presents itself to read Badiou’s work as a critique of queer discourse’s 
most deep-seated assumptions. 
And yet, Badiou’s philosophy amounts to more than a mere reaction 
to poststructuralist clichés. Indeed, it polemicises against what it seems 
to understand as a mostly German or Frankfurt notion of critique 
for offering no positive alternative. Systematically, Badiou subverts 
all the dominant motifs of late twentieth-century cultural theory: 
the all-encompassing text is ruptured by the unforeseeable event; 
the thick historicity of genealogical temporality (not to mention the 
queer-nihilist negation of any and all futurity) is halted by immanent 
emanations of the eternal; the heterogeneous relativism of an infinity 
of cultural systems is thrust aside as a self-evident banality in favour of 
politicised sameness and universality; the post-epistemological assault 
on knowledge succumbs to the heroic counterattack of truth; and the 
omnipresent discursive or social construction of reality is supplanted 
by a seemingly preposterous mathematical ontology. No, Badiou 
retorts to those irrational Heideggerians and their mystical cult of the 
pre-Socratics: to come closer to being you must read Plato and Georg 
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Cantor; learn about the immanentisation of infinity, not to mention 
the mathematically revolutionary invention of transfinite numbers 
and set theory.
The polemical frame of Badiou’s recent major text Logics of Worlds 
elaborates an explicitly doctrinaire distinction between his own project 
– redescribed as a materialist dialectic – and what he calls democratic 
materialism, a rubric which, for heuristic purposes, can be rendered 
loosely in the Anglo-American theoretical idiom as ‘French post-
structuralism’ – the very same poststructuralism that has decisively 
impacted elite queer theory. Badiou announces what he understands 
by democratic materialism with an axiom offered on the very first 
page of the book: ‘There are only bodies and languages’.14 The body 
in democratic materialism is the animal body that enjoys and suffers; 
that eats, defecates, makes love, and dies. It’s a body stripped of all that 
which ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ have suggested in the philosophical tradition; 
a machinic body of production weighed down by the factual, the 
pragmatic, the commercial. 
For Badiou, a notion of naked life construed as survival or 
endurance becomes the supreme value in democratic materialism. 
It underscores a pernicious ideology of human rights. This ideology 
reduces humanity to its capacity to become victimised, marginalising 
in the process the human powers of creation and innovation. Further, 
the idea of naked or animal life nurtures a vacuous relativism, which 
imprisons human groups within the bounds of their culturally defined 
difference. The properly pathetic assumption at work here is that 
human accomplishment is limited to what can be envisaged within 
the parameters of traditional life-worlds. The rhetoric of tolerance 
fomented by this relativism fails to disguise a hypocritical totalitarian-
ism: those who will not tolerate tolerance are obliterated by a potent 
mix of military power and international law. 
For its part, language is less conspicuous in Badiou’s evocation of 
democratic materialism. Yet, the dominant role played by structuralist 
linguistics and its subsequent deconstruction in Anglo-American 
literary and cultural theory, combined with the (to some extent) 
analogous influence of ideas of language on twentieth-century 
philosophical discourses – both ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ – makes 
plain the strange exoticism of Badiou’s recourse to the history of 
mathematics to support the weight of his philosophical project. 
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Badiou’s mathematical ontology, together with the formal logical 
language he elaborates in the view of founding a radically non-subjective 
study of the realm of appearances – a phenomenology, in that 
precise sense – even calls into question the relation of his project to 
psychoanalysis, and more specifically to Lacanian psychoanalysis. This 
remains the case despite two facts: first, that Badiou will routinely, and 
quite performatively, name Lacan as one of his ‘masters’; and second, 
that Lacan himself invokes the language of mathematics, although 
not without ambivalence, as the ‘ideal’ for his own intervention into 
the fraught legacy of Freud. At any rate, the valorisation of logical 
and mathematic ‘language’ in both Badiou and Lacan puts welcome 
pressure on the virtually universal queer assumption concerning the 
embeddedness of sexuality in language or discourse – that is, in the 
construction and deconstruction of meaning. 
Both the poststructuralist discourse on language and the language 
of ‘discourse’ in Foucault’s sense of the term commit two mortal sins 
for Badiou – pun fully intended. First, they privilege the realms of 
language-signification (il n’y a pas de hors-texte) and discourse-power 
(biopolitics) over the disruptive and exceptional event. Not only 
does the event break radically with both language and discourse in 
these precise senses. Also, the event, potentially, grants us properly 
subjective access to a truth both eternal and universal in its address. 
Second, poststructuralist language-discourse has the perhaps coun-
terintuitive tendency to reduce the human being to ‘life’, a life which 
must remain ignorant of the immortal excess that defines humanity 
for Badiou, as it does for psychoanalysis. This excess is what makes 
the human being capable of persevering through an act of faith in the 
invigorating promise of an idea. To be sure, this perseverance can 
persist beyond the limit that defends the value of self-preservation. 
The essence, as it were, of humanity is therefore not its merely animal 
attributes – its various physiological and sexual needs; its physical and 
psychological vulnerabilities; its appurtenance to the laws of nature 
– but rather a properly immortal supplement, which life itself can’t 
account for. In other words, a human life is fully capable of holding 
on to forms of being that don’t register in life’s own terms. Badiou 
affirms a subjectivity that can cling to their truth and trace their points 
of consequence more than it clings, as one says, to life itself.
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This idea of an immortal essence in the human by which the human 
can immanently transcend itself is hardly new. Badiou traces it to Plato’s 
eternal ideas. But it also, very conspicuously, characterises numerous 
religious traditions, including of course Christianity. Badiou’s 
discourse on immortality can helpfully be read as a materialist and 
explicitly atheist (as opposed to secular) reinterpretation of theological 
discourses about eternal life. Pascal, for example, developed the idea 
that one can be reborn in faith for all eternity in the here-and-now; that 
resurrection is something that happens before you die. 
Although the Christian motif of rebirth has been appropriated by 
conservative and fundamentalist sects, which function more or less as 
profit-driven corporations, the idea is surely too valuable to abandon 
to the reactionaries. Indeed, the transformative experience of resubjec-
tivation developed in Badiou’s philosophy teaches precisely the same 
lesson taught by the subtractive, de-individuating, and incorporative 
message articulated by Paul in the earliest days of Christianity. Lacan, 
too, oriented his teaching around an idea of the subjectivating effects 
of an inhuman, transpersonal cause (la cause freudienne), effectively 
inviting his followers to devote their lives to it. 
In the psychoanalytic literature, the most consequential meditation 
on the uncanny complexities of life and death is surely Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (1920). In this text, Freud makes a heroic attempt to 
come to terms with this immortal and inhuman essence of humanity. 
Two years after the end of the Great War’s unspeakable carnage, 
the psyche’s insistent revisitation of unpleasurable experiences had 
become all too evident to anyone involved with the care of returning 
military personnel. 
Traumatic neurosis, but also and primarily the transference neuroses, 
and then finally primary masochism and its conversion to sadism, 
all convinced Freud that the pleasure reference will never suffice to 
define the human subject. Enlisted for the organism’s self-preserva-
tion, what Freud called ego libido runs up against an object-oriented 
drive. This latter variety of libido is the one which, for Freud, compels 
the organism onto the terrain of what we commonly understand as 
sexuality. Of course, this sexuality can result in reproduction, but also, 
not uncommonly in the broadest historical and epidemiological terms, 
in death. At the heart of life, then, Freud discovers the antinomy of 
individual life and species life: sexual reproduction – that is to say, 
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species immortality – comes at the cost of the individual organism’s 
longevity. This remains the case across the broadest range of natural 
or biological life, to which Freud, on this level at least, considered 
humanity to belong. 
The life and death antinomy in Freud’s text is informed by the work 
of late nineteenth-century German evolutionary biologist August 
Weismann. It was Weismann who argued that living substance is 
divided on the cellular level between a mortal soma (body) and an 
immortal ‘germ-plasm’. Clearly, Freud saw a connection to his own 
distinction between death instincts and life instincts. In the end, 
however, Freud breaks from Weismann’s thesis. He couldn’t agree with 
the biologist’s contention that since unicellular organisms, innocent of 
the soma/germ-plasm split, must be immortal, death comes late onto 
the scene of evolutionary history, and is therefore not inherent in life 
as such. 
Like his theories of sexuality and sexual difference, then, Freud’s 
theory of the death instinct is explicitly offered as an alternative to the 
properly biological understandings available in the early twentieth 
century. This remains the case despite the complicating fact that Freud 
also expressed hope that a biological explanation for the death instinct 
might one day be discovered. Beyond the Pleasure Principle struggles 
towards the conclusion that the paradoxically deathly immortal 
kernel of humanity is disjoined from any biological or evolutionary 
function. Viewed as the traumatic insistence of senseless jouissance, of 
the body’s ceaseless bombardment of the mind with (representations 
of ) an excessive and purposeless libidinal excitation, death not only 
inheres in life as such, but also defiantly resists rendering as a horizon 
of meaning of any moral, evolutionary or even biological nature. 
Lacan draws attention to these paradoxes of Freud’s discourse 
on death in the same Rome Discourse I referred to above. In this 
text, Lacan further develops the psychoanalytic commentary on the 
properly biological definition of life. Specifically, Lacan elaborates on 
the notion that life and death entertain what he calls a ‘polar relation’ 
– a relation of interdependency, that is – in the very midst of biological 
phenomena that have been understood rather to distinguish life 
from death.15 
To support this idea, Lacan refers to the origin of modern biological 
science in the late eighteenth-century work of Marie-François-Xavier 
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Bichat. Quite simply, Bichat defined life as the set of vital forces 
that resist death. Hardly unlike Freud with his idea of Eros, Harvard 
physiologist Walter Bradford Cannon refined this definition in the 
early 1930s by associating life with the principle of homeostasis, which 
he viewed as a general vital function in the organism that regulates 
its own physiological equilibrium. Lacan takes these examples from 
classical biology and physiology to support an explicitly dialectical 
understanding according to which life can’t be conceived without 
positing an opposing force that tries to thwart it. Referencing 
Heidegger, Lacan qualifies this deathly force as ‘a possibility’ which is 
‘absolutely proper, unconditional, unsurpassable, certain, and as such 
indeterminate [indéterminée]’ for the subject defined in its historicity. 
Lacan summarises his point by describing Freud’s death ‘instinct’ as 
‘the limit of the historical function of the subject’ (261–2). 
It’s clear that Lacan enlists these authorities in the biological and 
physiological sciences to buttress Freud’s basic notion about duelling 
forces of life and death in the human organism. However, he adds a 
crucial distinction. Modern science situates death’s resistance to life 
in the biologically conceived organism itself, defining this resistance 
as a disruptive counterprinciple weaved into the fibre of humanity’s 
natural being. To develop an alternative psychoanalytic approach 
to the problem, Lacan returns to Freud’s concept of repetition. For 
Lacan, death isn’t a properly biological function of the organism. 
Death, rather, with its associated ‘drive’, is a consequence of the 
living being’s subjection to language, to the signifier. When he plays 
that famous game with the cotton reel, working through the mother’s 
traumatic absence with the help of a primordial and binary signifying 
structure (fort-da), the infant gains a modicum of mastery over nature 
by ‘murdering the thing’ (319). Also, he commits his destiny to the 
workings of a symbolic order that will forever exceed the limitations of 
his conscious knowledge. 
Already by 1953, Lacan had recognised in the subject’s subjection 
to the symbol something he called the ‘eternalization’ (319) of this 
subject’s desire. In choosing this word, Lacan didn’t wish merely to 
qualify desire as incessant and inexhaustible, although it certainly 
possesses both of those qualities. More radically, he meant to say 
that desire, on the level of what he calls its real, immanently lifts the 
subject out of the constraints of life; separates this subject from the 
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chronological and teleological historicity of human time. For Lacan, 
desire accomplishes this not by negating the future, as Edelman would 
have it, but rather by affirming a sort of background or underground 
non-temporality – eternity, in other words. In this way, Lacan 
introduces a crucial distinction between phenomenal time – not just 
chronological time, but also lived time, Bergsonian durée – and the 
non-time of desire’s real. As Freud said about negation, time doesn’t 
exist in the unconscious. 
But Lacan goes even further. Our apparent enslavement to the 
signifier, in other words the signifier’s deathly traversal of human 
biological life, emancipates us from the Other’s – the master’s – desire. 
This is so because the master’s menace of death will fall on deaf ears in 
the being who chooses to ‘enjoy the fruits of its servitude’ (320). 
It’s perhaps in this decidedly Hegelian mode that Lacan’s discourse, 
unexpectedly perhaps, approaches most suggestively Badiou’s concept 
of immortality. Desire in its most radical form, the real of desire 
that delivers us onto the threshold of the drive, discloses that ‘life’ 
in all it implies by way of compromise, accommodation, conformity, 
adaptation, equilibrium, reconciliation, isn’t everything. It’s not-all, 
we could say, in reference to the logic of feminine being. 
In this context, the master is the subject who defines and upholds 
the terms of life; separates what can legitimately be lived from what is 
condemned to deathly nonexistence. Lacan’s Hegelian message is that 
the master’s definition of life is binding only for the subject who fails, 
as it were, to read between the lines. Despite what it incessantly tells 
you, life need neither be swallowed whole, nor taken on its own terms. 
As long as you aren’t put off by its deathly look, there most decidedly 
is ‘more to life than this’. 
Despite the considerable differences that distinguish their discourses, 
Lacan and Badiou equally aim to subvert the understanding that limits 
what we view life to be to the level of the ordinary or the everyday. 
This is the understanding that considers life the stuff of unexceptional, 
workaday experience, governed by the logic of what merely appears. 
Such a life is necessarily complicit with the varieties of production that 
can only reproduce the status quo. At a variety of points in their work, 
both thinkers distinguish where they locate their privileged concepts 
– the real for Lacan, being and the event for Badiou – from the 
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dimensions of opinion, commerce, representation, ideology, spectacle 
or even politics understood as a popular or consensual good. 
Both thinkers have been similarly reproached for nurturing a sort 
of neo-aristocratic ideal of heroic exceptionalism. Terry Eagleton, for 
example, has sceptically quipped that Badiou’s idea of love refers to 
something that can only happen on the romantic streets of Paris.16 Yet 
Lacan and Badiou insist, in their respective idioms, that the privileged 
realm they seek to define is accessed neither through some humanistic 
or intentional exercise of will, nor through some gesture of sacrifice, 
abnegation or renunciation. Most crucially, access to this realm 
requires no specific qualities of status, personhood or subjectivity.
To be sure, the ‘point by point’ development of the consequences 
of a truth in Badiou, or else the refusal to give way on one’s desire in 
Lacan, necessitate something like work or effort, something other than 
pure abandonment to a will or power in the realm of alterity. But, on 
another level, the event as such, or the (missed) encounter with the 
real, simply happen: their occurrence is on one level utterly indifferent 
to what this or that person might make of them. Indeed, Lacan and 
Badiou share the anti-humanist view that when it comes to what 
should be done – ethics, that is – remaining open to the encounter 
with the real, or the maintenance of fidelity to a truth, have the effect 
of wrenching oneself from oneself, of subverting personhood and 
identity by subtracting the subjective function from its circumscription 
by what partakes, ideologically, of meaning or sense. 
The subject is therefore a privileged category for both Lacan and 
Badiou. This subject is neither the humanist subject of intentional 
consciousness, nor the liberal subject of rational self-interest. Lacan’s 
subject is of course the subject of the unconscious; a subject disjoined 
from knowledge and re/presentation. That the Lacanian subject 
is ‘what a signifier represents for another signifier’ can be derived 
analytically from Lacan’s elementary definition of the signifier.17 For 
Badiou, the subject is derived from that feature of the human being 
that’s capable of remaining faithful to a procedure of truth. Individual 
selfhood – including in particular the attachment to what Freud, 
after British anthropologist Ernest Crawley, called the ‘narcissism 
of small differences’18 – is precisely what blocks us from the kind of 
authentic subjectivation to which both psychoanalysis and Badiou’s 
philosophy aspire. Lacan’s Antigone embraces death as an escape 
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from an intolerable world that forbids her from acknowledging her 
brother’s fate. Badiou’s subject, transported by passion for a scientific, 
political, artistic or amorous idea, pursues that idea in a way that grants 
emancipation from the constraints and compromises of worldly self-
interest. 
The human condition presents us – individually, as it were – with 
a choice in regard to which we don’t have the luxury of remaining 
indifferent, sitting on the fence. Essentially, we must choose not 
between life and death, but rather between life and immortality. 
Agnosticism is mere self-deception. Life means existence on the level 
of the ordinary functioning of sociosymbolic relations, or the mundane 
and opinion-based democratic negotiation of antagonistic sets of 
interests. In other words, life is accommodation and conformity. By 
contrast, immortality requires a partisan commitment to pursue desire 
to the point where the law becomes suspended; to remain faithful to 
the real of the Idea and the transformative consequences it presents to 
the world in which it intervenes. But if the choice before us is between 
life and immortality, what becomes of death? 
The death drive is deathly, destructive, pathological, only for the 
neurotic subject of psychoanalysis and the reactive subject of Badiou’s 
philosophy. These are the pseudo-subjects who resist – set up defences 
against – the encounter with enjoyment, with the real of the event in 
any of its manifestations. It’s only from the defensive, ego-predicated 
perspective of life – this term, even more than ‘democracy’, is perhaps 
the most ideologically loaded term of the day – that death appears as 
the end, as the limit beyond which there might be, but maybe not, 
another, better world. 
In truth, death needn’t be the end. It needn’t cause us to proclaim, 
with confident nihilism, that there’s no future. Rather, death is the 
name of the infinity of immanent gateways that open up onto the 
threshold of an always-present arena of immortality open to everyone, 
without exception, on the other side of the queer horizon’s ambivalent 
and exhausted impasse.




 1. For historical accounts of Stonewall and its contexts, which take into 
consideration the link to the socialist tradition, see John D’Emilio, Sexual 
Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the 
United States, 1940–1970, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1998); and Martin Duberman, Stonewall (New York: Penguin, 1994). 
For an example of recent work on the homosexuality question from the 
American socialist left, see Sherry Wolf, Sexuality and Socialism: History, 
Politics and Theory of LGTB Liberation (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2004).
 2. For an example of the former, see Donald E. Hall, Queer Theories (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). For an example of the latter, see Rebecca 
Beirne, ed., Televising Queer Women: A Reader, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012).
 3. See in particular Janet Halley and Andrew Parker, eds, After Sex? On 
Writing Since Queer Theory (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011); 
and David M. Halperin and Valerie Traub, eds, Gay Shame (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010).
 4. Much of this last tendency can be traced back to the influence of Leo 
Bersani’s work, in particular his important book Homos (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995). 
 5. Freud develops these contentions in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 
The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
vol. 7 (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), pp. 125–248.
 6. Iain Morland and Annabelle Willox, eds, Queer Theory (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), p. 4.
 7. A truth is ‘indifferent to differences’, writes Badiou; ‘the same for all’. 
Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (London: Verso, 2002), p. 27. 
I further relate Badiou’s deployment of the category of the universal to the 
queer problematic in this book’s last chapter. 
 8. I consider in detail Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the 
Death Drive (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004) in this book’s 
conclusion.
Chapter 1
 1. The former phrase was introduced in Adrienne Rich, ‘Compulsory 
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence’, Blood, Bread, and Poetry (New 
York: Norton, 1994); the latter in Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism 
and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 2006 [1990]).
 2. Iain Morland and Annabelle Willox, eds, Queer Theory (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), p. 3. Further references are incorporated into the text.
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 3. I discuss the psychoanalytic idea of sexual difference in the context of the 
Lacanian clinical work broaching male homosexuality in Chapter 5.
 4. This is the subtitle of one of the sessions of Lacan’s The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (London: Norton, 1998), pp. 149–60.
 5. See for example Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994).
 6. Sarah Ahmed, ‘Orientations: Toward a Queer Phenomenology’, GLQ: 
A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 12.4 (2006): 543–74, p. 543. Further 
references to this article are incorporated into the text. This essay appears 
in expanded form in Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, 
Others (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
 7. See my ‘“You never look at me from where I see you”: Postcolonial Guilt 
in Caché ’, New Formations 70 (Winter 2011): 77–93.
 8. Lacan, ‘The Line and Light’, The Four Fundamental Concepts, pp. 91–104.
 9. See, for example, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ 
(London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 12–16.
10. Bawer develops his conservative but anti-minoritarian argument in 
A Place at the Table: The Gay Individual in American Society (New York: 
Poseidon Press, 1993).
11. Oddly, Ahmed goes on to acknowledge, without providing an explanation, 
that Bawer’s anti-anti-assimilationist strategy might provide the basis for 
‘a new angle on queer politics’ (569). She does this, however, without 
retracting her allegation that this strategy amounts to a normalising and 
regressive project of ‘assimilationism’ (568). It would seem that the onus 
is on Ahmed to go one way or the other. 
12. Simone de Beauvoir famously develops this argument, laying blame at 
the feet of both the patriarchy and women’s narcissistic complicity in their 
own victimisation. See The Second Sex, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila 
Malovany-Chevallier (New York: Vintage, 2011).
13. A member of the so-called antisocial wave of queer theory, Halberstam’s 
argument can be found in her book In A Queer Time and Place: Transgender 
Bodies, Subcultural Lives (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 
pp. 152–3.
14. Deleuze and Guattari write about lines of flight in their development 
of the concept of the rhizome in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (London: Continuum, 2001), pp. 9–10.
15. See the section ‘The Minoritarian Temptation’ in my The World of 
Perversion: Psychoanalysis and the Impossible Absolute of Desire (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2006), pp. 184–90.
16. See Foucault, ‘The Repressive Hypothesis’, in The History of Sexuality: An 
Introduction (New York: Vintage, 1990), pp. 17–49.
17. Sedgwick, ‘Melanie Klein and the Difference Affect Makes’, in Janet 
Halley and Andrew Parker, eds, After Sex? On Writing Since Queer Theory 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), p. 293. Further references 
to this essay in that volume are incorporated into the text.
18. I follow Slavoj Žižek in choosing this term over the alternative 
‘symptomatic’, rendered vague through misapplication and overuse. 
‘Symptomal’ as I use it refers to the dissimulated enjoyment that supports 
Penney T02732 01 text   198 08/10/2013   08:16
notes
199
a sociosymbolic identification by paradoxically violating or transgressing 
the ideal it upholds. To take a classic example, the thematic of freedom 
and democracy in American foreign policy has been unofficially, although 
not so secretly, accompanied by direct military support of anti-democratic 
tyrants in Latin America, Africa, West Asia and beyond. 
19. Agamben’s development of the biopower concept can be found in Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1998).
20. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2007), p. xviii. Further references are 
incorporated into the text.
21. Puar quotes from Kaplan’s article ‘Violent Belongings and the Question of 
Empire Today: Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, 
October 17, 2003’, American Quarterly 56.1 (March 2004): 1–18. 
22. See Agamben’s State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2005).
Chapter 2
 1. ‘(Queer) Theory and the Universal Alternative’, diacritics 32.2 (Summer 
2002): 1–18. I should add that after seven years of Tory rule under the 
reprehensible Stephen Harper, it’s become significantly more difficult to 
direct that smug, nation-defining look southward from Canada.
 2. I single out Laclau and Mouffe in acknowledgment of the centrality of 
their Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic 
Politics (New York: Verso, 1985) to the realignment of Marxist discourse 
in response to late twentieth-century social change. Further references are 
incorporated into the text.
 3. ‘Themselves’ and ourselves, I should add, since I see no other way to 
describe my relation to the phenomenon under discussion.
 4. See Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1983). I discuss Deleuze and Guattari’s impact on 
Guy Hocquenghem’s work in Chapter 4.
 5. In his fascinating, career-assessing dialogues with Castro, Ignacio Ramonet 
poses the question of ‘repressive behaviour against homosexuals’ in the 
early days of the Cuban revolution. In his answer, Castro explains that 
there were three categories of persons who weren’t called up for military 
service in those vulnerable days, one of which was homosexuals. As an 
alternative to military service, these persons were sent to work in UMAPs 
(Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción). ‘I can guarantee you that 
there was no persecution of homosexuals’, Castro says, ‘or internment 
camps for homosexuals’. He adds that ‘machismo was an element that was 
very much present in our society, and there was still widespread rejection 
of the idea of homosexuals serving in military units’. The exemption of 
homosexuals from military service exacerbated homophobic prejudice 
in Cuba at the time. See Fidel Castro (with Ignacio Ramonet), My Life 
(London: Penguin, 2008), pp. 222–3.
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 6. For detailed analysis of key exceptions to this rule, see Chapter 3. One 
can further mention Rosa Luxemburg, Clara Zetkin, Alexandra Kollontai 
and Herbert Marcuse; and from among those still writing, Jonathan 
Dollimore, Teresa Ebert, Danae Clark, Toril Moi, John d’Emilio and 
David Horowitz. 
 7. See Butler, ‘Arguing with the Real’, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive 
Limits of ‘Sex’ (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 187–222.
 8. Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 2000), 
p. 49. Further references are incorporated into the text.
 9. Laclau and Mouffe wrote, for example, that ‘the basic obstacle [to the left’s 
capacity for action and political analysis] has been classism: that is to say, 
the idea that the working class represents the privileged agent in which the 
fundamental impulse of social change resides’ (77). I’m hardly the first to 
suggest that, rather than simply discard the concept of the working class, 
we should work towards the delineation of the socioeconomic transfor-
mations under late capitalism that have changed its content, in particular 
the explosion of casual service labour. To be retained is the basic 
Marxian assumption that the most objectively potentially revolutionary 
constituency is the one most concretely disenfranchised in a given social 
formation. The question then becomes: what is the socioeconomic 
content, at the present historical juncture, of the concept ‘working class’? 
10. Introduced in 1999 during Socialist Lionel Jospin’s presidency, PACS 
is an acronym for Pacte civil de solidarité, a legal union which, since its 
introduction, has been revised to approximate more closely the terms of 
civil marriage. Inequalities exist still in the areas of the sharing of social 
benefits and the rights of partners of the deceased. My point, however, 
relates rather to the very need for a separate legal category for homosexual 
marriage. The closer the content of the two forms becomes, the more their 
continued separate existence gains in absurdity. 
11. Butler, Antigone’s Claim: Kinship between Life and Death (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 2. Further references are incorporated 
into the text.
12. I offer a more detailed analysis of Lacan’s reading of Antigone via Freud’s 
theory of hysteria, Kant’s analytic of the beautiful and Sade’s conception 
of crime in ‘The Guardian of Criminal Being’, The World of Perversion: 
Psychoanalysis and the Impossible Absolute of Desire (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2006), pp. 139–72.
13. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book 7. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: Norton, 1992), p. 283, my emphasis.
14. I deliberately avoid the term ‘sex-positive’, which implies quite 
nonsensically that one can choose a position on sex, no pun intended, for 
or against.
15. Of course, I don’t mean to say that so-called advanced societies have 
eliminated sexual violence. My point is rather that we too often forget 
that in many parts of the world, sex is lived in a general sense as violence, 
from cultural contexts that normalise the most radical forms of female 
circumcision to military occupations, such as the American one in Iraq or 
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the Israeli one in the West Bank, that institutionalise forms of sexualised 
torture and humiliation.
Chapter 3
 1. I’m thinking in particular of such figures as Dennis Altman, Martin 
Duberman and John D’Emilio.
 2. Ebert, Ludic Feminism and After: Postmodernism, Desire and Labor in Late 
Capitalism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
 3. Butler, ‘Gender is Burning: Questions of Appropriation and Subversion’, 
Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ (London: Routledge, 
1993), pp. 121–42.
 4. Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990), pp. 17–35. Further references are incorporated into the 
text. 
 5. See my The World of Perversion: Psychoanalysis and the Impossible Absolute of 
Desire (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), pp. 2–10. 
 6. See, for example, Chrysanthi Nigianni and Merl Storr, eds, Deleuze and 
Queer Theory (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2009).
 7. Marcuse, ‘The Conquest of the Unhappy Consciousness: Repressive 
Desublimation’, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced 
Industrial Society (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), pp. 59–86.
 8. Freud, ‘Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness’, The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
vol. 9 (London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974). For a presentation of the 
Lacanian approach, see Todd McGowan, The End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques 
Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2004). 
 9. Floyd, The Reification of Desire: Toward a Queer Marxism (London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2009), p. 7. Further references are 
incorporated into the text.
10. A version of this paper appeared in New Left Review 227 (Jan–Feb 1998).
11. I further develop this last point in the final section of this chapter.
12. See Chapter 1 for a detailed discussion of Laclau and Mouffe and the 
post-Marxist current in political theory.
13. Henry Abelove, Michele Ana Barale and David M. Halperin, eds, The Gay 
and Lesbian Studies Reader (London: Routledge, 1993).
14. Morton, The Material Queer: A Lesbigay Cultural Studies Reader (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 1. Further references are incorporated into 
the text.
15. Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990), p. 1.
16. See 1917 Collective, ‘Capitalism and Homophobia: Marxism and the 
Struggle for Gay/Lesbian Rights’, The Material Queer, pp. 369–79. 
17. I take up this argument’s significance for the end of queer theory in this 
book’s conclusion.
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18. Mieli, Homosexuality and Liberation: Elements of a Gay Critique (London: 
Gay Men’s Press, 1980), p. 208. Further references are incorporated into 
the text.
19. Lane, ‘Mieli’s Transsexual Aesthetic’. I’m grateful to the author for 
providing me with the unpublished original English-language version of 
his paper.
20. I provide my own detailed discussion of these Freudian concepts in the 
context of a reading of Guy Hocquenghem’s work in the next chapter.
21. Nina Power insightfully develops this notion for materialist feminism 
in her provocative and important One-Dimensional Woman (London: O 
Books, 2009).
22. See Zupančič, ‘Addendum: On Love and Comedy’, The Shortest Shadow: 
Nietzsche’s Philosophy of the Two (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 
pp. 164–82.
Chapter 4
 1. This is not to say that Hocquenghem’s text has had a deep impact on 
sexuality theory in France. Indeed, it has long since been out of print in 
the original French.
 2. As developed in this book’s introduction, by poststructuralist queer theory 
I broadly refer to what’s become the dominant stream of contemporary 
sexuality theory in the English-speaking world, as elaborated by such 
figures as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Judith Butler and David Halperin, 
for example. Though this discourse is far from monolithic, it features a 
number of common assumptions, the most important of which is the idea 
that sexuality is a construction of discourse and/or power. I discuss in 
detail how Hocquenghem’s view contrasts with the poststructuralist line 
in the following paragraphs.
 3. Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
1993), p. 73. Further references are incorporated into the text.
 4. Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1990), p. 1. Further references are incorporated into the text.
 5. Marshall, Guy Hocquenghem: Theorizing the Gay Nation (London: Pluto 
Press, 1996), p. 6.
 6. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 27n. Further 
references are incorporated into the text.
 7. Lacan, ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the 
Freudian Unconscious’, Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 
2006), p. 689.
 8. Gary Genosko’s edited volume The Guattari Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1996) informatively develops the impact of antipsychiatry on Guattari’s 
writing and clinical practice. 
 9. For a development of this argument, see Russell Jacoby’s classic study 
Social Amnesia: A Critique of Contemporary Psychology (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Transaction, 1997 [1975]).
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10. Freud, ‘Repression’ (1915), The Standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 14 (London: Hogarth Press, 
1953–1974), p. 152. Further references are incorporated into the text.
11. Freud, ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ (1914), SE vol. 14, p. 94. Further 
references are incorporated into the text.
12. See in particular the concluding ‘Summary’ of Freud’s Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality (1905–1925), SE vol. 7, pp. 231–43.
13. Lacan, ‘The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis’ (London: 
Norton, 1998), pp. 165–6.
14. Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII. The Other Side of 
Psychoanalysis (London: Norton, 2007), p. 89.
Chapter 5
 1. In particular, see Butler, ‘Arguing with the Real’, Bodies that Matter: On the 
Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 187–222.
 2. See Salecl, ed. Sexuation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000); 
Joël Dor, Structure et perversions (Paris: Denoël, 1987); and Jean Clavreul, 
Le désir et la loi (Paris: Denoël, 1987). For my book review response to the 
Salecl edited volume, see Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society 6.1 (Spring 
2001): 151–4. 
 3. Dean, Beyond Sexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 
p. 267. Further references are incorporated into the text. 
 4. Lacan, ‘The Signification of the Phallus’, Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (New 
York: Norton, 2006), p. 576.
 5. Lacan, Encore: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, trans. Bruce Fink 
(New York: Norton, 1999), p. 71.
 6. Indeed, if we consider Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the 
Closet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990) to be one of 
its foundational texts, queer theory’s very origins are marked by the 
censorship of this question, its relegation to a zone safely out of bounds 
(40–1). When the politicisation of sexuality reaches the point where 
it explicitly discourages intellectual interrogation for fear of phobic 
appropriation, it has, in my view, gone too far. Over two decades since 
the publication of Sedgwick’s text, anti-homophobic criticism has surely 
reached a state of maturity at which resistance to such facile political 
posturing is no longer subject to accusations of ‘internalised homophobia’ 
and complicity with heterosexism. 
 7. Serge André, L’Imposture perverse (Paris: Le Seuil, 1993), p. 33. Further 
references are incorporated into the text. All translations are my own; the 
original French is provided in brackets when helpful. 
 8. Freud, ‘Fetishism’ (1927), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 21, ed. and trans. James Strachey et. al. 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), p. 154.
 9. As Lacan writes in ‘The Signification of the Phallus’, ‘the fact that 
femininity finds its refuge in this mask [which “dominates the identifica-
tions in which refusals of demand are resolved”] by virtue of the fact of 
the Verdrängung inherent in the phallic mark of desire, has the curious 
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consequence of making virile display in the human being itself seem 
feminine’ (291).
10. Bersani, Homos (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 131. 
Further references are incorporated into the text.
11. Freud, ‘The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex’, SE vol. 19, p. 178.
12. See Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2007). I consider this text in detail in Chapter 
1.
13. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts, pp. 272–3. I develop an extended 
discussion of the significance of Lacan’s distinction between the two terms 
in The Structures of Love: Art and Politics beyond the Transference (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2012). 
Chapter 6
 1. Freud, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (1905), The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 7, 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1953–1974), p. 60.
 2. ‘It is a great injustice to persecute homosexuality as a crime, and cruelty 
too’, wrote Freud, who goes on to cite the additional approving authority 
of Havelock Ellis. See ‘Letter to an American Mother’, American Journal of 
Psychiatry 107 (1951): 787.
 3. Lacan, ‘Proposition de 67’, Autres écrits (Paris: Seuil, 2001), p. 247. The 
assumption is that the subject concerned is in fact an analyst, which – 
‘analytically’ as it were – assumes the experience of having been analysed. 
 4. Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), p. 9.
 5. It should be noted that despite his emphasis on the banality of difference, 
sexual difference also figures in Badiou’s thought, and should therefore 
be considered a different difference in his work as well. For example, see 
his article ‘What is Love?’, Umbr(a): A Journal of the Unconscious (1996): 
37–53.
 6. See, most significantly, Bersani’s Homos (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1995).
 7. Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2004), p. 2. Further references are incorporated 
into the text.
 8. Žižek’s key book The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology 
(London: Verso, 2000) did much to broaden the readership of these 
French authors in the English-speaking world.
 9. Lacan, ‘The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psycho-Analy-
sis’, Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (London: Norton, 2004), pp. 197–268.
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